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This dissertation examines the relationship between poor, informally housed communities and 
the state in Havana, Cuba, from 1930 to 1965, before and after the first socialist revolution in the 
Western Hemisphere. It challenges the notion of a “great divide” between Republic and 
Revolution by tracing contentious interactions between technocrats, politicians, and financial 
elites on one hand, and mobilized, mostly-Afro-descended tenants and shantytown residents on 
the other hand. The dynamics of housing inequality in Havana not only reflected existing socio-
racial hierarchies but also produced and reconfigured them in ways that have not been 
systematically researched. As the urban poor resisted evictions, they utilized the legal and 
political systems to draw their neighborhoods into contact with the welfare state. Not merely co-
opted by politicians, tenants and shantytown residents claimed housing as a citizenship right and 
played a decisive role in centralizing and expanding state institutions before and after the 1959 
Revolution.  
Far from giving the urban poor free rein over their destinies, however, their tight 
relationships with the Cuban state impelled officials to implement new policies drawn from 
abroad. Public debates over slum clearance reinforced the social-scientific discourse of a “culture 
of poverty” in ways that ultimately blended with the incipient socialist system. This discourse 
was embedded in the most beneficial interventions of the revolutionary welfare state but in ways 
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that perpetuated racism and social exclusion. By the early 1960s, then, slum policy in Havana 
represented a dynamic interaction between residents, social scientists, and state bureaucrats. The 
urban poor shaped the Revolution, even as the Revolution sought to manage them.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
These are capitalists of misery …who, according to the constitution, are as Cuban as any 
others, with equal rights and duties, but who, in reality, are more Cuban than anyone, because 
they have more problems, more misery, more hunger, more sickness, and more abandonment 
than anyone! 
—Pablo de la Torriente Brau, 1935.1 
 
When we got to Las Yaguas, a crowd gathered around us. Seeing it, [Police Chief] 
Ameijeiras said, ‘Let’s organize a committee here so we can help the Revolution together.’ 
A voice called out from the audience, ‘More than we have already?’ 
   —Alexis García, 1969.2 
 
As a US citizen whose acquaintances included government officials on both sides of the Florida 
Straits, John L. Stowers commanded some influence—and in 1940, he turned it to the Havana 
metropolitan area’s eastern edge. Urban passersby could catch hints of Stowers’ wealth in the 
heart of Havana, where an upscale shop bore his name.3 Yet at the city’s periphery, where he 
sought to clear several hundred zinc, palm, and scrap-wood shacks from land he had purchased 
                                                 
1 All translations are mine, except where noted. Pablo de la Torriente Brau, “La escuela publica en Fernando Poo,” Ahora, 
February 13, 1935.  
2 Alexis García is a pseudonym for one of Oscar Lewis’ resident informants, in accordance with requests from the University of 
Illinois. Lewis, Lewis, and Rigdon, Four Men, 95. 
3 “Visite la Casa ‘STOWERS,’” El Mundo, May 31, 1934, 21.  
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in an area called La Hata, circumstances were different. Stowers’ land had been “overrun by 
squatters,” reported US Embassy officials.4  
In facing this particular problem, Stowers was not alone. As he worked through 
municipal courts with support from the US embassy, another US property owner, Walter 
Ebeneezer Dickenson, filed the latest in what would ultimately be 26 years of legal claims 
through which he hoped to regain possession of land to which he held title.5 Several miles south 
of Havana’s new capitol, Cosme de la Torriente, a wealthy Cuban lawyer who served as Cuba’s 
ambassador to the United Nations, joined scores of Cuban title-holders and hundreds of Cuban 
landlords in seeking to remove poor people from their respective properties.6 From the 
presidential palace, US-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista echoed these claims in 1952 and 
proclaimed the need to eliminate impoverished shantytowns from Havana. Slum clearance, he 
said, was for the cultural benefit of Havana’s poor, and for the good of the Cuban nation.7 
Yet to the chagrin of Stowers, de la Torriente, and Dickenson, little came of their efforts. 
In the face of political mobilization, legal maneuvers, and street protests, their eviction attempts 
were frustrated. The shacks remained. In the meantime, the land de la Torriente had purchased 
grew famous for the actions of people he called “indigents.” Inspired by its maze of palm-bark 
huts, it was given a new name, Las Yaguas, which appeared on no property title. Residents were 
active, daring, and organized. Frequently speaking to the national press, Rufino González, a 
black man, was the shantytown’s locally designated “mayor.”  
                                                 
4 La Hata is referred to alternatively as “La Hata” and “La Jata,” because of its US owner. I refer to the neighborhood as La Hata, 
which is the official name in the present day. Albert Nufer to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1947, RG59/837.52/5-247, United 
States National Archive (hereafter USNA). 
5 “Interesado el Ministro Pardo Jiménez. Pretende resolver el desahucio én Quemados,” El Sol, May 7, 1955, 1. 
6 See chapters 3 and 5.  
7 See Batista’s comments in Enrique Pizzi de Porras, “Quiero que todos los cubanos vivan la vida digna a que tienen derecho,” 
Bohemia, April 27, 1952, Supplement, 8-11. 
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Then, in 1963, four years after an unlikely group of radical guerrilla fighters had taken 
hold of the levers of state power and two years after Fidel Castro had declared Cuba to be home 
to the first socialist system in the Western Hemisphere, Las Yaguas was eradicated. With their 
possessions loaded into trucks, their shacks demolished, their community divided, residents were 
moved into modern, concrete houses equipped with new furniture and running water and set in 
seven new subdivisions on the outskirts of the city. There, they were connected to social workers 
who promised cultural redemption and to institutions that promised political incorporation.  
Shantytown residents, a state publication boldly declared, “are Cubans too.”8 
What twists and turns marked this unlikely path between John Stowers, a wealthy 
foreigner, Rufino González, a black shantytown mayor of humble circumstances, and Fidel 
Castro, leader of the Cuban Revolution? What conflicts? Existing historiography offers few 
clues. Within several decades, slum clearance in Havana was transformed from a gold-plated 
aspiration of moneyed foreigners to a celebrated reform of an incipient socialist welfare state, all 
against a backdrop of popular mobilization. Yet the specific contingencies of this transformation, 
its continuities and ruptures, have not been systematically researched.  
Existing scholarship on housing in Cuba has confronted a wider problem in twentieth- 
century Cuban historiography—what Pérez-Stable calls the “great divide” separating the 
Republic from the Revolution.9 Because of its geopolitical significance, its radicalization, and 
the efforts of government leaders to delineate the new system from the old, the Revolution has 
found in the Republic its most reliable foil. Studies of the Republic are more than mere studies, 
then, since claims about the republican past are often implicitly linked to the Revolution’s 
                                                 
8 Gustavo Aguirre, “También son cubanos,” INRA 1, no. 3 (1960): 36-37. 
9 Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, xi.  
  4 
achievements.10 In this comparative framework, it is difficult to overstate the emphasis on urban 
poverty as a problem left unresolved by the Republic. The lack of studies addressing Cuban 
shantytowns is linked to the widespread belief that the 1959 Revolution eliminated them. As 
historians of Cuba have argued in other cases, “nonissues are not for study,” and shantytown 
housing ran true to form.11 In 1987 several Cuban scholars declared “the eradication of poverty” 
on the island.12 And as Castro explained in 1986, “we have no shantytowns here.”13  
From the 1930s into the mid-1960s and beyond, however, shantytowns were numerous 
and visible in Havana, and they shaped the culture and politics of the nation. This dissertation 
studies their evolving place in the wider socio-political structures of the Republic and the early 
years of the Revolution, addressing several questions. First, how widespread was political 
mobilization in shantytowns? How successful? What explains its successes and failures? Second, 
what factors underlay the drive to clear slums from Havana, both in theory and in practice? And 
how did these factors change according to time, place, and actor? Finally, why has this history 
been relegated to the dustbin of the late Republic? Why, to put it differently, has shantytown 
resistance not been celebrated as a component of revolutionary activism?  
Answers, I suggest, require an analysis of the deep, multi-layered connections 
shantytown residents built with the Cuban state and with a variety of political actors. These 
connections ranged from spheres that were intimately local to ones that were nearly global in 
scale. They began with ballots, since neighborhood residents had direct influence on local 
                                                 
10 De la Fuente makes this point with regard to race relations in Cuba. See de la Fuente, A Nation for All, 2.  
11 Ibid, 3.  
12 Luis Rodríguez and Carriazo Moreno, Erradicación de pobreza.  
13 The context for Castro’s remarks was a discussion of doctors working in “zones that do not have the best material conditions,” 
but which were not “shantytowns.” In Spanish: “El médico de la familia empieza a ser una realidad ya … que están trabajando 
en las zonas que pudiéramos decir que no tienen las mejores condiciones materiales de vida, las mejores condiciones de 
vivienda; están trabajando en antiguas zonas obreras—que no son barrios de indigentes, no tenemos barrios de indigentes aquí; 
no son villas miseria, no tenemos villas miseria—están trabajando en aquellas zonas donde más lo necesita la población, y están 
trabajando con resultados excelentes.” Fidel Castro, “Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante,” December 2, 1986, in Castro, 
“Discursos e intervenciones.”  
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politics through their votes. Yet shantytowns could wield political power in other ways, too, 
frequently appearing as sensationalized emblems of poverty and discrimination on Cuba’s 
competitive national political stage. In court battles, meanwhile, they made contact with the legal 
apparatus, where judges interpreted the precepts of Cuba’s progressive 1940 constitution and, for 
better or worse, made them real. Cuba’s slum policies carried weight in the realm of international 
relations as well, where postwar imperatives for national “development” swept across the 
hemisphere, spreading unfettered optimism that the webs of social conflict that surrounded 
informal housing should and could be solved.  
On each level, shantytown residents connected to the state in different ways, and the 
strength of those connections determined their ability to lay claim to the basic rights of 
citizenship. Yet they also drew them into collaboration with the politicians of the Republic, 
linking their success to the fortunes of governing officials, and redefining their protests 
according to the scientific language of the Cuban state. To scrutinize the place of shantytowns in 
the Republic, therefore, requires a deeper look at the history of these collaborations, which 
implies that shantytowns were integral, rather than marginal to the institutions of the republican 
state. This, in turn, implies that the slum policies of 1959 did not come without precedent. 
Mediating the time and space between John Stowers, Rufino González, and Fidel Castro was the 
halting, contested expansion of the Cuban welfare state, a process that spilled across geopolitical 
boundaries and into a time of revolution.  
At a time when the future of Cuba’s socialist project is under as much discussion as its 
past, particularly as it relates to urban poverty, this dissertation does not set out to expose the 
failures of revolutionary egalitarianism, or, alternatively, to justify the rise of Castro’s 
  6 
government uncritically.14 Its aim is neither to sensationalize nor sanitize the vast inequality of 
the republican period. Rather it seeks to show the ways that each of these metanarratives leaves 
crucial aspects of the history of Havana’s poor untold. The narrative below does not take for 
granted a stark division between pre-and post-1959 Cuba and instead explores the specific ways 
that this division became significant. In certain crucial respects, this project reveals that, for all 
the changes that took place, the basic dilemmas of informal housing in the Republic and the 
Revolution are not so very different—a finding that may offer clarity for analysts of the present. 
Tracing shantytowns from their respective origins until the early 1960s, I attempt to tell a 
comprehensive history, by examining complicated processes of state formation, social science 
research, economic development, socialist reform, and revolution, as they intersected with the 
lived experiences and collective action of poor people in bounded geographies throughout the 
city. 
                                                 
14 On urban poverty, see Espino Prieto, “Introductory Note: The Social Mobility Perspective”; Martín and Núñez, “Geography 
and Habitat”; Rodríguez, Los marginales; Torres Zayas, Relación barrio-juego abakuá; Espino Prieto, Políticas de atención a la 
pobreza. 
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Figure 1. Las Yaguas juxtaposed against the partially completed public housing project known as the Barrio Obrero 
(Worker’s Neighborhood) in 1947.15 
                                                 
15 “Las Yaguas en vías de desaparecer,” Diario de la Marina Magazine Ilustrada, March 13, 1947, 7. 
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1.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The chapters that follow address the relationship between Havana’s urban poor and the Cuban 
state during slightly more than three decades, from 1930 to 1965. The chapters overlap each 
other chronologically, often spanning presidential administrations and other shifts without 
engaging them directly. To begin, I therefore offer a brief synthesis of Cuban socio-political 
dynamics during the late Republic and early Revolution. 
The label “neocolony” could accurately describe Cuba in relation to the US during the 
first decades of the twentieth century, even as universal male suffrage fueled intense political 
contests. Following Cuba’s Independence War, the occupying US military imposed an 
amendment in the national constitution of 1901, granting the neighbor to the North unlimited 
powers to intervene in Cuban politics. As US capital extended its reach across the island, US 
officials invoked the Platt Amendment on multiple occasions to justify military occupation. 
Following prosperity in the early 1920s, the so-called “Plattist system” gave rise by the end of 
the decade to a democratically elected but increasingly authoritarian president, Gerardo 
Machado, whose administration confronted a collapsing economy by veering between gradual 
reform and brutal repression, ultimately suspending elections and constitutional guarantees.16 My 
study of shantytown settlements in Havana begins during this time.  
                                                 
16 The US accepted the amendment’s abrogation upon Carlos Mendieta’s assumption of the presidency. On the Plattist system, 
see Jorge Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, 11-53; Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 145-209. 
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Although Cuba’s dependence on US trade relations would continue until the 1960s, the 
label “neocolony” becomes less convincing after Machado’s fall in 1933, when a self-proclaimed 
revolutionary government with radical popular backing unilaterally revoked the Platt 
Amendment. Backed by a mobilized coalition of labor organizations, anarchists, students, and 
peasants, and initially supported by a successful barracks revolt in which low-ranking officers 
seized control of the military, President Ramón Grau San Martín’s 100-day government enacted 
a dizzying series of populist reforms. Among other things, this new government set agrarian 
reform as a priority while protecting labor rights.17  
The revolutionary experiment did not last. Withdrawing his support from Grau, 
Fulgencio Batista, a young, mulatto, previously unknown sergeant-turned-army-commander, 
courted US backing as he led the brutal repression of mobilized but often-disorganized labor 
protest. Many within the traditional oligarchy sought his support in returning to the old status 
quo. Carefully courting both sides, from 1934 to 1940 Batista allowed unpopular, regressive 
measures to be carried out by a series of more or less pliant presidents linked to traditional elites, 
but at the same time he supported the consolidation of the labor movement through Cuba’s 
Communist Party.18  
Under Batista, then, frictions between order and revolution were increasingly 
institutionalized. Beginning in 1937, the de facto head of state sought to gain popular support by 
legislating on many of the social reforms of Grau’s government through a three-year Plan 
Trienal. A central component was the Sugar Coordination Act, which imposed the state as a 
                                                 
17 The collapse of the government in 1933 has sometimes been labeled a “failed” or “incomplete” revolution. For a discussion of 
debates over the meaning of the 1933 Revolution, see Whitney, State and Revolution, 10-13; On labor, see Pérez-Stable, The 
Cuban Revolution, 41. 
On dependence, see Henrique Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, vii-xxv.  
18 The communists were not a major part of Grau’s 100-day government. Farber, Revolution and Reaction, 68; Pérez-Stable, The 
Cuban Revolution, 42. 
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mediator in labor disputes and price negotiations in the all-important sugar sector. Eddy Chibás, 
who was aligned with Grau's opposing Auténtico party, highlighted the paradox of Batista’s rule: 
“How is it possible,” he asked, “that the maximum champion of ... order can become the 
supreme leader of a socialist project?” Batista offered an explanation, and a new vision for the 
state: “Some want to see in me a simple defender of order,” he said. “But what do they 
understand by order? Because my conception of it has more to do with architecture than 
policing.”19 
The culmination of Batista’s populist turn was the 1940 promulgation of a new 
constitution, drafted with input from the political opposition and openly debated by 
representatives from diverse social sectors. The document spelled out extensive social rights and 
democratic freedoms—a constitution that, according to one historian, was “one of the most 
liberal and progressive ever written in the American hemisphere.”20 Among other things, it 
codified housing as a citizenship right and a state responsibility.21 The subsequent 1940 
presidential election, bitterly fought between two of the key figures of the brief 100-day 
government, Grau and Batista, was among the most open in Cuban history, and both sides 
competed for the votes of the urban poor. While Grau claimed to represent Cuba’s most 
progressive reformers, Batista openly incorporated the Communist Party into his coalition, 
crisscrossing the country with rallies that were attended by “the Negro race and the under-
privileged.”22 Still, Batista was no communist, and his electoral coalition included many 
politicians from the old oligarchy as well. 
                                                 
19 For an analysis of Batista as “The Architect of the Cuban State,” see Whitney, State and Revolution, 149-176; Domínguez, 
Cuba: Order and Revolution, 85. Quotation from “El Coronel Batista expone al Dr. José Rivero,” Diario de la Marina, 
December 20, 1937, in Cuba, Plan de reconstrucción económico-social, 18; Eddy Chibás, “El plan trienal,” Luz, August 2, 1937.   
20 Farber, Revolution and Reaction, 94. 
21 Jesse Horst, “Shantytown Revolution,” 703.  
22 Milton Patterson Thompson to George Messersmith, 17 June 1940, RG 84/800, USNA. 
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During the next two decades, politicians from across the political spectrum competed for 
the mantle of “revolution.” Winning the election in 1940, Batista served a four-year term; his 
coalition subsequently lost to Grau’s Auténtico party in 1944, though Batista did not run himself. 
The Auténtico party continued to rule until 1952, though it faced serious opposition when a more 
progressive splinter group bolted to form the Ortodoxo party in 1947. Fidel Castro began his 
political career with ties to this group. Running against Auténticos and Ortodoxos in 1952, 
Batista seized power once again, this time by force in an army-backed coup, after critical 
elements of his coalition defected before scheduled elections. Despite the polarizing nature of 
Cuban politics in these years, however, scholars have argued these political cleavages did not 
correspond to social ones, or to left- or right- wing ideologies. Grau and Batista each represented 
cross-class, cross-race coalitions with popular and elite support. Each claimed to represent the 
1940 constitution, and the struggle between them, not between right and left, defined the Cuban 
political system until 1958.23  
Underlying these political dynamics was a growing social malaise. Despite increasing 
popular participation in Cuba’s political system following 1933, for many Cubans the prosperity 
of the 1920s never returned. Economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago estimates that prior to 1931, 
employment rates in Cuba “were similar to…full-employment economies in the West,” while, by 
contrast, from 1931 to 1957, rates “were similar to less-developed countries seriously affected by 
unemployment.”24 Employment in the traditional export sector stagnated, while new industries, 
like construction, grew steadily but failed to keep pace with population growth. Many new jobs 
were located in the capital city, Havana, which grew steadily in terms of its absolute and relative 
population, as well as its economic weight. In the absence of robust economic growth, the 
                                                 
23 Szulc, Fidel, 168-219; Whitney, State and Revolution, 173; Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, 99.  
24 Mesa-Lago, The Labor Force, 28.  
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political system and the public sector became increasingly important as avenues for economic 
redistribution—and with resources that far surpassed the countryside, Havana became the 
epicenter of political contests.  
During the late Republic, then, Havana became a site where the stakes to what David 
Harvey calls the “right to the city” took on new proportions.25 With housing increasingly scarce 
at a time of expansive new formal citizenship rights, the state’s obligation to address urban 
poverty emerged as a key point of contention. As shantytowns produced strong confrontations 
among residents, land titleholders, and the state, the neighborhoods became focal points for 
wider debates about the meanings of citizenship. 
As these debates played out on the national political stage during 1940-58, government 
policy slowly shifted away from the popular classes, even as politicians maintained close 
alliances with organized labor. After the Auténticos came to power in 1944, communist 
influence among labor waned. In 1947, Carlos Prio, from within Grau’s cabinet, led a purge of 
the party leadership, following a broad Latin American pattern. Prio was strongly anti-
communist as president from 1948 to 1952, a stance that Batista retained during the 1950s as he 
tightened Cuba’s military ties to the United States. Exacerbating this shift, Batista declined to 
allow free elections during the 1950s, even while he claimed to have restored the 1940 
constitution to its full force.26  
Meanwhile, beneath this authoritarian veneer, the institutions of Cuban government 
expanded, with a significant impact on the housing sector. Peréz-Stable writes that in the 1950s 
Cuban leaders were slowly moving towards a new development model—one that aligned closely 
                                                 
25 David Harvey, “The Right to the City”; Mesa-Lago. The Labor Force, 28; Scarpaci, Segre, and Coyula, Havana: Two Faces, 
101-102, 119-123. 
26 Paterson, Contesting Castro, 25-34. 
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with postwar hemispheric trends. Foreign investment and growth beyond traditional export 
sectors grew, even as economic policy continued to favor sugar oligarchs. Modernization and 
development expanded, even as structural unemployment festered. In the meantime, government 
officials undertook new, centralized initiatives to deal with nagging problems like shantytowns, 
while urban poverty remained severe. In sum, even as a nascent developmentalist state was 
increasingly evident, Cuban society remained mired in the frustrating contradictions of 
dependent economic relations—and many blamed the political system.27  
Concerned by rising discontent, Batista’s government stifled all opposition, leading to 
increasingly radical protest. Commanding a US-backed military that was bent on eliminating 
communism, he successfully contained demonstrations in the capital, suppressing a major urban 
uprising in 1958. Meanwhile, however, on the Eastern side of the island, a small band of rebels 
captured increasing attention in Cuba and beyond. Born out of a failed military operation on July 
26, 1953, Fidel Castro’s July 26th Movement gained popular support in the mountainous regions 
of Oriente, where Batista’s corrupt, demoralized army failed to control them. In 1958, as the 
embattled dictator faced defections from all sides, eventually including elements within the US 
government, Fidel Castro emerged as the most powerful opposition leader on the island. On 
January 1, 1959, Batista fled, and the army surrendered to the rebels, leaving Castro and his 
guerrilla fighters to take control of the state.28  
From its first days the Revolution emphasized the radical, progressive, nationalist values 
common to political reformers at the time, but it was not initially communist. Through escalating 
trade confrontations in 1960, US and Cuban leaders grew mutually disenchanted, eventually 
engaging in open confrontation in the failed US-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. In 
                                                 
27 Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, 34-35; Also see Pérez, On Becoming Cuban, 445-477.   
28 See Paterson, Contesting Castro, 58-65, 125-139; Domínguez, “The Batista Regime in Cuba.”  
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April, Castro openly declared the Cuban Revolution to be socialist, paving the way for close ties 
to the Soviet Union.29 By 1962 the US banned most Cuban imports; formal diplomatic relations 
were suspended until 2016. In the meantime, as Cuban officials publicly addressed urban poverty 
and built housing to replace a number of shantytowns across the island, many saw the urban poor 
as key beneficiaries of the new system. Yet their history prior to 1959 and after remains largely 
unstudied. 
1.2 CUBAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The politics of urban space have received limited scholarly attention in Cuba.  Scholarship on the 
Republic has frequently discussed the importance of Havana’s popular classes in the instability 
of the 1950s and the radicalization of the 1959 Revolution, but attention to popular mobilization 
is generally limited to student radicals and an institutionalized “working class.”30 Housing 
scholarship on Cuba has offered descriptive accounts of shantytown neighborhoods, but ignored 
their political activism.31 Dating back to the Republic, scholars have discounted political 
engagement from shantytowns as a product of co-optation by politicians—a trend that reflects 
                                                 
29 Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, 80.  
30 For an overview of historiographical debates on the role of the working class in the 1959 Revolution, see Farber, Revolution 
and Reaction, 14-27; and Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution, 112-36. On the concept of “Working Class Revolution,” 
see Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics, 277-284. Other authors highlight broader social dynamics, while still noting the role of 
Cuba’s clases populares in generating social instability and radicalization. For example, see Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, 
7; Guerra, “To Condemn the Revolution is to Condemn Christ,” 94; Pérez, On Becoming Cuban, 450-53; Pérez, Cuba: Between 
Reform and Revolution, 230-31. Jorge Ibarra takes a wider approach, emphasizing the role of social inequality in generating the 
1959 Revolution. Ibarra, Prologue to Revolution, 161-74; Other authors follow similar lines. See del Toro González, Algunos 
aspectos económicos, 111-130. 
31 On shantytowns, see Hamberg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy,” 77-84, 190-91, 259-61;On popular housing and the 
working class during the Republic, see Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula, Havana: Two Faces, 51-130; Vega Vega, Comentarios a la 
ley general de la vivienda; Segre, La vivienda en Cuba; García Vázquez, Aspectos del planeamiento; Fernández Núñez, La 
vivienda en Cuba; Del Toro, Algunos aspectos económicos, 111-30, 257-68; Luis Padrón, !Qué república era aquélla!, 276-279.  
For recent works on Cuba that explore the complex relationship between architecture and governance without 
addressing shantytowns, see Hyde, Constitutional Modernism; Loomis, Revolution of Forms.  
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scholarship beyond Cuba, and whose merits I discuss in further detail below.32 Furthermore, 
discussions of slum clearance have overwhelmingly focused on the early years of the Revolution, 
offering little sense of antecedents or continuities.33  
A major exception to the dearth of scholarship surrounding Cuban shantytowns is the 
well-documented story of Las Yaguas in the immediate aftermath of 1959, a neighborhood that 
serves, in Roy’s terms, as Cuba’s “metonymic slum.” 34 As such, it functions as an idea as much 
as a place, a simplistic rhetorical stand-in for diverse, multifaceted conflicts elsewhere in the 
city. Despite their thoroughness in studying events within the neighborhood, studies of Las 
Yaguas have been conducted in what Fischer calls “the present tense,” more concerned with the 
neighborhood’s abstract cultural, social or political meaning than to the particular ways that it 
was shaped by political networks and state policies.35 Situating the story of Las Yaguas in a 
history of shantytowns across Havana, and with attention to its interaction with wider structural 
dynamics, I attempt a different kind of study here.  
This dissertation engages seriously with state policy before 1959, contributing to a 
growing body of scholarship that has focused on the autonomy of domestic policy makers, 
without losing sight of Cuba’s dependent position in the world economic system.36 Once 
discounted as dead letter, the Constitution of 1940 has received new attention for the important 
                                                 
32 This critique is frequent among the abovementioned works, and is leveled more generally by Castells, The City and the 
Grassroots, 179, 190. Also see note 49 below.  
33 On the roots and outcomes of Revolutionary Cuba's urban policy, see Hamberg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy”; 
Hamberg, Under Construction; Acosta and Hardoy, Reforma urbana en Cuba; Scarpaci, Segre, and Coyula, Havana: Two Faces, 
131-167, 196-233. 
34 Roy, “Slumdog Cities,” 223-238.On Las Yaguas, see Lewis, Lewis, and Rigdon, Four Men; Butterworth, The People of Buena 
Ventura; García Alonso, Manuela; Calderón, Amparo. Other works published from the Lewis project did not focus directly on 
Las Yaguas residents. Lewis, Lewis, and Rigdon, Four Women; Lewis, Lewis, and Rigdon, Neighbors.  
35 Fischer, “A Century in the Present Tense,” 9-67. 
36 Whitney, State and Revolution; Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution; Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution; Gillian 
McGillivray, Blazing Cane.  
Along with this trend has come a more general reengagement with controversial republican figures. See Frank Argote-
Freyre, Fulgencio Batista; Ilan Elrich, Eduardo Chibás.  
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ways it structured social life and local activism.37 For Havana’s urban poor it often served as a 
rallying point in claims for expanded citizenship rights, on issues ranging from property to 
housing conditions, employment, and rent prices. The result in this case, however, is not merely 
a new argument for tipping the scales of pre- and post-revolutionary comparison one way or the 
other. To put it differently, the Republic’s gain is not the Revolution’s loss, and vice-versa. 
Rather, the Revolution is an outcome of the Republic—though not the only one possible. Not a 
comparison of two distinct periods, this work joins a new wave of scholarship in questioning the 
precise meaning of 1959 as a “great divide.”38  
In doing so it also joins scholarship seeking to reassess the 1959 Revolution. New work 
has revealed that the process of toppling the Batista dictatorship had wider origins than the 
insurrection in the Sierra Maestra, and that urban opposition to the regime was extensive.39 Other 
studies have shown that popular mobilization had a deep impact on the early policies of the 
Revolution.40 This dissertation does not examine opposition to the Batista regime, either in the 
Sierra Maestra or in the Havana underground. Instead it highlights the ways that the policies of 
the early Revolution evolved from the republican state itself, which was subjected to many of the 
same popular pressures scholars have identified after 1959. And while the new regime 
restructured some aspects of the housing sector in radical ways, I suggest that post-1959 
                                                 
37 Documenting congressional failures to implement legislation upholding the Constitution, as well as inconsistencies in the 
document itself, are Farber, Revolution and Reaction, 92-98; Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 14; Pérez-Stable, 
The Cuban Revolution, 36.  
However, other authors have begun to highlight the enduring and concrete applications of the 1940 Constitution 
beyond the intentions of its framers. Sarah Arvey’s recent study of constitutional reforms surrounding marriage law documents 
the ways women employed the Constitution in unforeseen ways for their benefit, illustrating “the gulf between rather lofty ideas 
... propounded by the legislators who enacted it and its meaning and enforcement in everyday life.” Arvey “Making the Immoral 
Moral,” 658. Also see de la Fuente, A Nation for All, 209-222; Hyde, Constitutional Modernism, 1-39. 
38 Alejandro de la Fuente has analyzed this trend in Cuban historiography. See de la Fuente “La ventolera.” For examples of 
works challenging the “great divide,” see Lambe, “A Century of Work.” 
De la Fuente notes similarities with earlier revisionist scholarship on the Mexican Revolution. In terms of urban 
history, this project draws from several works on Mexico. See Lear, Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens; Johns, The City of 
Mexico; Diane Davis, Urban Leviathan; Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution.  
39 Sweig, Inside the Urban Underground; Chase, Revolution Within the Revolution.  
40 Guerra, Visions of Power. 
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shantytown policy only makes sense when its evolution is considered across these sharp political 
breaks.  
In addressing Havana’s urban poor, this dissertation also speaks to a growing body of 
work on the history and legacy of racial divisions and discrimination in Cuba, undertaken by 
scholars both on and off the island.41 Like this dissertation, work on race has highlighted forms 
of popular mobilization beyond organized labor. Still, despite its success in dismantling silence 
around ongoing racial discrimination, this scholarship has generally focused on the actions of a 
limited number of self-identified “black activists,” leaving aside other forms of political activism 
from a significantly larger Afro-descended population. Despite its enduring political salience and 
visibility, race by itself was often not a determinative organizational cleavage for poor, dark 
skinned Cubans.42 Moreover the focus on self-identified black activists has meant that studies of 
race have paid little attention to social categories, like urban poverty, that overlapped with race 
in both scientific and popular discourse.  
This study therefore pays attention to race but de-centers explicit black activism as a lens 
of analysis. For scientists of the Republic, shantytown housing was a discrete category of 
difference in its own right, and it was a key issue around which Afro-descended Cubans made 
claims, even if they did not do so in expressly racial terms.43 By widening the frame of analysis 
to encompass urban poverty, discriminatory practices that affected Afro-descendants in Havana’s 
housing market become clearer. In examining housing, I draw from research on the US, which 
                                                 
41 On race, see de la Fuente, A Nation For All; Benson, Antiracism in Cuba; Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba. On the Republic 
specifically, see Pappademos, Black Political Activists; Guridy, Forging Diaspora; Bronfman, Measures of Equality. For an 
example of growing attention to the topic within Cuba, see Rodríguez, et al., Las relaciones raciales.  
42 De la Fuente works against this trend by juxtaposing racial ideology with indices of social inequality, including housing. De la 
Fuente, A Nation for All.  
43 For an overview of eugenics and social science in Cuba and ways scientific categories shaped popular mobilization, see 
Bronfman, Measures of Equality; On similar processes regarding criminology in Mexico City, see Picatto, City of Suspects; For 
an overview of the eugenics movement in Latin America, see Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics.” For an analysis of biotypology as 
it related to government policies towards the urban poor in Mexico from 1920-1960 see Alexandra Minna Stern, “From 
Mestizophilia to Biotypology”; Rodríguez, Civilizing Argentina.  
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has explored the roles of suburbanization, and technocratic, political, financial, and local 
interests, in generating systematic racial exclusions.44 Studies on Latin American residential 
patterns have not revealed similar indices of segregation.45 Although Cuba was no exception, its 
close collaboration with US planners meant that some mechanisms of segregation in the US, like 
the mortgages insured by Federal Housing Administration, operated with similar effects, 
especially towards the broader category of the urban poor.  
1.3 CORE ARGUMENTS 
The history of Havana shantytowns therefore cuts across a number of trends in the 
historiography of Cuba. Looking beyond conflicts that were explicitly framed around class or 
race, I examine the mechanisms through which housing inequality was produced in contentious 
interactions between planners, politicians, and financial elites on one hand, and mobilized 
tenants and shantytowns residents on the other, most of whom were Afro-descendants. As the 
urban poor resisted eviction efforts, they employed political activism and legal mobilization in 
ways that drew them directly into contact with the institutions of the republican welfare state. By 
no means coming to a halt in 1959, the dynamics of these interactions were fundamental in 
shaping the trajectory of the early Revolution. 
Tracing these dynamics, I find that popular housing from Republic to Revolution did not 
merely reflect existing socio-racial hierarchies, but rather produced and reconfigured them in 
ways that have not been fully understood. Instead of being merely “co-opted” by politicians, I 
                                                 
44 Connolly, A World More Concrete; Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis; Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; Bristol, “The 
Pruitt-Igoe Myth”; Massey and Denton, American Apartheid. 
45 Telles, Race in Another America, 194-215; Caldeira, City of Walls, 273-4. Also see Fischer, “Quase Pretos de Tão Pobres?” 
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argue that by claiming housing as a citizenship right, shantytown residents played a decisive role 
in centralizing and expanding state institutions prior to 1959, ultimately shaping the policies of 
the early Revolution.46 The impact that these residents had on government practices came not 
through external attacks on the republican system, but rather from within. Residents used the 
radical potential of the legal system to nullify property claims from the wealthy and used the 
language of state officials and the 1940 Constitution to negotiate and defend against slum 
clearance. While the policies of the revolutionary government appeared to spring from nowhere, 
in fact they evolved from the contested and negotiated policies of governments past.  
Far from giving shantytown residents free rein over their own destinies, however, their 
tight relationship to the Cuban state impelled officials to adapt and implement recommendations 
from several internationally prominent scientific trends. Throughout the twentieth century, urban 
planners across the Western Hemisphere drew from two competing theses regarding urban 
poverty. Some planners argued that structural economic and spatial reforms could make slums 
disappear, while others joined social scientists to advocate targeted medical and cultural 
interventions to “improve” slum residents directly. The Cuban Revolution and the subsequent 
clearance of Las Yaguas came at a unique international moment, when these trends became 
deeply intertwined. I argue that, by articulating their resistance to arbitrary government slum 
clearances through a language of contention that emphasized the state’s obligation to provide for 
the urban poor, shantytown residents successfully remained in the city for years. By publicizing 
this language of resistance so widely, however, they pressured officials to intervene in their 
neighborhoods in other ways, leading core tenets of these theses to become policy. Ultimately, 
                                                 
46 There is a wide body of scholarship on citizenship, most of which I do not engage with in this dissertation. I find that during 
the conflicts analyzed below, the urban poor rarely used the word “citizenship.” Yet they frequently demanded social rights from 
the government, highlighting laws and symbols of the nation for leverage. I therefore use the term citizenship as a category of 
analysis, to describe the institutionalized relationships between poor people and the Cuban state. On citizenship, see Yashar, 
Contesting Citizenship, 31-53; Fischer, A Poverty of Rights, 306-315; Holston, Insurgent Citizenship. 
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public debates over slum clearance reinforced the social-scientific discourse of a “culture of 
poverty” in ways that blended with the incipient socialist system. This discourse was embedded 
in the most significant and beneficial interventions of the revolutionary welfare state, in ways 
that disguised but perpetuated racism and inequality.  
To some extent, then, the dissertation takes up a well-established agenda in uncovering 
the “agency” of subaltern residents of Havana, for whom many assumed passivity to be the 
norm—but it also focuses on the specific, patterned ways in which that agency was channeled 
and limited.47 Shantytown residents shaped the evolution of Havana’s urban institutions 
indelibly, but they did so through the institutions of the powerful, and the resulting 
configurations did not appear exactly as they wished. Their activism emerged in the early 1930s 
as a product of insurgent property claims, at a time when economic collapse led thousands of 
poor people to occupy land illegally. As they established institutionalized relationships to protect 
these claims, and secure additional rights based on expanded social legislation, their actions were 
sufficient to win de facto (and occasionally de jure) rights to occupy land. At the same time, 
officials formulated policies according to the categories of analysis and channels of power 
inherent to the Cuban political system. By 1959, slum policy in Havana represented a dynamic 
interaction between residents on one hand and the conceptual frameworks of social scientists, 
utilized selectively by politicians and state bureaucrats on the other hand. The urban poor shaped 
the Revolution, even as the Revolution sought to manage them.  
                                                 
47 On agency, see Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. 
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1.4 WIDER SIGNIFICANCE 
These arguments have implications beyond Cuba, where scholarship on urban poverty and 
housing has been more extensive. Because of Cuba’s unique place in twentieth-century 
geopolitics and the success of the revolutionary government in combatting many indicators of 
poverty, comprehensive studies devoted to urban planning and the development of welfare states 
in Latin America have treated Revolutionary Cuba as a counterfactual diagnosis for other 
nations. In the process, they devote limited, if any, discussion to the specific ways that Cuba may 
have resembled or differed from them.48 Beyond Cuba, meanwhile, scholarship from the left has 
often discounted shantytown protest as generally ineffective, or as being co-opted by capitalist 
elites, since it did little to alter the structures of the wider system.49 Yet the story of Havana 
shantytowns demonstrates that the widely heralded achievements of the Cuban Revolution with 
regard to slum clearance were made possible by institutional reforms undertaken within the 
capitalist system. Furthermore, continued negotiation remained necessary within a socialist 
system in order to make those reforms a reality.  
                                                 
48 For example, in their ambitious interpretation of labor movements in a number of Latin American nations, Collier and Collier 
do not mention Republican Cuba, writing only, “the Cuban Revolution dramatically posed the possibility that a socialist 
experiment could survive in the Western Hemisphere, producing an immediate impact on the political goals of the left in many 
Latin American countries.” Similarly, Francis Violich devotes little attention to pre-revolutionary planning in Cuba, concluding 
of Revolutionary Cuba that “clearly ... we find the scale and purposefulness of planning at the national level that is needed to 
control metropolitan growth in all Latin American countries.” Meanwhile, in her study of poor neighborhoods in Mexico City, 
Eckstein notes that, in Cuba, “the lower socioeconomic stratum is not subject to the same degradation. …Mainly because the 
Cuban state identifies above all with proletariat interests state power is used for different ends.” See Collier and Collier, Shaping 
the Political Arena; Violich, Urban Planning for Latin America, 112; Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution, 218.   
This tendency is part of a larger one, identified by Centeno and López-Alves, in which a focus on “grand theory” 
substitutes for more locally specific conclusions. See Centeno and López-Alves, “Introduction,” 3-23. 
49 Velasco makes a similar point about scholarship that has discounted the potential of urban popular mobilization to effect 
change. See Velasco, “A Weapon as Powerful as the Vote,” 667. Castells, for example notes the limited potential of urban protest 
to challenge the political order. Auyero is similarly unimpressed by the potential for reform evidenced by Peronist networks in 
Argentine shantytowns. “For many shantytown dwellers,” he writes, “Peronism is not a heretical voice…but a promise of food 
that holds no one responsible for its scarcity.” See Castells, The City and the Grassroots, 175-214; Auyero, Poor People’s 
Politics, 204. Collier, Squatters and Oligarchs, 55-82.  
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A pioneering figure in debates over urban marginality, Oscar Lewis exemplified wider 
tendencies to treat Cuba as categorically separate from the rest of the hemisphere. Lewis’ thesis 
that the poor lived according to patterns inherent to a “culture” or “subculture of poverty,” set the 
terms of debate for scholarship on urban inequality for years to come.50 Along similar lines, 
during the 1960s, the “marginality school” dominated policy initiatives across Latin America, in 
some cases seeking to address conditions of urban poverty, in which they perceived fertile 
ground for revolutionary movements akin to Cuba’s to expand.51 By the 1970s, however, Lewis’ 
conclusions on the “culture of poverty” were heavily criticized and roundly discredited. Jannice 
Perlman argued compellingly that favela residents in Rio de Janeiro were “not marginal,” and 
that Lewis’ brand of marginality was a “myth.”  In a parallel vein, Manuel Castells criticized the 
marginality school for linking together disparate components of marginality and failing to 
recognize the ways that shantytown residents were interconnected with broad social, political, 
and economic structures.52  
These criticisms coincided with a wider critique of technocratic interventions in urban 
policy, characterized by a growing skepticism of centralized state action. In the US, Jane Jacobs 
led a “revolt” against planners and technocrats, catalyzing a “transatlantic collapse of urban 
renewal” across the North Atlantic.53 Meanwhile, critiques of the “marginality school” in Latin 
America led to a similar push in favor of autonomous local control over informal areas. 54  
                                                 
50 On the importance of marginality in urban history as a field, see Armus and Lear, “The Trajectory of Latin American Urban 
History.”  
51 Murphy, “In and Out of the Margins,” 69.  
52 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality; Castells, The City and the Grassroots.  
53 Jacobs, The Death and Life; Caro, The Power Broker; Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse. On a reassessment of Moses see 
Jackson and Ballon eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City; On the contextualization of urban renewal, see Teaford, The Rough 
Road to Renaissance, 54. 
54 For a synthesis of earlier technocratic trends, see Violich, Urban Planning for Latin America. Critiquing centralized relocation 
plans is Turner, Housing by People; For studies of urban renewal programs in Latin America, see Holston, The Modernist City; 
Meade, “Civilizing” Rio; Scott, Seeing Like a State. 
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Yet this trend had consequences that were not intended by many of these authors. Similar 
arguments resonated deeply among neoliberal policy makers, who sought to blend local 
autonomy with the expansion of free market principles.55 By this view, titling land, and opening 
it for sale on the market, had the potential to liberate “entrepreneurial” shantytown residents 
from anachronistic state interventions. Subsequent research has persuasively questioned the 
extent to which titling alone can counteract spatial inequality, yet the conclusions of these 
scholars continue to permeate international initiatives towards informal communities.56  
In more recent work, Ananya Roy reframes these issues, advocating a lens of “urban 
informality,” which, in her rendering, is not a fixed category but rather requires historical 
grounding and contingency. In these terms, “urban informality ... is not reduced to the bounded 
space of the slum,” writes Roy. “Instead it is a mode of the production of space that connects the 
seemingly separated geographies of slum and suburb.”57 A number of studies in the past decade 
have taken up a similar conceptual framework in a rich and growing body of scholarship focused 
on rigorously interrogating historically embedded conditions of urban marginality as they were 
produced in conjunction with political, economic, and legal imperatives.58 Brodwyn Fischer’s 
groundbreaking study of urban poverty and citizenship in Vargas-era Rio de Janeiro centers its 
analysis on the ways that shantytown residents constructed their citizenship by claiming rights 
where none were clearly given—battles conducted in the uneven spaces left by the contradictory 
                                                                                                                                                             
For more recent work on modernism and politics, see Healy, Ruins of the New Argentina; Other studies addressing 
urban renewal programs in the Caribbean are Derby, The Dictator's Seduction, 66-108; Hoffnung-Garskof, A Tale of Two Cities. 
55 See de Soto, The Other Path; On the convergence of left- and right-wing ideologies in urban planning, see Hall, Cities of 
Tomorrow, 11. 
56 For a critique of de Soto, see Bromley, “Power Property, and Poverty,” 271-288.  
57 Roy, “Slumdog Cities,” 233.   
58 For a historiographical summary of urban informality see Roy and AlSayyad, Urban Informality, 7-32. Holston, Insurgent 
Citizenship; Fischer, A Poverty of Rights; Javier Auyero, Poor People’s Politics; Edward Murphy, For a Proper Home; Byan 
McCann, Hard Times; Velasco, Barrio Rising; Fischer, McCann, and Auyero, eds., Cities From Scratch. 
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expansion of wider legal structures.59 This literature emphasizes the ways that the urban poor 
engaged with the legal and political systems, both within and beyond their formal conventions, 
insisting that actions from beyond those conventions were crucial to understanding processes at 
their core. James Holston writes of “insurgent citizenship,” which “sustains the regime of 
differentiated citizenship,” but also creates “the conditions of its subversion.”60 Alejandro 
Velasco labels “institutional and extra-institutional mobilization” in Caracas as “an essential 
element of democratic life in Latin America.”61 “In becoming insurgent homeowners,” writes 
Edward Murphy of Santiago, Chile, “former squatters have helped to transform the state. Yet 
they have also been ensnared within its web.”62  
Closely aligned with this literature, this dissertation builds on it in several ways. I join 
Murphy in analyzing the official rhetoric of marginality as it was challenged, reshaped, and 
reinforced by local mobilization. I analyze the actions of the government’s poorest constituents 
for their impact on the utopian visions of planners and state officials. In Cuba, this meeting went 
beyond the judicial system relatively early. Whereas Fischer notes that during the 1950s, 
Brazilian courts emerged as the foremost battlegrounds in a wave of property disputes, Havana’s 
shantytown residents fought against relocations from institutions of health and social welfare 
instead.63 Unlike in Rio de Janeiro, and partly as the result of Cuba’s liberal Constitution of 1940 
and the strength of its populist compact, I find that by the early 1940s, legal avenues to evicting 
squatter neighborhoods had often become dead ends. Far from granting permanent land security 
to residents, however, these entanglements led to legislation, which shifted debates about slum 
clearance to the political system. As a result, officials launched national slum clearance 
                                                 
59 Fischer, A Poverty of Rights, 8.  
60 James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship, 9.  
61 Velasco, “A Weapon as Powerful as the Vote,” 668.  
62 Murphy, For a Proper Home, 6.  
63 Fischer, A Poverty of Rights, 271.  
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initiatives earlier than in Brazil. This study therefore focuses on the evolution of these initiatives, 
which synthesized knowledge from the bureaucracies of health and urban planning—a synthesis 
that was strengthened by the undemocratic regime of Fulgencio Batista and briefly expanded by 
the revolutionary government in the years after 1959.  
This combination of nationalist populism, urban planning, social science, and 
authoritarian control produced slum initiatives that were, in some respects, uniquely Cuban. 
Studies in Latin America have focused on urban informality as a field of conflict for questions of 
citizenship related to law, electoral politics, and land titling. This study demonstrates that such 
conflicts also shaped national institutions of social welfare and planning. In Cuba, these 
institutions ultimately limited the potential for insurgent property claims. At the same time, 
however, they opened avenues for more expansive sorts of claims to be made on the Cuban 
state—a potential that was realized for Las Yaguas residents in the early years of the Revolution.  
1.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
In constructing these arguments, my dissertation connects multiple lines of inquiry with the 
theme of urban poverty in Havana. In the first chapter I trace instances of land invasion by poor 
squatters in Greater Havana from the late 1920s to the early 1940s. By putting these occupations 
in conversation with republican politics and a patchwork of agrarian reform legislation, I argue 
that contentious mobilization revealed radical interpretations of the legal system, and resulted in 
de facto legal permanence for poor squatters in the capital. Yet this permanence impelled the 
government to take on a more active role in managing and relocating the poor.  
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To examine this role, the second chapter focuses on Las Yaguas, Havana’s most famous 
shantytown. Covering the period from 1930 to 1950, I argue that the elite status of Las Yaguas 
title-holders allowed them to enact legislation that effectively shifted the terms of debate from 
one of property rights to one about the meaning of urban citizenship. In response, residents 
publicly connected their resistance against relocation to the state’s obligation to provide for the 
urban poor, making relocation virtually impossible for elected officials. At the same time, they 
ensured the continued involvement of medical professionals in the neighborhood.  
The third chapter examines the evolution of social science that undergirded the state’s 
approach to these confrontations, including anthropology, eugenics, and urban planning. I argue 
that urban planning initiatives became deeply entangled with the conclusions of anthropology 
and eugenics before 1959 under the rubric of national development, ultimately leading the 
revolutionary government to link its slum clearance initiatives to social workers and the “culture 
of poverty” thesis. These initiatives were explicitly de-racialized, and yet overlapped with 
longstanding prejudices against Afro-descendants.  
These prejudices, along with debates about shantytown housing, were amplified by the 
dynamics of Havana’s wider housing market. The fourth chapter examines the politics of rent 
control and private investment in Havana from 1939-1963. I trace the emergence of rent 
legislation and examine its effectiveness through the analysis of occupancy disputes, which 
brought poor tenants to Havana courts. Contrary to previous scholarship, I argue that rent 
controls were strong in practice. Precisely because of their strength, however, politicians 
promoted additional policies that strengthened the role of private investors in the housing market 
outside the rental system in ways that coalesced with social and racial discrimination. Amid 
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debates about deficient housing in the capital, shantytowns became important points of reference 
to highlight state failure. 
In the final chapter, I return to Las Yaguas, to trace the neighborhood’s unlikely survival 
during Batista’s slum clearance program in the 1950s, until its subsequent eradication by the 
revolutionary government in 1963. I argue that the revolutionary government’s treatment of Las 
Yaguas at once reflected the success of resident mobilization on one hand and the continuity of 
negative assumptions linked to the “culture of poverty” thesis on the other hand.  
1.6 A NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
The vocabulary employed to describe urban areas where residents face challenges 
associated with some combination of precariousness, illegality, crime, impoverishment, deficient 
infrastructure, and marginality, is often imprecise, and always embedded in contested social and 
historical processes. In contrast to recent studies authored by the UN and World Bank, I 
generally follow Alan Gilbert in avoiding the term “slum,” due to its pejorative connotations and 
lack of specificity.64 As the title of my dissertation suggests, however, I find it useful to deploy 
the term when discussing “slum clearance,” or other historically specific circumstances, where 
the term’s general, pejorative nature is precisely the point.  
 This dissertation faces an additional challenge in accurately translating the words of 
historical actors from Spanish to English. During the period of my study, the term most often 
employed by historical actors to describe poor, informal urban neighborhoods was “barrio de 
                                                 
64 Gilbert, “The Return of the Slum.”  
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indigentes,” a highly loaded term, literally translated to “neighborhood of indigents.” I explain 
the origins and connotations of this term at length in Chapter 4. Elsewhere in the dissertation, I 
translate this term to “shantytown” for clarity, a word that I also use as an analytical category in 
my own writing. I understand it to mean a poor, urban area, where residents had constructed 
most of the homes and lacked title to the land.  
 In the case of rental dwellings, the Spanish vocabulary during the period under study was 
diverse and not entirely consistent. Solar, for example, was a racialized term used to indicate an 
overcrowded tenement house.65 Yet the term lacks a precise definition, and was often used 
interchangeably with cuartería, casa de vecindad, ciudadela, and other terms. For clarity, in 
translation and in my own writing, I generally refer to these types of dwellings interchangeably 
as “tenements.”  
1.7 A NOTE ON GEOGRAPHY 
During the republican period, Greater Havana included the separate municipalities of Havana, 
Marianao, Guanabacoa, Regla, Santa Maria del Rosario, and Santiago de las Vegas. Each had 
their own mayor and city council, with some control over housing policy. In 1965 the 
government created a Metropolitan Administration of Havana for the larger urban area and 
reorganized local jurisdictions.66   
 
                                                 
65 De la Fuente writes, “The identification of solares as black spaces was a construct aimed at excluding the poorest from the 
city’s geography and society, a cultural validation of social hierarchies.” De la Fuente, A Nation for All, 114. 
66 Scarpaci, Segre, and Coyula, Havana: Two Faces, 170-71.  
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Figure 2: Selected municipalities and shantytowns in Greater Havana.67 
 
                                                 
67 Text added; Área metropolitana de la Habana, n.d. (c. 1950), Mapoteca, Archivo Nacional de Cuba (hereafter ANC). 
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2.0  “THE PROBLEM OF LA HATA”: AGRARIAN REFORM AND URBAN 
INFORMALITY IN HAVANA, 1930-1947 
“Our lands, which are ours because they belong to the Cuban state…” 
Peasant literature, Realengo 18.68 
 
 
Until they threatened to take the land, Santiago Cutiño kept quiet. For several years, talk passed 
from hut to hut that a sugar company had purchased sections of the Zabala and Ceballos 
realengo.69 Fences were raised, and land-clearing fires burned. Finally faced with threats of 
eviction, Cutiño and his neighbors took action. With their work disrupted in the hilly lands that 
surrounded the Sagua de Tánamo Municipality in Oriente Province, they went to the municipal 
courthouse.70 
 On August 28, 1923, Cutiño and nine other residents sued for property damages to land 
that, by all accounts, they did not own. “The undersigned, residents of the Realengo ‘Zabala y 
Ceballos,’” they wrote, “notify you that Atlantic Frutera y Azucarera de Cuba believes itself the 
owner of these lands, attacking and evicting us.”71 Despite what may have seemed a mismatch 
between Cutiño's band and the wealthy international company they opposed, company 
                                                 
68“Boletín” from peasants in Realengo 18, quoted in de la Torriente Brau, “Realengo 18,” 154.  
69 Explained below, a realengo was a type of Spanish colonial land grant. 
70 Declaración de Bernardo Marrón y Laurencio, 31 August 1923, Legajo 60, Expediente 19, Secretaria de la Presidencia, ANC, 
8. 
71 Esteban Angel Rosa to Juez Municipal, 28 August 1923 Legajo 60, Expediente 19, Secretaria de la Presidencia, ANC, 3. 
  31 
representatives were called to the courthouse. There they claimed that the damages had been 
minimal, not on the areas occupied by families they deemed “squatters,” and that the company 
had purchased land titles through appropriate channels.72 Meanwhile, one by one, Cutiño's 
neighbors testified as well, many without knowing how to sign their name. As they gathered 
before the clerk, they repeated a single assertion: “it has always been said that this land belongs 
to the state.”73 
 In the decades that followed, claims of state-owned lands would be repeated hundreds of 
times across Cuba. These claims were often ignored, as titleholders pushed peasants away 
discreetly, thoughtlessly, and at times brutally, leaving men, women and children without shelter 
or recourse. Yet at other times, Cuba's poor wielded the name of their government with 
surprising effectiveness. Two decades after Cutiño's case had been resolved, residents of La 
Hata, an obscure suburb of the Havana metropolitan area, joined other neighborhoods to echo the 
poor orientales in their assertion. “In the name of 500 families,” a neighborhood association 
reported to the press, “we express that these lands correspond to the state, and that certain 
elements aim to usurp them through legalistic means. This is a theft, and it should be stopped by 
the government and punished by laws.”74  
 In Santiago Cutiño's case, after more than a year of court proceedings, the judge ruled 
against him, finding that the company had broken no laws in the limited incursions it had 
made.75 Cutiño's legal activism would not be in vain, however. In the process of trying the case, 
company officials defensively stated that, despite evidence to the contrary, no eviction 
                                                 
72 Comparecencia del Acusado Administrador de Compañía Atlantic Frutera y Azucarera de Cuba, 31 August 1923, Legajo 60, 
Expediente 19, Secretaria de la Presidencia, ANC, 17. 
73 Declaración de Juan Bautista, 31 August 1923, Legajo 60, Expediente 19, Secretaria de la Presidencia, ANC, 11. 
74 “Piden de nuevo al gobierno los vecinos de la Jata, que actúe para evitar varios desalojos,” Noticias de Hoy, March 1, 1944, 1. 
75 Acta y Sentencia, 20 November 1923, Legajo 60, Expediente 19, Secretaria de la Presidencia, ANC, 42. 
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proceedings had been initiated.76 Poor squatters would retain possession of the Zabala and 
Ceballos realengo until the area was collectivized in the 1960s.77  
 Arguments about the Cuban welfare state during the Republic have had little to say about 
men like Santiago Cutiño, the men and women of La Hata, or the specific dynamics of land 
tenure for the poor.78 Those few studies that have examined land legislation closely have 
concluded that the enforcement of land laws in Cuba led to higher rates of possession for poor 
people than indicated by land titles.79 Generally seen as a rural issue, however, no study has 
examined the implications of agrarian land laws on Havana. Yet a history of La Hata and other 
shantytowns in Havana raises questions. On what basis did these neighborhoods claim that they 
occupied state lands? How much leverage did they gain from these claims? And what did the 
property rights of Havana’s poor reveal about urban citizenship more broadly?  
This chapter examines the evolution of land laws during the decades following the 1933 
Revolution and how poor people in Havana put them to use. While the chapter discusses laws 
that applied to rural land, it only treats rural land disputes in relation to the capital. I argue that 
official norms of urban citizenship during the 1930s were narrow, but that by claiming a place in 
the city, poor people pushed for more expansive, inclusive possibilities. Their status as Cubans, 
they insisted, gave them rights to state lands in Havana. Whether ideological or practical, these 
                                                 
76 Comparecencia del Acusado Administrador de Compañía Atlantic Frutera y Azucarera de Cuba, 31 August 1923, Legajo 60, 
Expediente 19, Secretaria de la Presidencia, ANC, 17. 
77 “Miles de caballerías de tierra tiene el gobierno en Sagua de Tánamo que ahora mismo podía repartirlas entre los campesinos,” 
Noticias de Hoy, May 9, 1950, 6; Rafael Sánchez Alebret, “Sagua de Tánamo: Ciudades que surgen a una nueva vida,” Bohemia, 
February 21, 1964.  
78 By contrast, the study of agrarian reform in Latin America has produced an extensive body of work, which I do not engage 
with here. See, for example, Catherine LeGrand, Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia, 1830-1936 
(Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1986), especially chapter seven.  
79 For example, in an investigation of a conflict in rural Oriente over land known as “Realengo 18,” the authors conclude that “En 
alguna medida…la falta de definición legal que caracterizó estas tierras durante todo el periodo republicano fue un éxito para 
los residentes, que al parecer lograron permanecer en esas tierras y cultivarlas.” De la Fuente and Meriño Fuentes, “Vigilar en 
las tierras del estado,” 224.  
Other authors who have paid significant attention to land legislation are Suárez Rivas, Los días iguales; Domínguez, 
Cuba: Order and Revolution, 423-463. Also see Nelson, Rural Cuba, 162-173. 
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claims implied a different version of urban citizenship than the one proposed by officials.80 As 
poor people moved into the capital, they claimed these rights based on a legal framework that 
was designed for the countryside, not the city, and in most cases the results left them without 
legal title. Often, however, these claims were politically compelling enough to stall eviction 
proceedings—and in some cases to do even more. In mobilizing for permanent rights to the city, 
then, the rural migrants who became the urban poor revealed, and in some cases made real, a 
radical “insurgent” interpretation of the role of the Cuban state in the capital. Nevertheless, for 
many poor Cubans this interpretation remained unfulfilled, resulting in widespread informality.   
 The chapter begins with an overview of migration to the capital in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, followed by an analysis of new state initiatives to manage and exclude poor people. 
It continues by examining the ways that the urban poor constructed a more expansive vision for 
Havana. The next section examines state lands in Cuban law and the evolution of land reform 
during the 1930s. Next, the chapter examines the law in practice through a selection of urban 
land disputes in the 1940s, finally exploring the radical possibilities revealed by the case of La 
Hata.  
2.1 THE CITY OF REPARTOS 
The urban poverty that emerged in early 1930s Havana was unprecedented in its scope and 
radical in its political potential. In a nation where sugar was king, new forms of urban industrial 
                                                 
80 Here, I borrow the concept of “insurgent citizenship” from James Holston. “Citizenship,” he writes, “is…much more than a 
formal political institution. Its lived history develops in tensions between conflicting productions of social life as it both 
motivates struggles for inclusion and equality and sustains deep and common desires for exclusion.” Holston, Insurgent 
Citizenship, 22.  
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and manufacturing employment expanded in the 1920s as Havana grew in leaps and bounds. 
Between 1919 and 1931, the city’s population doubled. 18 percent of all Cubans now shared a 
city with their national elected leaders, up from 13 percent a decade before.81 As the government 
constructed a new national capitol in almost perfect likeness to the United States’, press reports 
theorized that the poor were “intoxicated by the lights of the great metropolitan capital.”82 The 
bright lights cast long shadows, however, as the global economic collapse of 1929 hit the city. 
Between 1929 and 1933, sugar production dropped 60 percent.83 Rural laborers were discharged 
from company-owned land, often losing housing and other benefits.84 In 1930, observers 
reported, “bands of hungry countrymen are marching towards cities in search of food and 
employment.”85 A 1934 report noted “an interminable exodus,” as rural families moved to cities 
to become “a grave social problem.”86 
Grave social problems indeed awaited these new habaneros. The housing situation was 
even worse than what could be expected from population growth or paralyzed construction. With 
tenants unable to pay, landlords refused to rent, and significant numbers of houses were left 
deliberately unoccupied at the very moment when new arrivals sought housing. In December 
1931, El Mundo reported 14,000 vacant homes in the Havana Central District, many of which 
had been so for more than two years. “Unoccupied houses…[are] found in the busiest and most 
central streets of the city,” it claimed, and evictions were surpassing 70,000 annually. As 
property owners fell into bankruptcy or defaulted on their mortgages, their properties were sold 
                                                 
81 Scarpaci, Segre, and Coyula, Havana: Two Faces, 120. 
82 “Turbas de antillanos viven como indigentes en la parte vieja de la capital de Cuba,” El Crisol, September 29, 1934, 1, 6. 
83 Whitney, State and Revolution, 58. 
84 McGillivray, Blazing Cane, 137, 142, 199-201; de la Fuente and Meriño Fuentes, “Vigilar en las tierras del estado,” 215; Dyer, 
“Urbanism in Cuba,” 224-33. 
85 Edward Reed, “Confidential Dispatch,” 5 August 1930, RG84/326, USNA.  
86 “Los campesinos sin pan y sin viviendas, en éxodo interminable, doloroso y cruel se encuentran en nuestra capital muy 
desesperados,” El Crisol, May 11, 1934, 1, 6.  
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at “auctions that no one attends.”87 Between 1927 and 1933, the Havana’s Center of Urban 
Property reported a 70 percent drop in rental payments across the city.88 Houses in Havana were 
left vacant, or impossibly overcrowded—and masses of poor people had no housing at all.  
With rental units unavailable, desperate people moved to informal encampments in 
Havana’s repartos—peripheral subdivisions away from the built city. Far beyond the dense city 
center, infrastructure was frequently lacking.89 In Marianao, an editorial noted, “in hygiene, 
cleanliness and beautification it is as if the city government had been created yesterday.”90 
Neighborhood associations complained about “loose animals, especially goats, who swarm 
around that neighborhood offering a shameful spectacle,” as rural and urban life blended 
together.91 Insufficient trash pickup in expanding areas fueled worries of sickness.92  
Such concerns were the product of changing times, and they would lead to new forms of 
governance. With masses of newly unemployed Cubans housed precariously, but within view of 
national politicians, the elements for increased popular political participation were now in place. 
As government officials sought to manage economic collapse, Havana became a theater for mass 
politics. The urban poor were on the scene. 
                                                 
87 “Las estadísticas acusan 70,000 desahucios al año, y las casas desalquiladas pasan de 14,000,” El Mundo, December 19, 1931, 
1, 2.  
88 Raúl de Cardenas, “Exposición que dirige al Congreso de la República el Centro de la Propiedad Urbana de la Habana sobre el 
Proyecto de Ley de Alquileres,” Revista Nacional de la Propiedad Urbana, March 1939, 12.  
89 On underserviced subdivisions, see Chapter 5. Among the fastest growing areas of the capital were the southern, inland 
neighborhoods of Arroyo Apolo and Arroyo Naranjo, areas that were barely urbanized. The municipalities of Guanabacoa and 
Marianao grew disproportionately as well. Cuba, Censo 1943, 825-6. 
90 “Aumento de la población en Marianao,” El Sol, October 24, 1931, 1.  
91 “Velando por el Reparto ‘La Serafina,’” El Sol, January 23, 1932, 1. 
92 “Razonable queja de algunas familias,” El Sol, Mayo 14, 1932, 1.  
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2.2 PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
As radical protests swept across the country, urban officials responded by blending 
repression with social assistance. They enacted these measures seeking to bend the capital’s 
residents to their own elite vision of what citizenship should entail. Police subdued protesters, 
and, where possible, deported poor foreigners. Meanwhile, officials offered basic assistance to 
citizens in need. In the process, they forcefully imposed norms for order, construction, 
cleanliness, and work discipline. When these visions of capital life proved unsustainable, 
officials sought to exclude poor Cuban citizens from Havana, just like the foreigners they sent 
away. In the construction of Machado’s welfare state, then, officials sketched the boundaries of 
urban citizenship narrowly.  
In February 1931, Machado’s administration created a “Central District,” subject to laws 
distinct from the rest of the Republic, placing control over the logistical functions and policing of 
the capital in the hands of military officers appointed by the president.93 Within the district, 
police repressed protests as disorder broke out among the poor.94 In April 1932, observers 
reported unruly bands of poor people attacking “each other with blows, sticks and rocks,” noting 
injuries as police used firearms “to quell a disturbance created by indigents in an obscure 
section” of Havana.95 In another section of the city, food kitchens that had been set up by the 
Spanish consulate to serve unemployed Spanish citizens reported “a serious alteration of 
                                                 
93 Harry Guggenheim to the Secretary of State, 17 February 1931, RG84/810.1/569, USNA.  
94 Rolando Rodríguez, Rebelión en la República, 175-227; Whitney, State and Revolution, 81-100. 
95 Edward Reed to the Secretary of State, April 1932, RG84/800/1155, USNA, 33; “Dispersó esta madrugada la policía a un 
crecido grupo de indigentes que se atacó,” El Mundo, April 28, 1932, 1. 
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order.”96 One writer observed a large group of unemployed men organize a protest “that was 
dissolved by clubbing from the police.”97  
Amid protest, officials sought to preserve the city as a space of order and prosperity, 
which led them to remove as many poor, disorderly people as possible. In 1931, Machado 
claimed that recent “disturbance comes from other peoples …directed by hidden foreign powers 
and developed in Cuba.”98 The message was popular, since many perceived Spanish workers to 
be taking jobs from Cubans. An editorial in El Sol argued that insolvent “foreigners …have 
‘skipped the line’ [and] crashed on our shores…to compete with our nationals.”99 Meanwhile, 
heavily racialized debates led to the forced deportation of black Haitian and West Indian laborers 
from eastern Cuba.100 In 1934, a report complained about black Antillean indigents in the capital 
as well. Lamenting their “African instincts,” exemplified by “fetishism and witchcraft,” the 
reporter hoped that they could be “sent to the nations from which they have come.”101 By 1935 it 
would become illegal to be foreign and “indigent” at the same time.102  
 Stoking nationalist fires, the government soon enacted measures to resettle and repatriate 
poor Spanish immigrants from Havana. Throughout the 1930s poor people were also repatriated 
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to Puerto Rico, China, Mexico, and elsewhere, usually from eastern Cuba.103 Little has been 
written about Spanish repatriations, however, which took place from Havana. From 1931-1932, 
several thousand Spanish “indigents” were rounded up into camps, where they were fed and 
housed as they awaited transport to Iberia. The Ministry of Governance oversaw camps at 
Tiscornia in Casa Blanca and at La Purísima in the central Atarés neighborhood, near growing 
informal encampments.104 By the mid 1930s, religious organizations established camps to house 
unemployed Spanish as well.105 These moves were mostly voluntary, although Machado’s 
officials at La Purísima sometimes used deportation as a threat.106 The Spanish government 
funded some repatriations, but they were more often sponsored by elite Spanish clubs in Cuba.107  
 Premised on its benefit to nationals, the exclusion of foreigners had important 
implications for the relationship between poor Cubans and the state. By linking deportation with 
urban poverty, government officials acknowledged a basic obligation to manage the destitute 
citizens they claimed as their own.108 On June 16, 1931, in the midst of the Spanish deportations, 
President Machado introduced a decree, later backed by Congress, which established a “National 
Committee for the Feeding and Defense of the Unemployed.”109 The committee would be funded 
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by money drawn from the salaries of public employees, and later came to be known simply as 
the “indigents fund.”110 In spite of some criticism, this was a key initiative in the early public 
welfare state in Cuba and would be referenced for decades.111 We hope to combat “public 
begging, and impede people … from … building shacks at certain places,” stated officials.112  
 The fund was used to forcibly clear informal encampments from around the city and 
house citizens in the same shelter used to hold deported Spanish “indigents”—although not all 
the Spanish had yet been deported. A building designed for 1,000 people, the shelter offered a 
variety of services. Men slept on cots on the bottom floor, while another floor was established for 
women and small children, and another area for single women. The camp had a medical staff, 
washing facilities, and offered food.113 It also imposed strict discipline on residents, who were 
expected to work, behave well, be “clean, shaved, and bathed,” remain in the camp unless 
authorized, and “obey and comply in whatever order they might receive.” Denying that the poor 
were prisoners, officials stated that residents could leave—but only on the condition that they 
find appropriate housing or abandon the capital.114  By 1932, residents from the camp were put 
to work paving streets.115  
Given the scale of poverty in Havana, these measures were small. As it became clear that 
a more permanent solution was needed, officials built indigent camps on work farms outside the 
city, where they hoped to relocate the poor from the central camps so they could help feed the 
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capital's prison population.116 On April 10, 1933, officials announced the opening of “General 
Machado Colony” near the outlying town of Bauta to utilize the labor of hundreds of indigents 
from La Purísima.117 As the government dealt with growing numbers of poor people in the 
capital, it therefore took responsibility for their wellbeing. Yet as poverty in the city outstripped 
the capacity of the state to manage it, a critical component of new welfare initiatives was to 
discipline and exclude those who could not meet official expectations for life in the capital. 
As life in the camp at La Purísima revealed, official expectations for urban life were high. 
Underlying Machado’s methods towards the poor was his government’s modern, civilized vision 
for Havana’s future. In 1930, officials publicized their own embodiment of this vision, a 
comprehensive new industrial and public housing development in the peripheral, partially 
urbanized subdivision of Boyeros, where thousands of new arrivals had made their homes. 
Project supporters explained that they hoped “to better the condition of the Cuban worker.” At 
the new neighborhood, they claimed, workers would achieve “cultural improvement” through 
night schools, and “physical conservation” with clean houses, “elegant promenades,” and a 
hospital.118 “What was a fourth-rate backwater has been miraculously transformed into a lively, 
laughing modern population,” explained an article in a government-sponsored publication. 
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“Rancho Boyeros woke up and General Machado rested.”119 Named for Machado's mother, the 
Lutgardita neighborhood included everything that officials expected from urban citizens.120  
The planners of Lutgardita projected their high hopes onto the surrounding city. The 
“picturesque and well tended” housing project was hailed as a triumph and a symbol of progress 
by the government that built it.121 Noting the success of shelters for the poor in other parts of the 
capital, pro-government reports noted the high approval rates for the president and Cuba's 
unusual success in dealing with urban poverty.122 “Havana is the first capital in the world to free 
itself of the painful spectacle of those conquered and beaten down by unemployment,” noted a 
press report. “This Christmas el habanero will not experience the remorse of enjoying himself in 
the face of misery.”123 
As government officials sought to structure the capital city according to Lutgardita’s 
utopian dreams, however, they would come up short. Well-constructed though they may have 
been, the small collection of homes were virtually insignificant amidst the waves of private, 
often informal constructions that comprised Havana's rapid expansion. Still, the homes were not 
without effect. Emblematic of the narrow, formal boundaries of urban citizenship, their meaning 
would be transformed in ways that officials could not expect.  
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2.3 RIGHTS TO THE CITY 
As Machado’s officials articulated visions of a modern, elite Havana in Lutgardita, masses of 
poor Cubans responded by reformulating it into visions of their own. While officials saw the 
primary role of the state as the regulation and exclusion of deviant behavior, poor people 
throughout the capital articulated another option for their government. In confronting the utopian 
expectations of Machado’s welfare state, many believed that they had the right to stay in the 
capital—and that, as citizens, the resources of the Cuban state should help them. Since they made 
these claims without formal property rights, however, they sought to construct them.   
They did so on the shaky, incomplete framework that state officials had built to regulate 
their behavior. The minimal public housing and social welfare measures begun under Machado 
highlighted an expanded set of commitments taken up by the Cuban state. As a backdrop to the 
intensified political protests, however, these projects exposed the state's inability to fulfill those 
commitments in specific, concrete ways. Sites allocated for public housing and welfare came to 
be centers of political activism, where poor men and women publicized their demands for state 
assistance. As the government collapsed, these demands intensified.  
  Demands for a place in the city often took the form of disobeying orders from officials. 
As Machado's government removed poor Cuban citizens from Havana to rural work camps in 
1933, for example, affected residents protested furiously. The US State Department noted 
official complaints that a “construction gang, consisting of able-bodied indigents who had been 
cared for by the Government for two years because of their inability to find employment, had 
shown its ingratitude by deserting when asked to work for its own benefit.”124 As similar 
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measures continued following Machado’s fall, a 1934 report similarly noted that most workers 
“have disappeared from the ‘La Purísima’ encampment upon finding out they would be brought 
to the work farm to labor.”125 The health ministry sought to evict other families who remained in 
the centrally located camp that same year, leading residents to form commissions to protest the 
order.126 Meanwhile, visitors to the camp’s food shelter complained of harsh treatment and that 
“they do not receive meat.”127  
Nor did problems end there. Those who were successfully relocated to rural camps 
chafed against harsh discipline and often deserted. In one instance, a belligerent worker known 
as “el Indio Bravo” attacked camp soldiers around mealtime and tried “to make the rest of the 
indigents rebel.” After being arrested, el Indio Bravo disappeared from custody, only to appear 
more than a year later on the other side of the city, in Regla.128 Meanwhile, residents of 
Pogolotti, a public housing project built in Marianao during the 1910s, used their status as 
recipients of state housing to demand infrastructural improvements and to protest against their 
required monthly payments.129 The city, residents concluded, was theirs too. 
Mass protests brought Machado’s government to collapse in 1933, leading poor people to 
expand their insurgent claims. As a provisional, left wing government suspended most evictions, 
vacant houses and lands were occupied all across the city. In Old Havana, scores of “beggars and 
other indigents” partially burned and occupied the Heraldo de Cuba newspaper building.130 In 
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Puentes Grandes, poor people constructed shacks in an area known as Aldecoa, given that the 
property owner had abandoned the land.131 Residents of Playa Viriato in Marianao called their 
land a “popular conquest … obtained from the struggle against the dictatorship as sole patrimony 
of the poor classes of the population.”132 Residents in Guanabacoa echoed a common claim: “In 
the period following the overthrow of the Machadista tyranny, numerous unemployed families 
built homes there.”133 New arrivals built on other vacant land in Guanabacoa, on the edges of 
Regla, in Marianao, and throughout Havana. Sometimes against protests by titleholders, 
organized bands of squatters covered urban lands with self-built shacks, forming communities, 
which the press deemed neighborhoods of “unemployed,” “indigents,” or “llega y pón” (arrive 
and build).  
Conditions in these settlements were harsh, but in a time of crisis their benefits were real. 
For one resident, who had enjoyed a relatively privileged life as a domestic worker for wealthy 
families before the economic crisis, moving to an improvised neighborhood was a way to acquire 
stability. “It’s true; they had to carry all the water to the house, and the floor was dirt …but they 
could make the house more spacious and they didn’t have to pay rent. … It was without the 
anguish of maybe that very day being thrown out into the street.”134  Another resident reported 
that in order to not have “their furniture in the street, well, they started to build the huts.”135 As 
officials sought to eliminate shacks, people across the city built more. To stay, they declared by 
their actions, was their right.   
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In response to elite visions for the future of Havana, then, poor people in the city 
expressed alternative, insurgent claims. While officials sought to exclude and regulate the urban 
poor in accordance with plans for a modern, prosperous capital, those same poor people 
demanded their own space within that vision. Targeting the specific sites where Machado’s 
welfare state had left its mark, these people claimed land and benefits from the Cuban state.  
As new governments took up an expanded set of issues related to the social welfare of 
poor citizens following 1933, these claims expanded apace. By the end of the decade, a set of 
claims with particularly radical implications would come from an unlikely place. Hundreds of 
residents built shacks near an Independence War monument at La Hata in Guanabacoa, a 
settlement that went unnoticed in the national press for being at the far eastern edge of 
metropolitan Havana.136 There, as the government outlined plans for agrarian reform in rural 
areas, residents responded with their own interpretation of the matter. The lands of La Hata, they 
claimed, had been ceded to them generations ago by the Spanish. Now, they said, they belonged 
to the Cuban state.137  
2.4 STATE LANDS IN CUBAN LAW 
As a site for these claims, La Hata was unlikely because it destabilized prevailing notions of 
rural and urban. In the early 1930s it was not at all clear that debates over state lands would have 
an impact on Havana’s poor. The 1933 Revolution brought agrarian reform into the political 
foreground, but debates on the matter universally centered on rural areas like Sagua de Tánamo, 
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where men like Santiago Cutiño waged battles across generations. It was only after the fact that 
residents of urban shantytowns would find ways to utilize these debates, yet their consequences 
for Havana were potentially far reaching. In claiming that their lands belonged to the state, poor 
habaneros joined a set of conflicts that had roots in the first days of Spanish settlement, an issue 
that, according to a 1939 study, “has given headaches to every generation of officials that has 
tried to govern Cuba.”138 Dating back to the sixteenth century, government officials distributed 
lands without precision, leading to heated conflicts and increasingly complex, overlapping 
claims. In an age of mass urban politics, these claims would grow more complicated still.  
The full legal history of land regulations in Cuba falls beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but pertinent issues can be briefly summarized in two types of state land: mercedes 
and realengos. Mercedes were colonial lands granted in usufruct—that is, rights to use without 
title—by city councils well into the eighteenth century. These rights were passed down to the 
heirs of the grantee—but rather than being divided among the heirs, they were held in common, 
as haciendas comuneras. As generations passed, no one could develop portions of these 
haciendas comuneras without consensus among the partners, even as the state technically 
retained ownership of the land. Overlapping these claims, an entirely different set of Spanish 
authorities distributed other lands, known as royal lands, or realengos. Because it often cost 
more to make arrangements to purchase titles than the lands were worth, many people simply 
settled on them without formalizing their possession.139 From the outset, then, lands held as both 
mercedes and realengos led to widespread uncertainty and conflict. 
Two key developments in the nineteenth century altered the situation. First, in 1819, 
royal officials enacted several pieces of legislation to grant full ownership of mercedes to those 
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in possession of them and established procedures for the division of haciendas comuneras. 
Through this same legislation, those who resided on realengos without title could gain full 
ownership of their lands by proving they had lived there for more than 40 years. (Other sources, 
including Cuba’s Communist Party, later claimed ownership rights based on 25 or 30 years.)140 
A second key development occurred in 1877 in the midst of Cuba’s independence wars. As the 
Ten-Years War wound to a close, the Spanish government distributed realengos to those who 
had remained loyal to the Crown, as well as to revolutionaries whom they pardoned.  
Far from resolving uncertainty over land in Cuba, the combination of these measures did 
the opposite. As peasants gradually occupied realengos across the island, and as entrepreneurs 
purchased titles to them from the state, “not even the government officials could always say that 
a given piece of land was not privately owned, or that part of it did not pertain to one of the still 
undivided mercedes.”141 Finding out, moreover, could be costly. The 1939 study noted many 
cases of litigation between “prescriptive rights” to the land, based on 40 years possession, against 
“paper rights” based on title, a situation that had led to “squatter sovereignty” in Cuba.142 So it 
was in Realengo 18 in Oriente, where the Spanish had granted land to peasants, even as three 
separate companies later purchased title to the same land from the state. Litigation ensued for 
decades.143 Similarly complicated was a dispute between José San Miguel and the Warner Sugar 
Corporation in 1937, over mortgage payments to lands of unknown size. Despite the fact that the 
company had held title to the land for more than a decade, the purchase could not be completed 
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because “both the sellers and the buyer knew that a large number of caballerías had been lost to 
squatters and others and that for such reason it was impossible to determine the exact area.”144  
In claiming that their lands belonged to the state, then, residents of La Hata and other 
informally occupied areas of the Havana metropolitan area invoked an entangled, ambiguous 
legal framework, where arcane decrees, regulations, inheritances, and purchases left lawyers and 
squatters equally confused. Yet it was precisely the type of ambiguity that could yield significant 
results given the right amount of political pressure. And in the 1930s, poor people in Cuba could 
generate political pressure in spades.  
The 1933 Revolution gave new impulse to longstanding demands for comprehensive 
agrarian reform, which ultimately highlighted the role of the state in urban land disputes. From 
Grau’s rise to the presidency in 1933, through the promulgation of the 1940 Constitution, 
momentum for agrarian reform accelerated along two lines. First, reformers sought to catalogue 
and distribute titles to state lands where ownership was in doubt. Second, they sought to prevent 
the eviction of poor peasants in cases where title disputes could not be definitively resolved. 
Politicians enacted decrees and legislation along both lines, but in general were more successful 
along the second than the first. In practice, reforms protected many families from eviction, even 
as it left them plagued by housing insecurity resulting from lingering title disputes. The result 
was a system in which sustained political mobilization was often required for land security.    
During the 1920s and early 30s prominent figures highlighted the need for land reform, 
but the government did not pass substantial measures.145 After his sudden rise to the presidency, 
Grau tacitly approved many land occupations, and even distributed properties held by officials 
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from the Machado regime to “indigent rural families.”146 The government also suspended all 
evictions, and enacted decrees on agrarian reform.147 In May 1934, President Carlos Mendieta 
continued along these lines, passing measures to distribute rural homesteads to “indigents.”148 
Even US Embassy officials concurred with such measures, warning in 1934 that a “grave 
situation” would develop in the absence of land reform.149 After the influential 1935 study by the 
Foreign Policy Association concluded that agrarian reform was a necessity, the matter became 
one of consensus.150  
These measures ran parallel to other measures affecting urban tenants.151 In most cities, 
municipal taxes were in arrears across the island, and mayors were largely unable to arbitrate 
property disputes.152 Yet rural conflict also generated interest in the capital for its own sake. As 
Batista and the army controlled the more radical elements of the 1933 Revolution, leading to 
Grau's ouster, politicized reports reached the national press of the land dispute at Realengo 18 in 
Oriente, where peasants under threat of forcible eviction claimed to be occupying state lands. 
The publicity of the case was such that the Minister of Justice personally travelled to the remote 
lands to negotiate with residents. Speaking to Diario de la Marina, he denounced the peasants 
for creating “a communist state” but he also stalled eviction proceedings.153 The Realengo 18 
dispute generated solidarity strikes among Communists and labor organizers in Havana.154 
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 Amid these efforts, the issue of state lands—the quantity of which was unclear—was a 
key variable. In March 1935, Mendieta signed a decree establishing procedures and offering 
incentives to successful denunciations of unlawful usurpation of state lands.155 In 1936, a senate 
committee publicly presented draft legislation for the partition of state lands.156 By June 1936, 
the House of Representatives had established a committee for agrarian reform as well, and by 
October, a draft for a new constitution included provisions to allow the government to 
expropriate land at will, for “social interest.”157 In 1937, these proposals gained traction as 
Batista announced a set of reforms known as the Plan Trienal, allying with communists and 
seeking to strengthen his populist credentials. Along with the passage of a number of temporary 
decrees, President Laredo Bru signed a law in December 1937 establishing measures to survey 
and reclaim state lands.158 The measure created a commission to assess which lands belonged to 
the Cuban state, and for the “repossession, parceling, division, colonization, and development” 
of those lands.159  
 A wide range of reactions greeted the law. Many celebrated it as an initiative in support 
of the rural poor, while one US lawyer called it “a move towards social revolution, modeled after 
the Mexican pattern.”160 In a country where there were very few vacant lands, and many titles 
overlapped or used vague measurements, a more common response was uncertainty. Ironically, 
critics worried that the state might use its authority to overturn the proscriptive rights of 
established landowners, based on 40 years occupancy. Of course, these were the same rights 
claimed by many so-called squatters. Meanwhile, US Embassy officials noted “the fear of land 
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confiscation from rightful proprietors,” indicating that they were prepared to support claims by 
US citizens.161 For his part, Batista played up hopes and fears of radical reform, announcing to 
the press, “within ten years there will be in Cuba very little land that is not the property of 
Cubans.”162 Speaking to US officials, however, Batista denied that the government would 
confiscate land whose title was in order. 163 
 All told, supporters and detractors of the measure agreed on a fundamental fact about the 
law: its impact depended greatly on how it was interpreted and implemented. In establishing a 
legal framework with which to assess and repossess state lands, the national government cleared 
space for itself at the center of occupancy disputes. By creating a legal mechanism with which to 
distribute confiscated lands to poor Cuban citizens it indicated a likely direction that it might 
pursue in such disputes. However, the law made no stipulation about how it might resolve 
conflict between occupants with titles against those who had proscriptive rights based on 
possession. Nor did it spell out any form of compensation in cases where legitimate claims 
overlapped. While the law gave the state the power to answer such questions, it was up to 
government officials to take the initiative to do so. Whatever it said on paper, the law was only 
as powerful as the political will behind it.164  
 The 1940 Constitution gave the measure firm backing. A proposed article to limit 
latifundia generated heated debate in the assembly, which initially proposed the establishment of 
“a progressive tax on land” for large land tracts.165 Yet a number of delegates complained that 
this amounted to expropriation. When others, including Communists Blas Roca and Juan 
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Marinello, proposed to strengthen the amendment with the wording “to return land to the Cuban 
state,” another group, including Eusebio Mujal, countered that land should be returned “to 
Cubans.”166 “If Marx were present,” exclaimed a delegate, “he could happily sign this 
amendment.”167 Though Marinello assured the assembly that the amendment was consistent with 
“a modern democracy,” its strongest form was rejected in favor of Mujal's wording that the land 
be returned “to Cubans.” Nevertheless, the amendment requiring the breakup of large 
landholdings passed. In theory, then, by 1940, new legislation highlighted the state’s role to 
settle land disputes that had plagued Cuba since the early days of the colony. In practice, 
however, follow-through would be difficult.  
 Reinforcing these agrarian reform measures was a flurry of legislation and decrees 
enacted to limit evictions from rural land. Following Grau’s decrees in the early 1930s, Congress 
discussed legislation to limit the eviction of peasants.168 Much of the issue was resolved in 1937 
with the passage of the Sugar Coordination Act, which guaranteed land security to peasants who 
productively cultivated sugarcane.169 Ultimately, legislation prohibiting rural evictions failed to 
pass Congress, but Batista nonetheless enacted it as a decree.170 After the decree was declared 
unconstitutional, Grau decreed new legislation suspending the eviction of peasants on state lands, 
naming the residents of Realengo 18 in Oriente specifically.171 In 1948 Congress passed new 
comprehensive legislation protecting non-sugar producing peasants.172 Evictions continued in 
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some cases, however.173 By the early 1950s, therefore, even as many Cuban peasants had not 
achieved title to their lands, many eviction proceedings remained in limbo. 
 Cuban officials made the state’s obligations to resolve land disputes clear in an 
environment where popular legitimacy became key to successful governance. By establishing 
measures to catalogue and distribute state lands to peasants, and by suspending many evictions in 
cases of uncertainty, the legal system offered new and radical possibilities to Havana’s urban 
poor. At the same time, these laws had not been written with them in mind, and how they would 
be implemented was far from clear. It would therefore be left up to the urban poor to seek 
political channels with which to use new legal reforms to their advantage.   
2.5 LAND WARS 
Informal land occupation in Havana was limited compared to cities like Rio de Janeiro, but it 
still represented a significant portion of the city.174 Accurate accounting is difficult, however. 
The most centrally located shantytowns of the time were occupied before 1933 in the vicinity of 
the Atarés Castle near Old Havana. Holding several hundred people each during the Machadato, 
by the 1950s between 6,000-10,000 people lived in these three central neighborhoods just miles 
from the capitol.175 Other neighborhoods were spread around the city, ranging from a few 
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scattered shacks to areas of more than 1,000 residents. An informant involved with a government 
food distribution network recalls that there were 16 shantytown neighborhoods registered 
throughout greater Havana by the end of the 1930s, though there were likely more. The first 
systematic effort to catalogue shantytowns identified 21 in 1951; in the 1950s, it is possible there 
were more than 36 neighborhoods. A report from Havana’s College of Architects estimated that 
five percent of the municipal population lived in these areas in 1950, or upwards of 50,000 
people.176 In each case, however, these estimates did not include legal, underserviced 
subdivisions or tenements, which were far more numerous (Chapter 5).  
There was never a comprehensive effort to claim that these neighborhoods occupied state 
lands, although such claims would have been logical given the ambiguities of the land reform 
legislation. Such claims instead emerged organically, through trial and error, when residents 
demonstrated through their actions the belief that Havana was a city in which they had the right 
to live. With some exceptions, informal neighborhoods were not linked to each other, except by 
the government agencies that sought to manage them. Discussed in chapter 3, the Communist 
Party networked among shantytowns and advocated for many of them in property disputes, but it 
did not articulate generalized demands for land distribution in urban areas.177 Instead claims of 
state lands arose defensively, on a case-by-case basis, as residents and their allies resisted 
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titleholders who sought to remove them. Gradually, residents and neighborhood organizations 
across the city included such claims in a repertoire of contention with which they fought against 
eviction.  
 It did not take a great deal of creativity to see that agrarian reform measures could apply 
to Havana.178 In 1939, President Laredo Bru appointed the former Secretary of Agriculture and 
confidant of Batista, Amadeo López Castro, as a “special delegate to the President of the 
Republic for the distribution of land.”179 Soon after, Batista and López made several trips to 
Oriente where they distributed land titles to poor residents on state lands, which attracted notice 
in the capital.180 Later, just outside Havana, peasants near the Mariel port received land titles 
under the program. And at the Santa Fé beach, “almost within sight of the capital,” squatters 
occupied realengo lands as would-be purchasers squabbled over its title. Later, as the courts 
definitively ruled that the land belonged to the state, they sold their rights to developers.181  
 Meanwhile, the utility of the agrarian reform program gradually became clear in other 
urban disputes. In the aftermath of the rapid migrations and settlement of the early 1930s, 
titleholders, tenants, and squatters sought to secure their land rights. As politicians sought to 
appease mobilized voters, poor people worked actively to stretch political connections into 
material gains. Occupants seeking protection often took their claims to municipal authorities 
first, who in many cases permitted settlement without much concern for absent titleholders. 
When not actively permitted, settlements were at least tolerated in the absence of protest, and 
often backed by the municipality later. Shacks in Marianao were, according to residents, “being 
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occupied by another number of families who assure that they were authorized by then mayor of 
Marianao Ortelio Alpízar.”182 In Havana, residents of Las Yaguas appealed to the Mayor for 
approval of the settlement prior to 1933 (see chapter 3). In Guanabacoa, the mayor approved 
several settlements, with support of the city council.183  
 Appeals to municipal governments could lead to overlapping jurisdictions or other 
uncertainty, and by 1940 numerous cases were in dispute. In August 1937, for example, the 
mayor of Guanabacoa reported being visited by “a commission of humble residents from this 
municipality regarding the acquisition and distribution of … land lots.” The mayor supposedly 
informed them that they would have to research who the title owners might be, but that if none 
appeared, the residents’ rights would be respected, provided they “prove their status as solemn, 
poor Cuban citizens.” After an investigation revealed that the “lands were not registered in the 
Municipality of Guanabacoa,” the mayor provided a guarantee that, as he put it, no property 
owners had appeared at that point.184 
 The mayor's statement was given as testimony to investigators from the adjacent 
municipality of Regla, where it turned out that the land was in fact titled, and it is likely that he 
had initially been more permissive than he let on. A judge in Regla ruled soon after that the 
titleholders should retain ownership, and a number of residents were presented with eviction 
notices. Yet possession of the land remained in dispute. In 1938, the titleholders sent a curtly 
worded letter to the Guanabacoa mayor accusing him of being “perfectly aware of the problem 
arising from the occupation of lands” and of encouraging mobilizations by the squatters. The 
owners complained that, while they had agreed to sell titles to many of the affected residents, 
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“those occupants are constantly bothered” by organizers who should have been evicted, who “are 
arranging to celebrate on the next September fourth,” rewarding “vagrants.”185 The political 
savvy of the residents was evidenced in the date of their celebration: September fourth, the 
anniversary of Batista’s 1933 barracks coup and a date that they chose as the name for their 
neighborhood as well.   
 By December 1940, residents of the reparto “September Fourth” reportedly claimed that 
its lands “belong to the municipality, others to the state, and so on.” The titleholders published a 
desperate plea to the city council demanding that they be recognized as owners, complete with a 
history of the land's ownership dating back to the nineteenth century.186 It is unclear how the 
reparto “September Fourth” fared in later years, although documents from the 1940s and 50s 
reveal that the same property owners continued to develop and parcel portions of the land for 
residential use.187 What is clear, however, is that, amid the legal wrangling around the 1940 
Constitution, poor squatters found themselves in positions where political mobilization combined 
with claims about state lands had the potential to yield material results in terms of settlement 
rights—at least temporarily.  
 In the periods leading up to and following the promulgation of the 1940 Constitution land 
disputes intensified. Many informally housed residents emulated those from “September Fourth,” 
by claiming to occupy state lands. Communist activists, who were heavily involved in similar 
rural disputes, generally assisted in formulating or reporting these claims, although the depth of 
their involvement is usually unclear. At Aldecoa, for example, a writer in the Communist journal 
Noticias de Hoy claimed that, “for a long time poor Cuban families constructed their houses in 
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this area which is solely property of the Cuban state.”188 Telegrams to Batista from multiple 
labor unions seem to have put the eviction on hold.189 In Guanabacoa, reports from settlers at 
Gasómetro, Camaco, and Potosí noted “unjustified evictions and exclusions by individuals who 
have no right over these lands, property of the state.”190 Guanabo residents claimed that “these 
lands … belong to us by natural law. They were left to us by the Spanish, our ancestors.”191 In 
these last two cases, claims were backed by evidence of 19th-century Spanish land grants, while 
other cases required more creativity. Residents of shacks constructed on clearly titled land in 
Marianao, “especially those who have their houses on the straight line towards the street,” 
claimed that their lands “belong to that street and not to the company, unless it has proved that it 
has the right to them.”192 In 1951, reporting that electoral agents had destroyed his shack because 
he refused to affiliate with the Auténtico party, a resident of centrally located Vedado stated 
defensively “that these lands belong to the state,” despite the fact that the land was not in 
dispute.193  
 It is unclear that any of these cases resulted in definitive titling for residents, or even 
prompted attention from officials involved in agrarian reform efforts. In most cases where 
evidence is available, the best residents could hope for was a judicial stalemate, which allowed 
them to stay where they were but left them short of permanent title. During court proceedings on 
one of Havana’s central shantytowns, Las Yaguas, for example, neighborhood representatives 
made claims that could have led to a review of land titles according to laws on state lands. 
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Neighborhood advocates published the results of deep archival research in El País, finding that 
Las Yaguas’ lands “were never fenced,” and were later confiscated by the Spanish during the late 
nineteenth century because of the revolutionary activities of their owners. “If the state can 
recover those lands,” the report concluded, “the problem of ‘Las Yaguas’ may find a 
solution.”194 Residents added to these claims by invoking their ownership of the land on the basis 
of meeting residency requirements, which they believed “granted rights to the residents of a 
piece of non-urbanized land that was occupied by 25 residents for more than 25 years and not 
demanded by the so-called property owners.” By the mid-1940s, they believed they had 
sufficient time.195 There is no evidence that these arguments ever made it into court, however. 
The residents of Las Yaguas never received title to their land, nor is there evidence that the state 
studied the possibility of expropriation.  
The result was a situation of informality—one where eviction proved difficult, while 
titles remained elusive and residents insecure. Throughout the 1930s, titleholders for Las Yaguas 
repeatedly sued for eviction. Whether judges dismissed these suits on the basis that the lands 
might belong to the state or on some other basis, or whether politicians merely left eviction 
rulings unenforced, is not always clear, but the neighborhood continued to grow.196 In one of 
these cases, the judge dismissed the suit on a technicality, ruling that since squatters occupied the 
land prior to the date of the contract on which the suit was based, the contract had never existed 
(Chapter 3).197 In a 1955 case tried between a titleholder and residents in a different 
neighborhood, a judge ruled against eviction on a similar basis, arguing that the residents had 
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lived on the land prior to the sale of the title, rendering the sale invalid.198 These rulings were 
sufficient to stay eviction suits, which may have been unenforceable in any case due to 
presidential decrees. They did nothing to resolve the status of the land for residents, however. 
Based on available evidence, claims of state land often played little role in court.  
Yet the claims were not made without purpose. By declaring themselves occupants of 
state lands, residents invoked a legitimate legal framework through which to demand rights to 
the city from elected officials—and the results spoke for themselves. A 1949 editorial in Alerta 
claimed that many property owners had seen their lands “practically invalidated” by 
shantytowns.199 A 1950 report from the US State Department noted that the eviction of 
shantytowns was “a tedious process,” and that owners opted to persuade squatters to leave “by 
paying them small amounts for their houses” rather than go to court.200 The claim of state lands 
therefore served urban shantytowns as a rallying point—one whose maximum legal potential was 
rarely fulfilled, but which could draw the attention of political allies and stall eviction 
proceedings. In demanding to stay in their homes, shantytown residents invoked their rights as 
citizens by way of a legal framework whose applicability was not fully clear. Meanwhile, 
titleholders remained without land and residents remained without title. 
The worry that these land claims instilled in titleholders is clear by the lengths to which 
they went to sign rental contracts with occupants—contracts that pushed eviction proceedings 
into a different legal category. By establishing rental contracts, titleholders gained written 
acknowledgment of their ownership and could sometimes secure rulings of eviction—although 
rent laws had complications of their own (Chapter 5). In many Havana shantytowns residents did 
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not pay rent to titleholders.201 Amid trial proceedings at Las Yaguas, for example, residents 
claimed that titleholders offered bribes to several of them to sign a false rental contract, in order 
to sue on that basis.202 In a different neighborhood, a lawyer from a railroad company brought a 
suit before the Urgency Court in 1944, claiming that squatters had overrun their property in 
Marianao “without consent,” threatening “fatal personal consequences and subsequent damages 
to the company.”203 Not impressed, the investigating officer found similar houses built “with 
permission from the mentioned company, which has extended contracts … for which they pay 
one peso monthly.” “One arrives at the conclusion,” he continued, “that the protest of the 
company is due to the fact that the residents do not pay the monthly peso.”204 Meanwhile, at 
Finca Requena, part of a large conjunction of squatter neighborhoods near the current Plaza de la 
Revolución, poor families allegedly sub-rented their shacks from tenants who had signed 
contracts with titleholders. When the tenants deliberately ceased to pay, a judge ordered the 
neighborhood evicted.205 
When such evictions were carried out, poor families were precipitously displaced, a 
threat that loomed over all poor, informally housed habaneros. Arriving at Finca Requena with 
court officials on February 12, 1945, police proceeded to “destroy all of the homes, without 
exception, to the surprise of the residents who energetically protested.” A “large quantity” of 
poor people were cast out into the city to find lodging.206 Meanwhile, in other cases where 
residents had no title, they were left vulnerable to incursions of a less official variety. At Playa 
                                                 
201 Ibid, 4. 
202 MD, EB Interview of FA, 4 May 1969, Box 142, Folder 1, Papers, UIUC Archives, 56. 
203 Fiscal del Audiencia to Juez del Audiencia, 20 November 1944, Legajo 260, Expediente 19, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC, 1. 
204 The judge quickly ruled against the company, though appeals continued. Fiscal del Audiencia to Juez del Audiencia, 20 
November 1944, Legajo 260, Expediente 19, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC, 1; Sentencia, 25 February 1944, Legajo 260, 
Expediente 19, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC, 8; Fiscal del Audiencia to Juez del Audiencia, 20 April 1945, Legajo 274, 
Expediente 30, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC. 
205 “Violento desalojo en la Finca la Requena. Acusan directamente al procurador E. López,” Noticias de Hoy, February 13, 
1945, 1,3. 
206 Ibid, 1,3. 
  62 
Viriato in Marianao, where an estimated 600 people had constructed homes, private guards 
allegedly attacked and injured a leader from a neighborhood association, prompting protest.207 At 
Aldecoa, residents were reportedly told that if they refused to leave “their shacks, they would 
light them in flames.”208 Later, 20 policemen removed four families from the neighborhood, 
even as politicians were disputing the eviction.209 In Marianao, shacks were destroyed in the 
midst of conflict between municipal and national authorities over whether such destruction was 
permissible.210 As residents protested another impending eviction, the owners allegedly 
responded by hiring an off-duty policeman who was “charged with evicting the residents, 
creating through him true disorder.”211  
 In sum, as poor people redefined the boundaries of urban citizenship by claiming the city 
as theirs, one strategy they used was to claim that they occupied state lands. By invoking legal 
reforms initiated by the 1933 Revolution, they nearly always failed to gain formal property 
rights. Yet in many cases, they secured a precarious, enduring place in Havana. Framing the 
Finca Requena eviction as an affront to the legal reforms of the past decade, a Communist 
politician condemned the move as “being the same as those carried out in earlier times when the 
laws did not guarantee the respect, consideration, and protection that citizens deserve.”212 In part, 
he was right, since recent reforms had given many squatters in Havana leverage with which to 
claim rights to their land. Yet the eviction was a reminder that these were contested, insurgent 
                                                 
207 “Intervendrá el presidente en el pretendido desalojo de la playa libre ‘Viriato,’” Noticias de Hoy, November 16, 1940, 7. 
208 “Quieren desalojar a los indigentes del Reparto Aldecoa,” El Crisol, August 31, 1940, 8; “Amenazadas con ser desalojadas 
varias familias,” El Crisol, September 23, 1940, 8; “Piden intervención de Batista en el desalojo de ‘Aldecoa,’” Noticias de Hoy, 
February 26, 1940; “Esta anunciado para el martes otro injusto desalojo de familias en el barrio de desocupados de ‘Aldecoa,’” 
Noticias de Hoy, February 29 1940, 1.  
209 “Desalojan a cuatro familias en el barrio de ‘Aldecoa,’” Noticias de Hoy, September 25, 1940, 1, 6. 
210 “Mientras se negaba la entrada en la playa “Viriato” a los ediles de Marianao, destruían las casas,” Noticias de Hoy, June 8, 
1941, 7. 
211 “Vecinos de ‘La Requena’ piden a Batista que actué contra el desalojo de varias familias,” Noticias de Hoy, July 9, 1944, 8.  
212 “Violento desalojo en la Finca la Requena. Acusan directamente al procurador E. López,” Noticias de Hoy, February 13, 
1945, 1,3. 
  63 
claims, which sought to interpret existing legal frameworks in the interest of the poor. For most, 
the rights they afforded were significant but incomplete. 
2.6 THE PROBLEM OF LA HATA 
By 1940, La Hata embodied the incomplete promises of Cuban legal reform. Built without title 
on hilly lands on the far eastern edge of metropolitan Havana, the neighborhood was in many 
ways typical of the numerous poor, informal settlements scattered around the capital. Its 
difficulty in carving out a space there would be typical as well. Yet by the end of the decade, the 
mobilization of neighborhood residents revealed the potential for poor Cuban citizens to gain 
property rights from the Cuban state. In the process, residents of La Hata made real the promises 
that had previously only been imagined by the informally housed, urban poor.   
Residents built the shacks of La Hata during the early 1930s, adjacent to a well-known 
Independence War monument, with approval from the municipal government. By the 1940s, 
approximately 500 families occupied the land, making it one of the largest informal settlements 
in the city. By 1941, as in many other neighborhoods, a titleholder claimed ownership of the 
land. In protesting this claim, residents sought help from the Guanabacoa city council, which 
offered them legal support, since residents “have contributed to the Municipal Administration for 
many years.”213 The municipality helped neighborhood advocates to locate evidence of a 
nineteenth-century royal decree, which had ceded the lands for common use. “These lands 
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correspond to the state,” a neighborhood association wrote to government officials.214 No less 
certain, however, was the fact that, in the century that followed, John Stowers, a US citizen, had 
purchased a title to the land. The problem of La Hata was therefore familiar: US Embassy 
officials reported that the land “has been occupied by Cuban squatters whom the Cuban 
authorities have refused to remove.”215 
 In many other occupancy disputes around the city, the matter would have ended there, 
leading to a situation of informal occupation for residents and an effectively worthless title for 
the would-be owner. As a US citizen, however, La Hata’s titleholder was different, and he 
reached out to the US Embassy for help. In the meantime, residents responded in kind. As the 
titleholder used US allies to press Cuban officials, residents gained support from the Guanabacoa 
mayor and the city council along with various national politicians and union leaders from the 
Communist Party. With the residents backed by the municipal government and the titleholder 
backed by the US Embassy, both sides looked to the national government for a solution. Under 
pressure, the Ministry of Public Works agreed to expropriate the land in 1944. Legally, the move 
fell under the government’s agrarian reform initiative.216  
To ensure that officials followed through on their commitments, mobilization in La Hata 
continued on both sides. Neighborhood leaders held a mass rally in July, where veterans from the 
Liberation Army, representatives from the Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC), and Communist 
Senator Salvador García Agüero all called for action from Batista.217 Children from the 
neighborhood gathered for a photo for the press, with a caption noting that bureaucratic hang-ups 
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were placing numerous families in jeopardy of eviction.218 In late August 1944, with just over 
one month remaining in Batista's term, residents celebrated a “tribute” to the president 
“motivated by the plausible accord adopted by the Council of Ministers in its latest meeting, 
expropriating the lands.”219 By late September, El Mundo confirmed progress, prompting 
celebration.”220 Behind the scenes, Batista reportedly negotiated with Stowers over an 
expropriation amount, offering $25,000.221 Yet disputes surrounding the neighborhood did not 
end. The following year, a column in Noticias de Hoy wrote of “the problem of La Hata,” 
explaining, “the accord has still not been executed.”222 Like other areas of Havana, La Hata 
remained in legal dispute. Meanwhile the US property owner continued to agitate against the 
residents.223  
As tensions in the neighborhood remained high, negotiations between Stowers and the 
Cuban government revealed problems with the land legislation not anticipated in the debates 
surrounding its passage. To push the expropriation forward, the US ambassador took up the 
matter directly in a telephone conversation with President Grau, Batista’s successor, who 
expressed approval. Yet the proceedings took an unexpected turn, when Paulina Alsina, the First 
Lady of the Republic, allegedly approached Stowers in a “late evening appointment” where she 
offered to pay him a $200,000 appropriation, designated for “low-cost housing,” on the condition 
that he return $150,000 to her. Without her help, she reportedly said, it would be “difficult to 
secure payment.” Stowers claimed to be “disgusted with the whole matter,” but eventually 
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agreed to accept the payment provided it could be registered by the US Embassy for his 
protection. Because he had stalled, however, Alsina claimed the money had since been allocated 
for other expropriations.224 Embassy officials suspected similar instances of graft in the 
administration’s plans to use $19 million in sugar revenues to expropriate lands “ostensibly for 
redistribution to poor farmers.”225 Caught in the morass of palace intrigue, the “social 
revolution” some property owners feared from the 1937 agrarian reform law was rumored to 
have become a vehicle for corruption instead.  
Hope was not lost for La Hata, however. As embassy officials continued to pressure the 
Cuban government into 1947, the Ministry of Public Works now offered $34,900, an amount that 
Stowers protested but ultimately accepted. Even so, Stowers remained concerned that he would 
not receive payment. Observing the dynamics of Cuban land conflicts in the 1940s, Stowers’ 
Cuban lawyer therefore sought to utilize an additional source of pressure against the government. 
With Stowers’ interests coming into perverse alignment with those of neighborhood residents, 
embassy officials reported,  
On April 30 Mr. Stowers’ attorney … ostentatiously visited the property in question and 
soon found himself surrounded by squatters, who asked why he had come. He reminded 
them that in the neighboring Court of Guanabacoa there were filed the decisions of the 
Supreme Court under which the squatters were ordered ejected from the land. … He 
suggested that if the squatters wished to forestall his actions, they could most 
conveniently do so by visiting the Ministry of Public Works and petitioning the Minister 
to conclude promptly the formalities in the case which would give them final and definite 
title to the land, with compensation to Mr. Stowers. Having produced his effect, he 
departed.226 
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Hoping that popular protest could achieve what legal proceedings could not, the lawyer 
was surprised by what came next: “The squatters did not visit the Minister of Public Works,” 
reported embassy officials, “but during the night of April 30-May 1, persons unknown, 
presumably not unconnected with the squatters, fired the Court and its contents.”227 Press reports 
from Guanabacoa confirmed, “at two thirty in the morning a fire began in the Archive 
Department of the Correctional Court of Guanabacoa, destroying important documents.” A 
police lieutenant reportedly found “a can containing gasoline and a reel of film.”228 At least some 
residents of La Hata were determined to ensure that their rights to the land were upheld, by any 
means necessary.  
Efforts to resolve the case of La Hata revealed deep flaws in the procedures surrounding 
the distribution of state land to poor citizens. These procedures required initiative and 
expenditure from the Cuban government, and they generated opportunities for corruption and 
graft. In most shantytowns in Havana, they were never initiated at all. Yet the unlikely series of 
events that led to a courthouse fire in 1947 revealed other possibilities. By mobilizing inside and 
outside of established political channels, residents of La Hata expressed a belief that they had a 
right to stay on their land. In doing so, they insisted that the lands belonged to the Cuban state, 
and that by virtue of their status as poor Cuban citizens, lands of the Cuban state should be theirs. 
In July 1947, these beliefs became reality. In the only such case I have located for the Havana 
metropolitan area, the Ministry of Public Works made funds for the expropriation available to 
Stowers, giving definitive land rights to residents of La Hata.229 With the status of the land 
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resolved, La Hata was removed from the informality that afflicted other shantytowns. The 
neighborhood, however, remained bitterly poor. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
From the remote province of Oriente to the capital of the Republic, the claim of state lands was 
debated and twisted across decades of radical social transformation. As poor people crowded into 
Havana, government officials defined narrow boundaries for urban citizenship, deporting poor 
foreigners, disciplining poor Cubans, and relocating them to the countryside. Yet the poor 
transformed these notions into a vision of their own. Where government officials constructed the 
shaky foundations of a welfare state designed to assist, manage, and exclude, the urban poor 
reconfigured sites of state control into centers of popular protest, where they demanded tangible 
benefits from their government and a place in their capital city. As the 1933 Revolution led to 
new measures on land reform, the urban poor reinterpreted these laws. By invoking agrarian 
reform laws in urban land disputes, poor people in Havana articulated the belief that the 
government should intervene on their behalf and, on that basis, that land in the capital belonged 
to them.   
 In making this claim, residents referenced a legal framework characterized by uncertainty 
and conflict. Many lands in Cuba had been titled ambiguously, leaving both the poor and the 
wealthy to rely on proscriptive rights based on possession. By the late 1930s, reform legislation 
stated that the government was responsible for cataloguing and reclaiming lands for the state, 
and, further, that it would redistribute such lands to the poor. In practice, however, these reforms 
merely perpetuated uncertainty, leaving stakeholders to wait and see how officials might 
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implement them. In many cases they were disappointed, since implementation required political 
will. In the meantime, however, many poor neighborhoods took these laws at their word, 
resisting land claims from titleholders by demanding intervention from the state. In most cases, 
they failed to gain title to their land, but they often succeeded in staving off eviction nonetheless. 
The result was a situation of informality, where titleholders could not evict, but poor people 
remained vulnerable to insecurity, threats, and violence.  
 That a court archive would be the target of arson from mobilized shantytown residents 
underscores the importance that the law acquired during these years for many of Havana's urban 
poor. Far from abstract phrases left to lawyers and politicians, residents of La Hata had learned 
through more than a decade of promises, threats, and uncertainty that the law was not fixed, but 
rather something to be leveraged and negotiated, and, if circumstances required, burned. In the 
process, they made real a radical interpretation of Cuban land legislation—an interpretation in 
which the government was obligated to legitimize informal land occupations in the capital and 
intervene on behalf of the urban poor. In pressing this interpretation to be carried into practice, 
La Hata had escaped the legal grey area of most informally occupied neighborhoods in Havana 
and put forth an expansive vision of urban citizenship. The government backed their claims. 
Land in the capital was theirs.  
While the torched courthouse in Guanabacoa led to full property rights for La Hata’s 
residents, many neighborhoods would not be so lucky. Miles away residents of Las Yaguas laid 
claim to their piece of the city, too. Their fight would be more difficult. 
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3.0  “THE FIRES OF ROME”: SHANTYTOWN NETWORKS AND THE STATE, 
1931-1950 
The state is obligated to rule on the juridical situation of such lands…  
   –Law decree 3173, 1939.230 
 
There are two options: ... either build [us] decent homes ... or apply euthanasia to [us] 
all, wiping [us] from the world of the living. 
   —Attributed to Las Yaguas Mayor Rufino González, 1947.231 
  
 
The flames spread quickly through Las Yaguas. Built in a steep ravine in the industrial Luyanó 
neighborhood, the dense concentrations of scrap wood shacks lit up like kindling. Firefighters 
arrived amid crowds of semi-dressed residents, torn suddenly from sleep. By sunrise, more than 
4,000 people were homeless. “We heard the fire alarm, but I was too tired,” one recalled. “Then 
my sister knocks down my door ... [She] didn’t have any more time but to grab the boy and pull 
me. … We couldn’t save anything but the boy and a dress.”232 All told, on April 2, 1950, 12 
people were hospitalized for burns, one was killed, and 80 percent of Las Yaguas’ homes were 
destroyed.233  
Spreading almost as quickly as the flames themselves, reports of the fire crisscrossed the 
nation the next day. In the commentary that ensued, it was soon clear that the political stakes of 
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the event surpassed the damage. Television news filmed residents scavenging for lost 
possessions, titling the report, a “national shame.”234 “The current problem will undoubtedly be 
resolved,” stated an editorial in Información. “But…it is not what those people need at the 
moment but rather tomorrow.”235 An editorial in Alerta was grim: “Will they wait until fire does 
the work of erasing those neighborhoods, even if it comes with the cost of exterminating most of 
the occupants?”236 The fire of April 1950, reports agreed, revealed a neighborhood whose 
precariousness was disgraceful to the government. Not just an isolated tragedy, many interpreted 
Las Yaguas’ destruction as part of an ongoing failure of the Cuban state.  
 If the national implications of such a local event were notable, however, it was even more 
notable that the “work of erasing those neighborhoods” remained undone—even after a fire had 
eliminated so many shacks. If the mainstream press saw the neighborhood as the embodiment of 
failure, the behavior of residents complicated this story. Las Yaguas was quickly rebuilt. In the 
following days, a report stated that the residents were “sleeping over the ashes of their burned 
homes,” since they “feared losing the piece of land attached to them.”237 Dense as ever, new 
scrap wood shacks soon covered the ravine. 
What allowed this shantytown to remain in the city for so long? What did residents hope 
to gain by staying in a neighborhood that all agreed to be a refuge of last resort? And why had its 
prospects come to be so deeply associated with the state? While many accounts of Las Yaguas 
have focused on personal histories of residents, little is known about the wider legal and political 
contexts that allowed them to become so firmly entrenched in Havana.238 In contrast, this chapter 
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analyzes the connections that developed between the neighborhood and the national government 
in the two decades that preceded the 1950 fire. As local mobilization met state initiative, these 
dynamic interactions changed Cuban slum policy, while leaving Las Yaguas unmoved.   
Las Yaguas’ collective struggles during these years were defined by property claims. 
Occupying land without title, residents made demands beyond the formal protections 
theoretically afforded to Cuban citizens. Legally, the neighborhood should not have existed, but 
it did—a situation that led to deficient infrastructure, persistent precariousness, and low social 
standing. Yet there were benefits too, including free rent in a central part of the city, possible 
access to employment, and, over time, social services from public and private organizations. To 
protect these benefits, residents built connections to the political system, and they did so by 
highlighting their status as citizens in spite of their informal property rights.  
In response, the government recognized its obligation to assist residents in poverty, but it 
refused to extend that obligation to the legitimization of land claims. In addressing the poor, 
officials instead affirmed a basic thesis about the relationship between urban informality and the 
state: the government was justified in prohibiting urban land seizures so long as it met its 
obligations to poor people in other ways. Defining these obligations would be the catch. As the 
government expanded its commitments to citizens throughout the 1930s, the content of state 
obligations to the poor came to be the central point of contention in debates over Las Yaguas’ 
future.  
By no means inevitable, this was one of several debates that could have defined conflict 
in Las Yaguas, and its primacy was a result of the neighborhood’s property status. Unlike La 
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Hata, whose land belonged to a US citizen, Las Yaguas’ land title belonged to a high Cuban 
government official, Cosme de la Torriente. From his influential position, he pressed to 
normalize Las Yaguas’ informal status, making the relocation of residents a contractual state 
obligation. By doing so, he foreclosed for Las Yaguas the possibilities that remained open for La 
Hata, effectively impeding the legalization of residents’ land claims. Yet he opened up a new set 
of debates. With property off the table, conflicts over the future of Las Yaguas now hinged on 
the extent of the state’s obligation to provide basic social services for residents. The specific 
content of citizenship therefore became a language of contention between residents and the state 
and with unforeseen results: on one hand, it offered a path to protect the neighborhood from 
arbitrary relocation. On the other hand, it ensured that state intervention remained a political 
necessity.  
In constructing these arguments, I focus specifically on Havana's most famous 
shantytown, Las Yaguas, and the shantytowns most closely linked to it, Isla de Pinos and Cueva 
del Humo.239 As well-recognized emblems of poverty, the neighborhoods were not significant 
for their size or material deprivations alone—traits that were shared with and sometimes 
exceeded by other urban and rural settlements. Rather, they became famous due to their central 
locations and to the contentious interactions discussed below.  
I begin the chapter by reconstructing the early settlements of Las Yaguas and Isla de 
Pinos and the very different responses they provoked from the government. I then trace the ways 
that neighborhood leaders deployed vocabulary from the radical labor movement and the 1940 
Constitution to advance local claims. The next section analyzes legislation drafted by de la 
Torriente for Las Yaguas, and shows how it re-centered subsequent debates on the content of 
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citizenship rather than on property claims. Finally, I trace resistance to the relocation efforts of 
the Ministry of Health in 1944, which left the central shantytowns firmly in place while also 
solidifying a consensus that the state should act to eliminate them. 
3.1 BETWEEN FIRE AND FREEDOM 
Although informal neighborhoods had existed around Havana since its founding, 1931 marked 
the year when poor people’s occupation of ambiguously titled land received significant attention 
from the national government. As migration, population growth, and internal displacement 
during the 1920s and early 1930s led poor people to invade vacant land throughout the city, the 
occupiers quickly sought official protection. Property claims made on the government were 
therefore fundamental to these neighborhoods at their settlement, and defending those claims 
was often their central organizing principle. In doing so, local leaders used an array of tactics to 
amplify their political leverage, implicitly reinterpreting officially stated norms for citizenship in 
the process. In cases where these tactics fell flat, residents stubbornly transgressed formal legal 
boundaries. As shantytown neighborhoods interacted with government officials, then, they 
contested the narrow boundaries of formal citizenship—sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by 
force.   
Centrally located and spacious, Las Yaguas offered significant benefits to residents. The 
area was settled because of its close proximity to the central city during a rash of evictions from 
urban rental dwellings. The land was widely occupied during the late 1920s. According to 
resident Amparo Loy, “the first little house was built in October [19]26, the first, and after that, 
by [19]27 ... all the workers without jobs began taking shelter there. … After that there was a 
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dead mass of Cubans.”240 The land’s appeal came from its accessibility to an array of nearby 
factories and Havana’s port, long a center for poor workers. Early in the century Liberal 
politicians proposed to build a worker's housing project nearby.241 At a time when jobs were 
scarce and rent was steep, Las Yaguas meant an opportunity to stay close to whatever work that 
might appear and to whatever assistance that might be available from the government. In 1931, a 
neighborhood mayor, Carlos Granados, spoke to reporters about the appeal of the 
neighborhood’s informal status: “We are without the worry of rents, or taxes that stifle us …in 
all, free.”242 
 Las Yaguas was not alone. A short way down the hill, just outside the factories and docks 
that surrounded Havana's bay near the Atarés Castle, settlers occupied other land, soon known as 
Isla de Pinos. Offering many of the same benefits as Las Yaguas, the area was also appealing for 
its proximity to discarded industrial materials, which poor people recycled to sell. Residents told 
reporters,  
They used to go there to earn their two daily pesetas. One day, it occurred to one 
of them, to Santizo, to build a little shack …where he could wait for the trucks 
and other vehicles that used to go to dump scraps. … A few days later, there were 
a dozen shacks, later another dozen more and like that in succession, until they 
formed a group, currently some thirty homes.243  
 
By the 1930s, the surrounding area was notorious. Visiting Havana in 1930, famed scientist 
Albert Einstein broke away from a scheduled itinerary to tour the area, hoping to penetrate “the 
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most miserable households … the typical neighborhoods of Cuban poverty, which residents have 
baptized with the strange names of Pan con Timba and Llega y Pon.”244 
As they occupied land and built homes, both neighborhoods sought political allies to 
protect their claims. They used a variety of tactics to prove their civic worth. In Isla de Pinos, a 
local mayor checked the criminal backgrounds of new arrivals, indicating that he had a 
relationship with city police and perhaps local politicians. Leaders there also divided poor 
newcomers from those who had more resources, which was likely a strategy to protect the better-
constructed homes against arbitrary clearance. A resident explained that in “Vedado,” a section 
of shacks named after the wealthy Havana neighborhood, “we don’t permit making homes 
without zinc or with walls of sacking.” Those with fewer resources settled in a different section, 
Pogolotti, named after a poor workers’ neighborhood in Marianao.245 Highly conscious of their 
weak position, Isla de Pinos residents refused to be photographed by journalists.246   
Leaders in Las Yaguas sought allies as well, with greater success. Initially, leaders named 
the area “the Cuban barrio,” only adopting the name Las Yaguas after Machado’s fall. Unlike 
Isla de Pinos, which had numerous West Indian residents, the settlers used their name to signify 
that they were Cuban citizens—an important point at a time of mass deportations (Chapter 2). A 
neighborhood leader explained how he appealed to the government when the Spanish-born 
property owner insisted on eviction:  
I explained to him that we were Cubans without work, and if our [Cuban] 
employees sacrifice themselves giving contributions to sustain the indigents, 
mostly Spanish, then as a good Spaniard he should be generous with us, the 
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evicted sons of this land. … I resorted to the authorities, who used reasons more 
convincing than mine to persuade the property owner.247  
 
Making reference to the government’s housing and repatriation of unemployed Spaniards, the 
leader framed residents’ claims to the land as a right that should be granted on the basis of their 
citizenship. By 1931, then, the neighborhood already claimed its national status, voicing the 
same insurgent interpretation of citizenship that residents made in La Hata and across the city. 
As the state gradually acknowledged its obligation to assist the urban poor, residents of Las 
Yaguas insisted, in effect, that it legitimized their land claims as well.248 
Unlike claims made in Isla de Pinos, La Hata, or elsewhere, the claims of Las Yaguas 
quickly gained recognition at high levels. Because of Machado’s constitutional reforms through 
which he directly appointed leaders to administer Havana, the officials who approved the Las 
Yaguas settlement were not just from the municipality, but from the national government as well. 
Neighborhood activists reached out to Liberal Havana mayor and Machado appointee, José 
Izquierdo, who worked closely with Machado’s Minister of Governance, Octavio Zubizarreta. At 
a time when both men were actively seeking to quell labor protests, they intervened to stop 
eviction efforts against the settlers. Mayor Izquierdo spoke directly with the land’s title-holder 
after attending a meeting of Liberals, where “numerous electors who have their ‘shack’ in the 
Llega y Pon shantytown [Las Yaguas] communicated that ... more than 100 shacks had been 
destroyed.”249 By late 1931, they stalled the eviction, and leaders required political affiliation to 
Machado and the Liberal party in order to move into the neighborhood. Minister Zubizarreta 
                                                 
247 “El nuevo barrio cubano,” Bohemia, November 8, 1931, 36-37, 49, 52. 
248 “El nuevo barrio cubano,” Bohemia, November 8, 1931, 36-37, 49, 52; “Conjurado por el alcalde el conflicto planteado por 
una orden de desalojo contra doscientas familias que están residiendo en le lugar llamado 'llega y pon'“ El Heraldo de Cuba, 
October 29, 1931, 2.  
249 “Conjurado por el alcalde el conflicto planteado por una orden de desalojo contra doscientas familias que están residiendo en 
le lugar llamado ‘Llega y Pon,’” El Heraldo de Cuba, October 29, 1931, 2. 
  78 
reportedly used the area to occasionally shelter his own needy family members.250 Police soon 
monitored the settlement, strictly limiting land plots to 4 square meters.251  
What Izquierdo and the lands’ title-holder discussed in their meeting is unclear, but the 
approval of the Las Yaguas settlement was aided by their conflictive relationship. One of the 
would-be owners, Cosme De la Torriente, was a lawyer of impeccable credentials—a veteran of 
Cuba’s Independence War, a senator, and Cuba’s representative to the League of Nations.252 By 
the early 1930s, however, he became one of the most prominent figures in the moderate 
opposition to Machado. Also controversial, José Maria Bouza, his business partner, made his 
own enemies in the government, publicly criticizing officials and opposing well-connected 
business leaders.253 In 1931, a police report directed to Minister Zubizarreta found the Spanish-
born Cuban citizen to have become “wealthy in Cuba, [by] conjuring bureaucratic intrigues, 
traitorous rivalries and administrative collusions … always to the detriment of the Cuban state.” 
The report went on to conclude that Bouza “constitute[d] the true case of an undesirable 
alien.”254 While officials hoped to have Bouza deported, they discovered that, as a citizen, he had 
the right to stay. They were less convinced, however, of his right to have voting citizens cleared 
from his land.  
Partly due to local tactics and partly due to circumstance, then, national officials 
supported Las Yaguas’ land claims. In the months that followed, the neighborhood was 
exempted from the clearance efforts that targeted other settlers around the city. Still, for the 
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government this agreement was an exception, not a rule, and it never formally expropriated the 
land (nor would it have had a clear legal mechanism to do so prior to 1938). Las Yaguas 
achieved unique recognition because of its unique connections to the national government. The 
blessing, however, would ultimately be mixed.  
As Las Yaguas’ residents built connections to politicians, state initiatives elsewhere in 
the city revealed the government’s ongoing commitment to a narrow vision of urban citizenship. 
It publicized a new set of welfare initiatives days before New Year’s Eve in 1931, releasing a 
film to audiences nationwide, which proudly documented the eradication of several Havana 
shantytowns. Reported in the press, the film showed the efforts of Minister Zubizarreta to resettle 
poor families from improvised housing across the city. Residents were fed and housed at a newly 
renovated shelter called General Machado Camp, at an old market near the Isla de Pinos 
shantytown called La Purísima, where poor Spanish families had awaited repatriation (Chapter 
2). There, residents were allegedly incorporated into the labor market and offered shelter. 
Meanwhile, several shantytowns were burned to the ground—actions celebrated by government 
officials as acts of charity in spite of protests from residents.255   
 The film optimistically recounted recent government initiatives, which included a census 
of Isla de Pinos. Then, apparently without prior notification, police torched the neighborhood. 
Minister Zubizarreta personally supervised the burnings, encouraging reporters to take 
photographs, and cryptically comparing the flames that engulfed the shacks to “the fires of 
Rome.” Residents noted that they had “never received the visit of a bill collector or an eviction 
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notice, which were now presented with extreme urgency.”256 Surprised families were collected 
late at night and trucked to the new shelter, a move that was enforced by police. Over the course 
of two days, the entire neighborhood was turned to ash. Reporters noted several injuries, 
explaining that,  
The watchmen that carried out the eviction had to struggle with the ‘inhabitants’ 
who in no way wanted to abandon that place, saying that ‘they would set the 
houses on fire if [residents] wouldn’t come out.’ One of the Jamaicans residing 
there, a young man, well-built, resisted the police, in the end was sent to the 
ambulances and dispatched to ‘La Purísima.’257   
 
Protests to the move were likely made more intense by the fact that many residents were not 
Cuban citizens, leaving them vulnerable to deportation. One resident with “English” citizenship, 
likely West Indian, sued the government later for lost possessions with help from his embassy.258 
As press coverage of the clearances highlighted their brutality, however, officials expressed 
satisfaction, publicizing the measures nationally and even boasting of them to officials from 
Uruguay.259  
 The paradoxical blend of state assistance and repression that manifested itself in the 
burning of Isla de Pinos was the result of conflicting notions of urban citizenship. By occupying 
land, demonstrating their worth, and seeking political allies, the Isla de Pinos residents joined 
many poor people in expressing the belief that in spite of their poverty they had the right to live 
in the city, where they hoped to be protected by their government. In clearing informal 
settlements, however, the government responded with its own narrower vision. Rather than 
legitimize insurgent land claims in Havana, officials sought to act against them by establishing 
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their own norms for urban life. In this view, clearing poor neighborhoods was not repressive, 
since it was intimately linked to measures designed to provide social assistance. The urban poor 
saw land invasions as legitimate claims, whereas the government saw them as transgressions 
associated with poverty. By destroying Isla de Pinos and seeking “proper” settlement for the 
poor, the government sought to address the problem of poverty—but it denied that the urban 
poor had the right to claim land.  
In a letter released to the press after the clearance, Minister Zubizarreta clarified these 
dynamics, stating a basic relationship between order and social assistance that would 
characterize slum policy in Havana for decades. The police, he wrote, would continue to round 
up the poor to provide “shelter and food at the ‘General Machado’ Provisional Camp.” At the 
same time, he used these provisions to prosecute the behaviors of those unwilling to accept 
assistance. These behaviors, he said, were “ruining the City with lamentable scenes before 
foreign visitors.”260 Such behavior, the ministry stated, was now “unjustified” because of state 
assistance, and would lead officials to “destroy the shacks and prevent the needy from living 
there.”261  
Enforcing rigid norms of urban citizenship, Zubizarreta therefore implied, required the 
government to care for to the poor. Conversely, by doing so, the government denied legitimacy 
to the poor’s insurgent claims. Several weeks later, when numerous residents abandoned the 
Purísima shelter and returned to Isla de Pinos, actions Zubizarreta called “inexplicable,” officials 
burned the neighborhood again.262 Yet if the charred ground left neighborhood families with 
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little recourse, it also symbolized that urban poverty was an issue that would have to be dealt 
with by the Cuban state.263  
Their neighborhood twice burned, the Isla de Pinos residents did not give up on their 
demands. In September 1933, the Machado government collapsed, and shantytown residents “did 
whatever they felt like and no one did anything to stop them.”264 As poor people occupied land 
across the city, Isla de Pinos residents rebuilt their homes. By late 1933, the neighborhood was 
larger than before. When military forces battled revolutionaries at the Atarés Castle nearby, 
residents from that neighborhood refused to seek safety, knowing how easily they could lose 
their homes.265 By that time, a new neighborhood had emerged in the immediate vicinity, known 
as Cueva del Humo.  
 As Machado fled Cuba and mass participation came to play a greater role in Cuban 
politics, the growth of Las Yaguas and the rebirth of Isla de Pinos reflected the respective 
benefits and hazards of connections between shantytowns and the state. With a number of 
circumstances in its favor, Las Yaguas had been officially recognized through regulation and 
compromise and sustained by political networks—even as government officials made no effort to 
formalize its land. By contrast, the Isla de Pinos residents had forced their neighborhood into 
existence, against the work of police and their fires, finding no space for dialogue with officials. 
Through both force and persuasion, these neighborhoods acted to expand established notions of 
urban citizenship in similar ways, succeeding in occupying land, but failing to gain formal rights 
to do so. In both cases, residents expressed belief that their occupation of central areas of the city 
was legitimate and that the government should protect them. As a new regime was consolidated 
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by the end of the decade, politicians made new promises to deal with housing and urban poverty. 
Whether they would follow through according to precedents established at Las Yaguas, at Isla de 
Pinos, or some combination thereof, remained to be seen. 
3.2 MAKING CLAIMS 
As revolutionary upheaval left the government in disarray, the key connections that had 
sustained Las Yaguas’ relationship to national officials disappeared. Publicly linked to the fallen 
dictator, Las Yaguas’ core group of leaders fled in 1933.266 With no formal trace of their rights 
to occupy the land, it was up to a new group of local leaders to justify the existence of their 
settlement once again. As they built connections to the new government, neighborhood leaders 
used the same tactics that had proven effective during the machadato, emphasizing their political 
loyalty and their worth as citizens. Yet now they went further. The flurry of social commitments 
to the urban poor, first articulated by Zubizarreta, later expanded under Ramón Grau (1933-34), 
and finally institutionalized under Fulgencio Batista (de facto head of state, 1934-40), gave the 
neighborhood an effective new vocabulary with which to negotiate its claims. Where 
neighborhood leaders had once focused on their own worth, they now focused on the ability of 
the state to fulfill its stated commitments as well. 
 In protecting their neighborhood, leaders found a new set of allies in Cuba’s growing 
labor movement. Among the first groups seeking to organize in shantytowns was the National 
Confederation of Cuban Labor (CNOC), a radical labor federation that recruited support from the 
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unemployed in “parks, kitchens, encampments.”267 Eyeing the masses of people in Havana, 
organizers noted, “When the unemployed masses mobilize, they can immediately secure 
demands from the dominant classes.”268 Yet the same document in 1933 admitted that, despite 
the power of unemployed workers, the CNOC had had relatively little success incorporating 
them into the organization.269 These ties grew, however, amid the rapid rise and fall of Grau’s 
left-wing government. Following Grau’s fall in 1934, a CNOC-affiliated union briefly began a 
school in the neighborhood and included teachers such as the well-known revolutionary, Pablo 
de la Torriente Brau.270 With ties to the Communist Party, residents formed the Committee of 
Unemployed from the Neighborhood of Las Yaguas around the same time, joining with similar 
committees around the city.271  
By the end of the 1930s local leaders leveraged organized labor to generate influential 
ties to national politicians. Batista and Mendieta's brutal repression of the labor movement 
disrupted neighborhood links to the CNOC in 1935, but new organizations quickly took their 
place.272 An independent organization of the unemployed was registered in 1936 to operate in 
Las Yaguas by commander Estanislao Núñez, an Independence War veteran and neighborhood 
resident, who had been registered as an “indigent” in the shelter at La Purísima in 1933. Alexis 
García, a Santeria priest and longtime neighborhood leader, was also part of this organization, 
which later expanded to incorporate Isla de Pinos and Cueva del Humo.273 In 1938 Núñez rather 
optimistically claimed to represent “all of the residents of those miserable neighborhoods on all 
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the Island (more than thirty thousand).”274 Núñez's organization merged with the Communist 
Party after it gained control of the officially recognized Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC) 
and allied with then-Colonel Batista in the late 1930s. The party quickly formed an organization 
within the CTC led by Juan Conde Nápoles, called the Unemployed Section, and whose rallying 
cry was “BREAD OR WORK!”275 His organization incorporated organizers from the 
neighborhood, including Rufino González Terry, who would be one of Las Yaguas' mayors until 
1959.276 By establishing a network within the CTC, central shantytowns had powerful leverage 
within the incoming Batista administration.  
 In establishing these ties, residents employed a number of strategies to bolster their 
political strength and protect themselves from outside threats. One tactic was to demonstrate 
their credentials as Cuban citizens, as previous leaders had under Machado when they adopted 
“the Cuban barrio” as their name. While leading his committee of unemployed, for example, 
Nuñez referenced symbols of the nation as he promoted an image of civic worth for the 
neighborhood. Reaching out to the press, he used his status as an impoverished veteran of Cuba’s 
Independence War to generate positive publicity, leading the popular journal Bohemia to publish 
a feature on elderly veterans in the neighborhood.277 In 1936, residents held a ceremony in Las 
Yaguas to honor fallen Independence War hero Antonio Maceo, news of which Afro-Cuban 
columnist Gustavo Urrutia highlighted in the elite daily, Diario de la Marina.278 Meanwhile, 
Núñez publicly denied rumors that Las Yaguas residents were complaining about police 
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brutality. Composing an open letter to a police captain, Nuñez assured the public that officers 
had acted “with all respect and consideration,” and noted that “said rumors have been circulated 
by people of bad faith.”279 Other neighborhood leaders denounced reports about neighborhood 
crime in the press in similar terms, calling them efforts “to justify the aggression that they want 
to do to us.”280 In this case, the “aggression” referred to renewed eviction efforts from de la 
Torriente and Bouza. Their civic worth, residents implied, justified their resistance.  
 Following 1933, leaders in Las Yaguas went beyond claims about their own worth. In 
protecting and improving their neighborhood, they now utilized the language of the radical labor 
movement to make new kinds of claims. In a recruiting manifesto published in 1935, prior to 
Batista’s suppression of the general strike, the CNOC-supported Committee of the Unemployed 
of Las Yaguas denounced “foreign and native exploiters” and exhorted residents to “demand 
from the government the things that it can give us,” specifying, “we want Electricity, Water and 
Toilets, School for our children and Materials to rebuild our houses!”281 As new organizations 
formed in 1936, similar claims for food, schools, and infrastructure blended with demands to 
protect the neighborhood against “the persistent threat” of forcible eviction.282  
Leaders’ success in using the language of the radical labor movement to demonstrate 
their legitimacy to a wider public was reflected in reports on the neighborhood in the popular 
press. A 1935 report in El Sol lauded a government plan to eradicate the neighborhood. “But 
before dislodging them from their sordid slums [tugurios],” it declared, “the government must 
equip adequate sites for their lodging, since it cannot…leave them on the street.”283 A 1936 
essay in Bohemia framed the issue as “the capitol vs. Las Yaguas: one of the two must yield.” 
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“Their shacks cannot be burned,” it read. “The Health Ministry must respect their dens. … They 
are dignified Cubans. …They need social laws.”284 Responding to these demands during his 
1936 mayoral campaign, incoming mayor Beruff Mendieta promised, “the Revolutionary 
governments” would soon “construct in place of the huts of the ‘Cueva del Humo,’ ‘Llega y 
Pon,’ ‘Las Yaguas,’ etc.; comfortable and clean houses.”285 The administration did not construct 
the homes, but neighborhood leaders utilized the promise to further publicize the government’s 
obligation to help them.286 In 1931 Minister Zubizarreta had clearly linked the clearance of 
shantytown neighborhoods to the government’s obligation to provide for their basic welfare. By 
the late 1930s, the stakes of this obligation had risen.  
 They would rise still more with the drafting of the 1940 Constitution. Amid debates in the 
Constitutional Assembly and subsequent presidential elections, shantytown organizations 
competed for local votes by highlighting official promises of social rights. In the 1940 Havana 
mayoral campaign, Communist Juan Marinello made a well-attended appearance in Las Yaguas, 
with enthusiastic support from the CTC.287 Raúl Menocal, the eventual victor, also visited the 
neighborhood with a slew of local candidates.288 “The demands of the unemployed are not 
simply that they be given a plate of harina y picadillo,” noted the CTC’s Unemployed Section 
during the campaign, criticizing a rival Unemployed Union of Havana. Those demands included: 
“social security, fulfilling the Law of Eight Hours, low-cost kitchens, the Law of Paid Rest, a 
broad plan of public works, sanitizing the poor neighborhoods and opening closed factories.”289 
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Meanwhile the association they criticized pushed for similar demands.290 Reflecting the 
increasing openness of the political process, neighborhood leaders cultivated ties to multiple 
politicians. With an abundance of connections, the new Constitution gave them added leverage 
in demanding social rights. 
 By 1940, then, the potential benefits of political reform had never seemed so enticing for 
the urban poor—but there were reminders that state assistance could be double-edged. By the 
late 1930s, after relatively limited involvement since the time of Zubizarreta, the Health Ministry 
made visits to several shantytowns. Noticias de Hoy reported the news with optimism, noting 
that the ministry’s new initiative to sanitize the neighborhoods “responds to the work that the 
National Unemployed Section of the CTC has been doing.” At the same time the article warned 
of “other occasions” where “the remedy has turned out to be worse than the sickness, since … 
the resident has had his humble shack burned.”291 The warning proved prescient when, weeks 
later, the paper reported that the Unemployed Section confronted the chief of police about 
“clashes” with Cueva del Humo residents, citing police officers who “exceed their functions and 
dare to give 24 hours to some residents to move, threatening to destroy the shack where they 
live.” The Section claimed to be preparing “a protest meeting in the three neighborhoods.”292 It 
is likely that the harassment was part of the Health Ministry's preparation for a convention of 
Rotary Clubs, for which it rounded up more than 400 poor people at La Purísima.293  
 Two days later, ostensibly unrelated to the dust-up with police, flames devoured portions 
of Cueva del Humo. Press reports mentioned no cause, “believing the origin to be coincidental.” 
No deaths were reported, but the flames generated fear. “100 people…with their meager 
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belongings totally devoured by the fire … Many saw themselves totally surrounded by flames, 
and the married couples, men and women, risked their lives … to rescue their small children.”294 
Even with the rapid arrival of firefighters in the hours before dawn, 20 shacks were destroyed. 
The CTC’s Unemployed Section oversaw a reconstruction effort, enlisting support from several 
unions and factories.295 
 If by 1940 shantytowns appeared to have gained a strong foothold in the urban political 
process, the fire hinted at their potential vulnerability to heavy-handed government intervention. 
If the fire seemed to repeat Zubizarreta’s 1931 campaign, however, there was a difference: by 
1940, no elected official sought credit. Through the labor movement, and with reference to the 
Constitution, Havana’s central shantytowns had cultivated important political links.  
3.3 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAS YAGUAS 
As shantytown leaders reformulated the political language of the 1930s into compelling demands 
for neighborhood improvements and protection, discussions of Las Yaguas’ land rights often 
stayed beneath the surface. The absence was notable, since the neighborhood’s property status 
had singular importance in shaping its relationship to the state. Neighborhood leaders were slow 
to make explicit demands related to property, however. The Unemployed Section of the CTC, for 
example, explicitly pushed for the government to establish more sites like Las Yaguas for the 
poor, but it envisioned such sites as impermanent.296 Mostly, the group focused on other types of 
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demands. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade there was real potential for Las Yaguas’ 
property status to change. In late 1937, government officials raised radical possibilities for land 
claims in Havana with agrarian reform legislation through which the government could reclaim 
and distribute land to the poor. By 1940, numerous shantytowns in Havana tried to undermine 
eviction attempts by claiming to occupy state land (Chapter 2). Yet in Las Yaguas, ostensibly 
Havana’s most politically savvy shantytown, these calls remained muted.  
Part of the anomaly of Las Yaguas’ weak property claims was due to its success. Densely 
populated and well connected, by the late 1930s the neighborhood was no longer the rough 
encampment it had been during the Great Depression. Numerous local businesses sold cheap 
merchandise, the Catholic Church built a school for children, and some residents improved their 
homes enough to sell them and move elsewhere.297 Eviction was bound to be a messy affair. One 
of the land’s title-holders, José Guillén, a public official, concluded that it was not worth the 
trouble. Residents reported that he “decided to lose his rights” to the land.298 “He had his 
aspirations and it was more convenient for him to have us on his side than to have us against 
him,” one explained.299 Still, this was not the same as giving residents a land title.   
The other title-holders, de la Torriente and Bouza, were not so amenable, and in pursuing 
their title claims they shaped slum policy across the island. No longer the sworn opponent of an 
authoritarian regime, de la Torriente was named Cuba’s Secretary of State under President 
Mendieta, later representing Cuba in the United Nations. Even with his political influence 
restored, however, he and his partner Bouza remained unable to regain possession of their land, 
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despite several attempts.300 A lawyer with a deep understanding of property legislation, de la 
Torriente personally spearheaded opposition to the 1937 agrarian reform law.301 As Congress 
passed the legislation, which was also backed in the Constitutional Assembly, he was therefore 
more aware than most of the potential implications for his property. It was increasingly apparent, 
moreover, that Fulgencio Batista, the young, mulatto military officer with populist leanings, 
would run for president. With eviction proceedings moving nowhere, de la Torriente shifted his 
tactics.   
When government officials refused to clear occupants from the lands in 1935, de la 
Torriente asked the government to sign a rental contract to formalize the state’s possession. They 
stalled. As land legislation moved through Congress, he continued to press the matter. In 1939, 
de la Torriente pushed President Federico Laredo Brú to sign a decree to acknowledge that “the 
state is obligated to rule on the juridical situation of such lands,” in order to “avoid conflicts of 
public order that would imply the total and complete eviction of the indigents who inhabit them.” 
The decree authorized the Secretariat of Health and Welfare to issue a public rental contract with 
the owners on behalf of the Cuban state.302 Once signed, it formalized the state's possession of 
the lands, leaving the Health Ministry to “impede the construction of new shacks or 
constructions.”303  
After de la Torriente personally requested that the president solve “such an upsetting 
problem,” Laredo signed the decree in December 1939, but the Health Minister declined to issue 
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the contract.304 With Batista's presidency drawing near, de la Torriente grew more insistent, 
writing to Laredo as a “dear president and friend ... to beg you with insistence that you leave this 
matter resolved before you abandon the presidency.”305 In consultation with de la Torriente, 
Laredo’s legal consultant recommended an additional presidential decree in August 1940, 
explaining to the president that none of the new measures “imply abuse to the current occupants 
nor injury to the rights of the property owners.”306 Laredo signed the decree in September, one 
month before Batista took office. 
In addition to recognizing the state as a tenant, the new decree directed the Ministry of 
Health to “undertake a census ... of the Finca El Blanquizal [Las Yaguas] to determine which are 
the occupants of shacks who, not having such a character, are able to rent a place to move into.” 
Tenants who could pay would be moved immediately, while “the construction of new shacks 
remains strictly prohibited ... on the lands rented by the state.” Identification cards would be 
provided for remaining residents while the government prepared a new shelter for them outside 
the capital. Although the decree was specific to Las Yaguas, its implementation was treated as 
policy for other shantytowns as well. As a final measure it noted that whichever shacks were left 
abandoned, “will be destroyed by means of fire.”307 
By formally acknowledged the state’s role in maintaining residents of Las Yaguas on the 
land, the decree had serious political implications. Where residents at La Hata demanded state 
intervention in a dispute between private parties, at Las Yaguas de la Torriente acknowledged 
openly what officials would not: settlement was a product of state intervention. By implication, 
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whatever the state intended, occupancy rights were defined as a social benefit. By 
acknowledging that “complete eviction” would generate disorder, however, the decree conceded 
that these occupancy rights temporarily served the public interest. Nevertheless, in stopping short 
of making such rights permanent, the legislation codified Zubizarreta’s narrow thesis about 
urban poverty and the state: by ensuring the basic welfare of citizens who could not provide for 
themselves, the state was justified in withdrawing its charitable endorsement of transgressive 
land claims.  
Taken together, these clarifications shifted the terms of debate for shantytowns in 
Havana. Prior to the decree it was possible that Las Yaguas might use its political leverage to 
dispute the property claims of the title-holders and demand rights to the land. In its aftermath, 
however, title-holders forfeited their own claims to evict by handing responsibility for relocation 
to the state. Rather than a property dispute, then, debates over when that relocation could take 
place would now focus on the extent of the state’s obligation to assist residents—on which 
residents could afford to find their own housing, for example, and which could not; or on what 
decent housing meant in an overcrowded city. It was not immediately obvious that a battle over 
property rights would have benefited residents more or less than one over social welfare. With 
the decree signed, however, the die was cast. In 1940 de la Torriente still had not regained 
possession of the land at Luyanó, but he had effectively foreclosed the possibility of 
expropriation and titling for residents. Las Yaguas, it was clear, would not follow the path of La 
Hata. In practice, the legislation meant that the neighborhood would now receive official 
protection in eviction suits. However, it also tightened its relationship with what was potentially 
a more formidable adversary: the state itself.    
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3.4 A LANGUAGE OF CONTENTION 
As news of the decree reached the press, neighborhood leaders in the CTC saw the move as a 
ploy by the property owners. Noticias de Hoy ran the headline: “They want to destroy the Las 
Yaguas neighborhood by fire.” The article claimed that de la Torriente had been “visiting the 
chief of state frequently and it appears that his visits are related to the drastic presidential 
resolution.”308 Several days later, the paper ran an editorial criticizing the neighborhood's 
“would-be property owners.”309 Another columnist alleged Bouza's support for the Spanish 
Falange Party, and pointed out that the decree’s objective was “not of ending indigence, but of 
removing the indigents as discreetly as possible from the lands they currently occupy to turn 
them over to their ‘property owners.’”310 Other papers supported the decree. “Little by little, 
those conglomerations of houses” have become “towns,” stated one editorial. “One has to 
think…of setting out rules.”311  
In framing their opposition, however, local leaders did not reject the plan outright but 
instead addressed the decree on its own terms, disputing that residents could find adequate 
housing elsewhere in the city. That month, CTC committees from various shantytowns met to set 
terms for their removal, highlighting “the problem that eviction would create for families.” 
Rather than express opposition to the eviction on principle, they demanded that health officials 
provide “an adequate place where they might go and reside,” a claim they resolved to circulate 
so that “public opinion” would “support this demand.”312 Whether they had real expectations that 
the government would provide such a space is unclear. With their stated ally coming into office, 
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reports noted that residents were “convinced” that the relocation measures “will remain in 
disuse.”313 Batista was less than a week from the presidency.  
As the Health Ministry prepared to implement the decree, it contradicted the claims of 
neighborhood activists directly by publishing the names and occupations of numerous residents. 
Rather than deserving poor, the ministry stated that the residents of Havana’s central 
shantytowns were “public employees, businessmen, and industrialists, with economic resources, 
who live with an excessive eagerness for profit, at the margin of sanitation and tax laws.” The 
minister announced a period of 72 hours in which residents of Las Yaguas and Cueva del Humo 
who had the means to live elsewhere would have to move.314 “The majority of the supposed 
indigents are people who have jobs,” reported El Mundo.315 
Yet the move provoked confusion. Along with the immediate removal of allegedly well-
off residents, the ministry indicated that “true indigents” were also to be moved—some to 
Tiscornia in Casablanca, others to Finca Torrens, and others to the La Purísima shelter. While a 
timeline was not established for these moves, press reports implied there would be little delay. 
While some reports implied that only public employees would be evicted, other reports stated 
that the ministry would “evict all the houses and destroy them.”316 Alerta reported that, 
according to the Health Minister, “the true indigents, who are very few, will be moved to the old 
market at La Purísima.” “We will not act violently,” the minister declared, “but we will have a 
heavy hand towards those who try to cause harm to the rest of society.”317 Meanwhile reports 
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trickled out that the government would split up neighborhood families, sending “the children to 
Tiscornia and the parents to ... ‘La Purísima.’”318   
 The measures were widely publicized throughout the capital and it was quickly apparent 
that shantytown activists won the debate. The Auténtico journal Luz called the move “cold,” 
while Noticias de Hoy called it “radical.”319 A columnist in the paper speculated, “Maybe one 
day we will also find out that …in the large residences of Vedado … live numerous indigents 
who are fantasizing to be wealthy people.”320 With dry sarcasm, another columnist in El Avance 
Criollo celebrated the “news of great transcendence: that in Havana indigents do not exist. … 
The next Christmas should be happier than any.”321 
 With the clearance publicly questioned, President Batista intervened, ordering more time 
for the move.322 An additional 72 hours was set, while the Health Minister clarified that only 
those who were state or union employees would be moved.323 As the proposed evictions caused 
protest, not only from residents but the wider public as well, the Health Ministry backtracked 
further. On November 26, several papers reported that the minster had ordered a medical census 
of the neighborhood to treat sick residents, and that, in a gesture of charity, he had prepared 350 
scholarships for neighborhood children.324 
 With the clearance stalled, publicity intensified around the claim that the state could not 
meet its obligation to house residents adequately. The Unemployed Section stated, “It is not 
logical to suppose that the government finds itself in conditions to lodge eight thousand families 
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[sic] anywhere.”325 The Catholic University Students Group admonished the Health Ministry 
“not to designate the titles of businessmen and industrialists to those who hardly have enough for 
subsistence.”326 Calling Finca Torrens a “concentration camp,” a columnist from Luz made the 
electoral stakes clear: “Why are these things like this? …because the President of the Republic is 
not named [opposition leader] RAMÓN GRAU SAN MARTIN, the president of the Cubans.”327 
No further decisions by Batista or the Health Minister regarding the clearance reached the press. 
Unprepared for the sophisticated political strategy from the neighborhoods, the ministry 
postponed further action.328 
 The Health Ministry failed to clear shantytowns from Havana in 1940, but in the process 
they successfully reiterated a claim made by Zubizarreta during the machadato: in cases where 
the state met its obligations to care for residents, it was justified in prohibiting their illegal 
occupation of land. Throughout the 1930s, however, neighborhood activists had developed a 
political language with which to contest such claims. By insisting that, whatever their 
employment status, the state had not made adequate provisions for housing, they negated the 
Health Ministry’s justifications for removal on its own terms. For shantytown activists, housing 
was a right.  
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3.5 URBAN INFORMALITY ON BEHALF OF THE STATE 
The responsibility of the state to address Las Yaguas was reinforced in September 1944, late in 
Batista's presidency, when Bouza and de la Torriente again sought to reclaim the land. Rather 
than sue the residents, however, they sued the Cuban state for breach of contract, and they faced 
the disapproval of a nation. Press coverage of the trial revealed deep public support for 
neighborhood activists as they fought against eviction on the basis of property rights—a far cry 
from the ambivalence surrounding the initiatives from the Health Ministry. Yet since the state 
represented the neighborhood already, popular support did not translate into demands to 
expropriate the land and distribute it. Instead it highlighted the state’s responsibility to provide 
for shantytown residents in other ways.   
As the trial began, neighborhood activists and supporters made a powerful case in the 
press. In a series of articles that was supported by neighborhood leaders, a reporter from El País 
interviewed a mother who reflected on the possibility of eviction. “It would be so painful for 
us… Here my four children were raised; here they go to school, receive medical assistance; … 
We love ‘Las Yaguas’ like we love Cuba.” Days later, the mayor, Rufino González, gave 
interviews in several papers, preparing for battle.  
For thirteen years an enemy has threatened our borders, which is to say our wire 
fence marking the land claimed by the government. We respect the law and never 
use force against force, but within legal means we hope the government will 
protect us before the enemy, before the judicial claims. The landholders may have 
their reasons. We have ours.329 
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Reports noted an enthusiastic press and radio campaign for the neighborhood.330 El Mundo cited 
“enormous interest,” in the case, calling it “the most important eviction in recent times.” At a 
hearing in mid December the paper estimated that 60 people from Las Yaguas packed the 
courthouse to observe verbal arguments.331  
 
 
Figure 3: A journalist speaks with neighborhood leaders Rufino Gónzalez and Manuela Azcanio during the 1944 trial 
between Las Yaguas’ property owners and the state. Below, neighborhood children.332 
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In suing the state, de la Torriente and Bouza faced long odds. Meeting in the municipal 
courthouse, their lawyers argued that the state had violated its agreement to gradually remove 
residents.333 State attorney Carlos R. Duval led the defense.334 Despite the fact that the 
government had clearly not achieved what Brú's decree had intended, he countered the claims on 
multiple points, reportedly giving a “brilliant exposition.”335 Pointing out that the 1939 contract 
was celebrated at a time when squatters already occupied the land, Duval argued that the land 
had never been delivered to the state, since de la Torriente and Bouza did not have possession to 
deliver it. “The Judge will have to consider said contract as simply celebrated, but not 
consummated, accepted within its writing that the lands are occupied by indigents.” Secondly, 
Duval argued that a demand for the eviction of a third party, in this case the squatters, could not 
be carried forth in a suit against another party, the state. Reporters also pointed out the 
impossibility of “tossing 4,000 citizens from their homes into the most complete misery”336  
Residents waited anxiously in late September to hear the verdict. Making no statement 
about the status of the property itself, the judge agreed with Duval's argument, citing the 
“physical” impossibility of the “expiration of an inexistent contract.” “It is inferred…from the 
text,” he stated, “that prior to the month of December 1939, said indigents occupied the land.”337 
For good measure, the judge charged de la Torriente and Bouza for the trial costs.338 When the 
eviction order was found to be unjustified, “jubilation” was unleashed in the neighborhood, 
where “the ‘streets’ and ‘avenues’ filled with hundreds of residents giving vivas to the judge and 
                                                 
333 “Admitida la demanda para el desalojo de las familias pobres de ‘Las Yaguas,’ y señalado el importante juicio para el 19,” El 
País, September 12, 1944.  
334 “Opuesto el fiscal al desalojo del barrio de indigentes de Las Yaguas,” El Mundo, September 20 1944.  
335 “Declaran sin lugar el juicio de desahucio seguido contra el barrio de los indigentes ‘Las Yaguas,’” Alerta, September 28, 
1944, 2.  
336 Roberto P. de Acevedo, “Impugno el fiscal, Dr. Duval, la demanda para el desalojo de los 4,000 vecinos residentes 
actualmente en ‘Las Yaguas,’” El País, September 19, 1944, 1.  
337 “Declarado Sin Lugar el Desahucio del Barrio de Indigentes de Las Yaguas,” El Mundo, September 28, 1944, 1.  
338 Bouza and de la Torriente appealed the ruling, but apparently to no effect. “El desahucio del Barrio Las Yaguas,” El Mundo, 
November 17, 1944, 3; “El desahucio de Las Yaguas,” El Mundo, November 24, 1944, 3.  
  101 
to the prosecutor Duval.” In the neighborhood's church, a mass was celebrated before the Virgin 
de la Caridad del Cobre, while reporters noted that the neighborhood’s permanence was now 
“guaranteed.”339 “With this ruling, justice has triumphed,” stated Las Yaguas mayor González to 
the press. “Las Yaguas must not disappear.”340  
 By the mid 1940s, behind a wave of public support and an active campaign within the 
neighborhood, Las Yaguas' land was clearly the responsibility of the Cuban state.341 Unremarked 
in the press or in the neighborhood, however, was the fact that the ruling merely halted an 
eviction but did nothing to alter the neighborhood’s property status. During the course of the 
trial, some neighborhood activists implied that the lands might belong to the state, indicating a 
potential path for residents to acquire formal title.342 Yet in a trial where the defendant was the 
state itself, the utility of these arguments was limited. In declaring war with the title-holders, Las 
Yaguas’ mayor Gonzales stated that the lands were already “claimed by the government.”343 
While certainly the case, these claims did not translate into permanent occupancy rights for 
residents. Instead, the peculiar status of the neighborhood’s property, combined with its close 
relationship to the state, continued to invite government intervention.  
Indeed, rather than halting momentum for state intervention, publicity surrounding the 
trial encouraged it—beginning from within the neighborhood itself. Celebrating their court 
victory, González voiced his hopes that the incoming presidential administration “would resolve 
at once the social problem that we confront.”344 Similarly, a prominent scholar said he had been 
moved to tears by reports of Las Yaguas' property trial and made his terms clear: “To redeem 
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Las Yaguas is to fulfill a duty in the tradition of José Martí.”345 What such redemption would 
entail, however, was subject to a variety of interpretations. By leaving open the possibility of 
relocation on the condition of high concessions from the government, neighborhood leaders 
staved off clearance efforts from title-holders. Moving forward with such rhetoric, however, they 
walked a fine line. 
3.6 A CURE WORSE THAN SICKNESS 
By the time Grau was inaugurated as president in October 1944, victory was fresh for Las 
Yaguas, but the position of central shantytowns vis a vis the new government had grown 
complicated in ways not reflected in the trial. For reasons that are not clear, the CTC’s 
Unemployed Section was dissolved by the end of Batista's term.346 Even at the height of the 
section’s influence during the 1940 elections, a columnist in Noticias de Hoy noted that most 
local unions had little interest in reaching out to shantytowns.347 Some organizers in Las Yaguas 
spoke of racism among members of the Communist Party.348 With shantytown networks 
weakened, residents were vulnerable.  
Circumstances conspired to make them more vulnerable still. On October 18, 1944, 
several days after Grau’s inauguration and less than a month after Las Yaguas’ victory in court, a 
hurricane struck Havana, causing widespread damage. Thousands of poor people were left 
homeless. Las Yaguas, Cueva del Humo, Isla de Pinos, and other poor neighborhoods were 
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devastated. Diario de la Marina reported that many shantytown residents were lodged in shelters 
around the city, and that “Las Yaguas was in ruins.”349 Many residents flocked to the 
neighborhood’s cement chapel after staying “firm until the last moment in their modest 
houses.”350 A large picture of Cueva del Humo was printed the next day, showing residents 
swimming down a flooded neighborhood street. 351 
 The storm prompted a full-scale response from all levels of government at a time when 
Grau had barely taken office. Shantytown residents were wary. A military officer stationed at the 
Atarés Castle later recalled that the night of the storm, Grau himself appeared at the castle to 
check on preparations.  
Dr. Grau … told me he had word from … a nearby neighborhood of indigents 
named ‘Las Yaguas’ [probably Isla de Pinos] …He ordered…that we evacuate the 
inhabitants … and that we give them refuge in the Castle. But, to our surprise, 
almost no indigent would take advantage of the opportunity … And almost at the 
point of bayonets, we brought them up the slope to the fort.352 
 
Health officials quickly dictated “a resolution ordering the OBLIGITORY ANTI-TYPHUS 
VACCINE in all those areas affected by the hurricane,” specifically targeting shantytowns.353 
Residents were defensive when approached, and reportedly “rejected the doctors and shouted for 
them to bring food, since they were hungry.”354  
Suspicion was justified. The Heath Ministry quickly decided to relocate all residents, 
despite the fact that after the property trial it now had no legal pressure to do so. The Ministry of 
National Defense immediately prepared camps at a military base in Managua and at Cangrejeras 
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in Bauta, both outside Havana, to “provisionally” house shantytown families.355 Then, on 
October 21, three days after the hurricane, the Health Ministry “dictated … a resolution declaring 
THE NEIGHBORHOODS OF INDIGENTS UNHEALTHY AREAS, through which proceeded 
their immediate ENCLOSEMENT.”356 The decree called “the unhealthy state” of the 
neighborhoods a “danger…for the entire city of Havana.”357 The new president backed the 
initiative for different reasons, stating, “The government intends to end what are called 
neighborhoods of indigents … eliminating first some criminal elements who take refuge within 
them.”358  
Officials framed the move as one that was required by health concerns, but like previous 
relocation attempts, one that was justified by the government’s efforts to provide assistance to 
residents. Health officials declared that “residents would not be abandoned by the government,” 
and at least some residents were convinced.359 By October 22, four hundred people voluntarily 
joined other hurricane victims in the Managua camp, where smiling children were pictured on 
the front page of El Mundo, eating at a cafeteria. “They do not want to leave Las Yaguas; 
Satisfied to be in Managua,” the headline read, contrasting the destruction and stubborn 
resistance in the neighborhoods to the ample provisions of the camp.360 Visiting Managua, Grau 
was pictured with the children.361 “Now we can eat a hot meal and we trust that the government 
will fulfill the promise it has made to give adequate housing and work to our families,” a resident 
was quoted.362  
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Other residents fiercely opposed the moves, however, employing established public 
relations strategies and physically refusing to comply with orders. Rejecting the government's 
health concerns, Las Yaguas mayor Rufino González declared that “during … eleven 
years…there has never existed an infectious sickness” in the neighborhood.363 Calling on the 
government to better provide for their relocation, Grau's supporters within Las Yaguas wrote to 
the president, questioning the “need to abruptly remove hundreds” and instead asking the 
government to “cede some of its lands…to construct a Neighborhood of Indigents of Havana.” 
Meanwhile, in Isla de Pinos, Cueva del Humo, and Las Yaguas, El Mundo reported “an almost 
generalized situation of protest, which sometimes comes close to the limits of violence.” While 
some were willing to move, the report continued, there were “others, significantly superior in 
number to the first ones, who resolutely oppose.”364 According to resident Manuela Azcanio, 
only 30 families from Las Yaguas went to Managua. “It was very far,” she explained.”365  
 As the government strengthened its efforts to remove residents throughout the week, 
negotiations deteriorated. Officials convened neighborhood mayors to try and convince them of 
the move, with little result.366 Visiting with the president of the University Students Federation 
(FEU), Manolo Castro, Senator Eduardo Chibás circulated throughout the neighborhoods. The 
press reported that “Chibás began to speak and the residents interrupted him without letting him 
finish, after which he left.” Later, he “visited house by house, leaving milk for each child, taking 
the opportunity to tell the mothers the advantages of going to live in a clean place.”367 Manuela 
recalled,  
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Chibás went to the neighborhood on various occasions trying to take them by 
force to Managua, but he was looking for the house of hate. One day he was this 
close to staying in Las Yaguas. The fashionable greeting at that time between us 
was ‘To Managua!’ ‘To fuck your mother!’ was the response.368  
 
Dramatizing their opposition, on October 24th, groups in Las Yaguas burned quarantine posts 
put up by the Health Ministry. According to one report, residents of Cueva del Humo attempted 
to burn the Health Minister's car as well. Sergio Carbó's Prensa Libre reported that residents 
were “rebelling against sanitary authorities, brandishing rocks and parts of trees … altering the 
… humane intentions of the government to intern them.”369 transform 
 Even as they publicly created disorder, however, neighborhood activists were conscious 
of their image before a wider public. Manuela reported that only neighborhood women were 
involved in burning the quarantine posts, likely a strategy to avoid public fears of criminality 
associated with masculinity.370 Furthermore, demonstrators were pictured in the press standing 
beneath a Cuban flag with pictures of Grau and José Martí. As they linked themselves to 
symbols of the nation, Alexis García recounted conscious efforts to generate positive publicity.   
Many people arrived, asking if it was us who had become aggressive with the 
police or attacked someone. …Immediately there appeared a lieutenant…‘Well, 
what happened here? What happened here?’…He tried to close the businesses, cut 
off the water to see if it would produce a riot, but…our attitude was calm, so that 
the journalists would come.371  
 
 Protesters recognized that violence might hurt their cause. Meanwhile, as García hoped, the 
conflict generated the widest press coverage ever for the shantytowns.  
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Figure 4: Las Yaguas residents pose beneath a Cuban flag as they protest against relocation orders in 1944.372 
 
Amid strong public backing both for and against the relocations, all agreed that the 
moves required the government to adequately provide for residents. Seeking to rally public 
opinion, Chibás stated, “The inhabitants of the neighborhoods of indigents are slaves of misery 
whom we must liberate, in spite of themselves. …The Revolutionary government cannot tolerate 
Cubans living like animals.”373 In a blustering editorial entitled, “Burn down the shantytowns, 
Dr. Grau,” Sergio Carbó called on the new president to burn “those African hovels” which 
dishonored “the program of the New Cuba.” Yet even this argument rested on government 
assistance to residents. Denouncing the “insolence of those who with great irresponsibility, have 
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insulted and attacked the authorities from the sordid shantytowns,” he noted that resistance came 
“simply because the government wants to redeem them.”374 An Auténtico publication defended 
the relocation as a positive social intervention, stating, “The government ... did not seek to expel 
some unfortunates from those lands at the request of their influential property owners…but 
rather from a labor of social cleansing.”375 On all sides, then, official efforts to help 
neighborhood residents were integrally linked to relocation—but residents refused to move.  
As the situation settled into a stalemate, new scrutiny around the government’s plans for 
assistance tipped the balance away from the Health Ministry. Amid repeated promises for 
redemption, the details of the government’s long-term plans had been limited to photos of the 
temporary Managua camp. In the storm’s aftermath, Manolo Castro of the FEU worked with 
Chibás to convince residents to move to the camps. In the meantime, he discussed plans for the 
neighborhoods with Havana's College of Architects.376 In one meeting, Castro proposed a 
fifteen-day delay for the move and a $1,000,000 peso credit for housing construction, which 
residents would undertake themselves.377 By October 31st, however, after extended meetings 
with neighborhood leaders, Castro grew skeptical of the government’s good faith and opposed 
any further moves. He soon agreed to coordinate neighborhood commissions in Las Yaguas and 
the Atarés neighborhoods, with membership that included numerous veterans from the 
Unemployed Section led by Conde Nápoles in the CTC. Neighborhood leaders stated to the press 
“that they will go wherever Manuel de Castro sends them.”378 “If he suggests that they…be 
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moved to other places, they would do it immediately.”379 Now unconvinced that the government 
would fulfill its commitments, Castro suggested they stay. As his leadership lent credibility and 
publicity to shantytown leaders who claimed the moves would not meet their needs, the 
government abruptly stopped releasing statements to the press. 
 By November, it was clear that the government had again failed to relocate central 
shantytowns from Havana. In the process, however, officials again reinforced the connection 
between relocation and government assistance. In a radio broadcast on November 11, Grau noted 
that a “total solution” had not been found for shantytowns, but nevertheless claimed the 
Managua operation a success.  
The government sought to move those indigents to Managua and to other places, 
facilitating the means of living to which they have the right. True, this was done 
against the will of many. … It was not possible for the government to tolerate 
things in such a state in the suburbs of the very Capital of the Republic.380  
 
Imposing the power of the state against the wishes of residents, Grau indicated, was acceptable—
but only in order to improve their situation.  
 Throughout the end of Grau's term and into the term of his chosen successor, Carlos Prio, 
the Health Ministry continued to push for the elimination of shantytowns. Yet following the 
1944 hurricane, these efforts generated cynicism. By linking their efforts to relocate shantytowns 
so closely to their own capacity to deliver basic social services, the continued presence of such 
neighborhoods highlighted state failure in a variety of ways. Critics of Grau claimed his inability 
to clear the neighborhoods was an effort to “placate the indigents … the purest demagoguery.”381 
Local industrialists complained to the government that the neighborhoods were bad for 
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business.382 Others pointed to the absence of public housing construction as “precisely what 
caused those urban blights that we are so ashamed of.”383 Still others blamed the absence of 
adequate social security laws.384 All agreed that Las Yaguas, for its very existence, required the 
government to act. Meanwhile, however, determined activism from within the neighborhood 
made the cost of action steep. “Neither the hurricane, nor the fire, nor the government can do 
anything against us,” boasted Las Yaguas mayor Rufino González in 1947.385  
By the end of the 1940s, then, the government arrived at a delicate stalemate with 
Havana’s central shantytowns—one that served as a nagging reminder of the state’s inability to 
act. Then, in February 1950, fire struck Cueva del Humo, leveling about one third of the 
neighborhood. In late March, an entire informal neighborhood was destroyed by fire at Playa 
Cajío.386And on April 2, a fire in Las Yaguas surpassed any previous destruction. Noticias de 
Hoy reported on groups of residents, “some wandering, others throwing themselves to the 
ground, crying and lamenting what appeared to be a nightmare.”387 Nearly two decades after 
avoiding Zubizarreta’s fires, Las Yaguas was destroyed. As it was rebuilt, officials began to 
consider new directions for the neighborhoods.  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The fire of April 1950 registered as national shame. Ironically, however, the fire emerged 
alongside a widespread consensus that the elimination of Las Yaguas was necessary. Even 
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neighborhood activists were not opposed to moving, under the right conditions. The public 
frustration following the 1950 fire was therefore not exclusively drawn from concern for the 
neighborhood’s preservation, but rather from the knowledge that the government had not met its 
obligations in providing for its relocation. In 1931, Octavio Zubizarreta had declared himself 
justified in burning down shantytowns because he had launched parallel initiatives to care for the 
poor. In 1944, Ramón Grau declared himself similarly justified in opposing “the will of many” 
residents in order to provide for their basic needs. As shantytown activists demanded that the 
state provide services, infrastructure, employment, and benefits consistent with the stipulations 
of the 1940 Constitution, however, they made it clear that fulfilling these basic needs could not 
be done offhand.   
By 1950, then, Las Yaguas had successfully contested the discourse of the state on its 
own terms. While the neighborhood might have emerged as one of the most significant property 
disputes in Republican Cuba, legislation written by the neighborhood’s elite title-holder, Cosme 
de la Torriente shifted the terms of debate. With lines of battle clearly drawn between residents 
and the state, activists from central shantytowns resisted relocation not by making property 
claims like the residents of La Hata but rather by demanding that the state ensure their rights to 
housing and other social benefits. As residents successfully highlighted the government’s failure 
to meet its obligations, they also transformed their neighborhood into an emblem of state 
incapacity. As officials sought to build their government according to a different image, they 
sought to show their capacity through new methods. For new solutions, they turned to medical 
professionals, urban planners, and criminologists, whose ideas for the neighborhoods were 
developing quickly. 
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4.0  “FACTORIES OF MEN”: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE CULTURE 
OF POVERTY, 1924-1963 
The imperfections of the past move to the present in the consciousness of the individual, 
and constant work is needed to eradicate them.  
  -Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Socialism and Man in Cuba, 1965.388  
 
 
The relocation of several hundred shantytown residents to a camp at Managua after the hurricane 
of 1944 was characterized by President Ramón Grau as an initial solution to areas he called 
“barrios de indigentes” (neighborhoods of indigents). “In addition to terrible misery, those 
neighborhoods sheltered much terrible vice,” he said, and they did “harm to all…especially the 
children.”389 Yet after a confrontational standoff with police and health officials, residents of the 
barrios de indigentes refused to relocate. “Indigents” held at Managua, it was meanwhile 
reported, “remain in a continuous state of uprising, attacking law enforcement and fleeing.”390  
Five years later, in 1949, Cuba’s Health Minister announced new plans to relocate 
shantytown residents. The minister proposed building a “culturing” neighborhood, “which would 
organize and orient its residents on cultural paths more attuned with Cuban civilization.”391 
Despite this rhetoric, by 1950 no such neighborhood had appeared, and these initiatives, too, 
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seemed doomed to failure.392 When fire struck Las Yaguas in April 1950, however, a significant 
transformation was evident. Rather than police, the minister sent teams of social workers to 
shantytowns with instructions that they use persuasion to fulfill their tasks. And rather than a 
dramatic confrontation, some social workers reported gaining the trust of local residents.393  
 The political justification for these moves was clear. The 1944 property trial put Las 
Yaguas in the national spotlight, propelling demands for action from the state. By 1950, state 
action took place through social workers, who began their operations amid national outrage after 
Las Yaguas burned. In both cases, residents were active in generating political will for state 
assistance and in resisting relocation. Yet the cultural focus of government officials and methods 
they used in their interventions followed a different logic. Beyond responding to property 
conflicts or political pressure, what did government officials hope to accomplish by moving poor 
people out of the city? What disciplines and ideas influenced their methods as they did so? And 
how did their actions shape wider social classifications? This chapter offers an intellectual 
history of slum clearance in Havana. 
 Scholars of housing and urbanism in Cuba and Latin America have often engaged with 
the combination of technocratic planning and economic inequality in explaining patterns of 
spatial inequality.394 Cultural, ethnic, and racial categories of difference have generally been 
treated as only indirectly related to housing policy.395 The difficulty of locating racially targeted 
housing policies is unsurprising in a region where eugenicists advocated “constructive 
miscegenation,” or “mestizaje,” a construct that upheld aspects of white supremacy while 
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rejecting strict racial divisions.396 Yet even the role of so-called “soft eugenics” in housing 
policy has been largely left unexamined.397 In Cuba, studies of social science and eugenics have 
examined the early part of the twentieth-century and focused on the categories used by social and 
political actors in debates about racial discrimination.398 Their role in housing policy has not 
been investigated. 
 This chapter focuses on the role of urban planning and social science in debates about 
shantytowns. It joins recent scholarship on Brazil that argues that urban poverty came to be a 
more salient category of discrimination than traditional racial categories in Rio de Janeiro’s legal 
system.399 In the context of public debates over shantytown relocation, many academic fields 
during the 1930s and 40s treated shantytowns—or barrios de indigentes (neighborhoods of 
indigents)—as an important spatial category that marked collective difference, even when 
explicit racial categories were left unstated. “Indigence” was de-racialized, yet it provided a 
space to openly highlight associations between race, crime, ignorance, primitivism, promiscuity, 
and physical inferiority. In barrios de indigentes, moreover, many scientists believed such traits 
to be hereditary (though not necessarily immutable). Through the lens of urban poverty, then, 
language associated with racial discrimination was refracted, reconfigured, and applied to 
housing.  
These classifications shaped wider plans for the nation, since policy solutions to 
problems associated with barrios de indigentes preoccupied scholars from a variety of fields. On 
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one hand, medical professionals and social scientists in the fields of eugenics, sanitation, and 
criminology proposed solutions that targeted the poor as individuals, while on the other hand, 
urbanists and economists proposed structural solutions. As shantytowns attracted widespread 
notice in Havana during the 1930s and 40s, I argue that these disciplines and their respective 
concerns for urban poverty converged under the rubric of national development and provided a 
compelling justification for the clearance of shantytowns.400 To align structural and individual 
solutions to urban poverty, officials established a new academic field in Cuba, social work that 
was specifically focused on implementing technocratic plans according to social scientific 
research, in a way that minimized political conflict.  
Cuban scholars operated alongside counterparts from other Latin American governments, 
the US, and the United Nations (UN) to pursue national development along multiple fronts. The 
local synthesis of these international trends laid foundations for distinctive policy initiatives. 
Beginning in the 1950s and continuing after the 1959 Revolution, Cuban officials initiated 
centralized slum clearance programs in Havana (Chapter 6). In the process, they explicitly 
connected national development to the elimination of indigence, normalizing the idea that 
cultural characteristics associated with barrios de indigentes were antithetical to the norms of 
urban citizenship. Following the 1959 Revolution, these links between structural reform and 
individual behavior were adapted to a new socio-political reality.  
I begin the chapter with an analysis of the work of one of Cuba’s earliest and most 
notable housing reformers, Luis Bay Sevilla, who drew from progressive and structuralist roots 
in proposing housing legislation for Havana from the 1920s to the 1940s. I then examine the 
emergence of “barrios de indigentes” as a spatial category in the 1930s, and the classification 
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and analysis of indigent neighborhoods by social scientists in the 1940s. Next I discuss the 
parallel rise of modernist architecture in the city and its entanglement with economic 
development initiatives nationally and internationally following World War II (WWII). I 
conclude by examining the emergence of social work and the “culture of poverty” thesis as a 
fusion of both structuralist and progressive intellectual frameworks before and after 1959. 
4.1 FORERUNNER LUIS BAY SEVILLA 
As poor people crowded into Havana during the prosperous 1920s, architect Luis Bay Sevilla 
voiced concern. In his sprawling 1924 book, La vivienda del pobre, he synthesized a variety of 
academic disciplines in addressing urban poverty and housing. His scholarship reflected his 
eclectic background. A one-time tenement health inspector, prolific journalist, founding member 
of Havana’s College of Architects, and periodic policy consultant, Bay Sevilla was among 
Cuba’s most vocal housing reformers. Throughout the 1930s and 40s he served as director of the 
professional journal Arquitectura.401  
Something of a prophet in the patronage-system wilderness of the first Republic, Bay 
Sevilla's writing was frustrated and eclectic. He railed against “useless laws” that went 
unenforced, and a politics that “only have a personal character.”402 Years later, in his obituary, a 
colleague gently noted that he was “critical.”403 During the 1930s, he wrote on a number of 
subjects, reconstructing the customs of habaneros from centuries past, demanding attention to 
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urban planners in Europe, and reflecting on the bohíos (rural huts) of pre-Columbian indigenous 
groups.404 Yet he reserved his most passionate ruminations for the urban and rural poor, whose 
housing he interpreted through the currents of criminology, social medicine, proto-modernist 
architecture, and classical progressivism, and the improvement of which he saw as critical to the 
development of the Cuban nation.405 “Contemplating those sad spectacles of misery,” he wrote, 
“a mute protest rises in us…[and] the patriotic fiber beat[s] in our chest.”406 
Bay Sevilla premised his vision of housing reform on perceived physical, behavioral, and 
cultural shortcomings of the poor, perceptions he backed with references to medical and social 
science. “To solve the housing problem it is not enough to give a house to the worker,” he wrote. 
“It is necessary to educate him so he knows how to keep it clean.”407 Outlining the deadly 
sicknesses and physical shortcomings caused by insufficient hygiene, the “promiscuity” caused 
by “unfortunate mixture, brothers close to sisters and parents to adult children of both sexes,” 
and the criminality caused by the anonymity of life in a “solar” (tenement), Bay Sevilla saw 
comprehensive housing legislation as critically important to the formation of a strong national 
population in a civilized world.408  
At a time when scientific classifications of race were quite normal, Bay Sevilla did not 
write in explicitly racial terms, instead making thinly veiled references to black-identified 
cultural practices, which he assumed to thrive amidst sub-standard housing. He wrote about the 
“scandalous reputation” of tenements, fueled by “drums played by knotted, quivering fingers,” 
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the “saints” of the residents, and “outrageous dancing until dawn.”409 In similar fashion, he did 
not view deficiencies among the poor as permanent or immutable. Drawing from the principles 
of the neo-Lamarckian, so-called “soft” eugenics, which were influential on the island, he called 
homes “factories of men,” prime sites for state intervention to “improve” their moral, physical, 
and social capacities. “While the poor lack decent shelter it will be impossible to better the 
customs of the people and elevate their level of civilization,” he wrote.410  
With his unlikely background as both a former health official in tenement homes and an 
architect, Bay Sevilla’s writing drew from two established intellectual traditions that circulated 
throughout the Atlantic world: progressivism and Marxism. Tenements, Jacob Riis had written of 
New York City in 1890, are “the hot-beds of the epidemics that carry death to rich and poor 
alike; the nurseries of pauperism and crime that fill our jails and police courts; ... because, above 
all, they touch the family life with deadly moral contagion.”411 A noted voice of US 
progressivism, Riis called for the expansion of charity, the enforcement of municipal regulations, 
and the construction of new homes by employers.  
Criticizing such reforms, Frederich Engels saw the issue in starkly different terms. Noting 
that poverty and crowding had been a constant feature of urban life across time, Engels argued 
that under capitalism only the scale of such crowding had greatly increased. This, he argued, had 
to be eradicated at the root. “In order to make an end of this housing shortage there is only one 
means,” he wrote: “to abolish altogether the exploitation and oppression of the working class by 
the ruling class.”412 The two conflicting visions of those like Riis, who saw so-called slum 
housing as an issue for targeted physical and moral reforms, and those like Engels, who saw the 
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issue as symptomatic of wide structural imbalances inherent to capitalism, shaped the strategies 
of politicians and planners throughout the twentieth century.413  
Bay Sevilla took the basic tropes of nineteenth-century progressives in Europe and the 
United States as his initial point of departure. Whether or not he had read Engels, he seems to 
have been little interested in a structural critique of society during his early career. In 1924 he 
briefly hypothesized that the overcrowding of Havana was caused by the city’s rising wealth and 
high “level of culture,” causing families to demand more spacious homes, and leaving urbanizing 
migrants to rent “dirty rooms.”414 In the tumultuous decade that followed the fall of the Machado 
regime, however, his thinking would evolve.  
In 1938, army chief Fulgencio Batista appointed Bay Sevilla to lead a commission to 
study comprehensive housing legislation. Producing a 39-page bill, the commission proposed a 
variety of actions, to be directed by a planning committee that was heavy with architects but also 
included doctors, judges, and representatives from the labor ministry. Charged with demolishing 
tenements and shantytowns, the committee was to be freed from political constraints and given 
expansive flexibility. Within its purview were numerous aspects of urban development, and even 
the distribution of land.415 “The solution to the problem of housing,” Bay Sevilla wrote in the 
law’s defense, “is a problem not only of construction technicians, but also of doctors, 
sociologists, jurists, and educators.”416 Presenting the legislation to the International Congress of 
Municipalities, which met in Havana in 1939, the architect was confident that the commission 
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had found a path towards making Havana a modern capital city, suitable for “the salvation of the 
race.”417  
The legislation, however, proved too ambitious for its time. As the bill was modified in 
Congress, Bay Sevilla's frustration was palpable. “My dear Colonel,” he wrote to Batista in 
1939, the new legislation “basically ruins the affordable housing bill that I redacted, with your 
own ideas, and mine.”418 Housing legislation did pass Congress, and various housing measures 
were written into the 1940 Constitution, but none of them was as extensive as what the 
commission had proposed. As failure became apparent, Bay Sevilla's frustration grew more 
pointed. Speaking to the College of Architects, he lamented, “A Cuban, generally, when he rises 
to an elevated position, does not accept that there might be another Cuban who knows more 
about a subject than he. …This problem of deficient housing is something more complicated and 
difficult than the respectable members of Congress imagine.”419 About the emergence and 
growth of shantytown neighborhoods, he was more pointed still. Criticizing the “hysterical 
defenders” of the neighborhoods, he noted that “on distinct occasions high government 
functionaries have sought to end this urban stain, without having done anything else but leave 
everything in the state they found it.”420 “The government should liquidate them with the 
greatest haste,” he concluded, “in order to free the City of the deplorable spectacle that those 
pigsties offer before the gaze of the foreigners who visit us.”421 
In enacting legislation, Bay Sevilla had failed, but in the process he spoke of things to 
come. Combining progressive and structuralist visions of reform, and linking the precarious 
homes of Havana's poor to urban planning and economic reforms, which he premised on the 
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conclusions of medical and criminal scientists, he had laid out an expansive vision for the Cuban 
state. 
4.2 “BARRIOS DE INDIGENTES” 
As Bay Sevilla pushed for comprehensive housing institutions to address the urban poor, urban 
poverty was taken up by the government on a different trajectory. In terms far less ambitious 
than the crusading reformer would later propose, government officials acknowledged that caring 
for the urban poor was an official obligation. Machado’s 1931 legislation for the “feeding and 
defense of the unemployed” proposed to assist workers in a state of “indigence.”422 In popular 
and official lexicons, the urban poor were therefore labeled in two ways: desocupado 
(unemployed) and indigente (indigent). Far from trivial, the tension between the two revealed the 
same tension between the nineteenth-century housing prescriptions of Engels and Riis—the need 
for structural reform on the one hand, and the need for social assistance and individual 
rehabilitation on the other.  
During the 1930s, politicians, journalists, and activists debated the respective utility of 
these terms in describing informally housed communities like Las Yaguas. The language used to 
describe shantytowns therefore referenced a central question about the relationship between 
neighborhoods and the state: what type of intervention did they require? By the mid-1940s, the 
debate over vocabulary found an answer: the term barrios de indigentes was solidified in popular 
and political usage as a recognized category of space, framing policy initiatives towards 
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shantytowns. This reflected an uneven popular consensus that the neighborhoods were not 
merely the product of unemployment, but instead required reforms targeting culture, health, and 
behavior as well.  
“Indigent” and “unemployed” were social categories long before barrios de indigentes 
entered public discourse. However, they took on new meanings as the Great Depression 
transformed Havana. In his 1924 La vivienda del pobre, Bay Sevilla included a chapter called 
“The protection of the indigent.” Indigents, he implied, without mentioning barrios de 
indigentes, were “social elements that live without sufficient resources in a way that chokes 
them, and they fight without any success to separate their family from the corrupting 
environment of the tenement.” He related indigence to “street begging.” Indigents were those 
who could be moralized and regenerated, those who were “conquered by fortune.”423 As masses 
of unemployed, landless people crowded into cities, by the end of the 1920s both terms came to 
apply to visible, identifiable groups. Spanish “indigents” were gathered and deported from 
Havana, while “indigent” Puerto Ricans, Chinese, Mexicans, Haitians, and Jamaicans were 
repatriated from Oriente.424 Struck by economic depression, “indigent” North Americans, one 
report noted, were gathering in camps in Washington, D.C.425 “Indigent” Cubans were spread 
throughout Havana, as well. The rival term, “desocupado,” was at times used in combination 
with “indigente,” and was more evocative of labor struggles and the political upheaval of the 
                                                 
423 Bay y Sevilla, La vivienda del pobre, 381, 382, 385. 
424 “Los indigentes portorriqueños serán repatriados a bordo de un transporte norteamericano,” El Heraldo de Cuba, August 18, 
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425 On Washington DC: “Socorro para los indigentes en el invierno,” El Heraldo de Cuba, September 2, 1931, 1. 
  123 
early 1930s, especially as groups of protesters organized themselves under the mantra “los sin 
trabajo” (the unemployed).426   
This tension between the terms was not lost on contemporary observers. During the early 
1930s, union literature eschewed the term “indigent” and used the term “unemployed” when 
referring to the growing masses of poor, non-unionized men who were often homeless. In 1936, 
groups within central shantytowns hoping for assistance of all kinds invoked both terms, forming 
an “Association of Defense for the Unemployed Indigent Residents of the Province of 
Havana.”427  In 1945, the director of Hygiene and Social Provision within the Ministry of Labor 
sought to take control of the “unemployment” fund from the Health Ministry. “But if that is not 
possible,” he added, “at least the name should be changed to Indigents Fund, since that fits 
within the functions of welfare.”428 In the 1950s, the fund was still referred to alternatively as the 
“unemployment” or “indigent” fund.  
 By the early 1930s, then, “unemployed” and “indigent” were officially recognized 
categories used to describe poor people, and both had implications for their relationship to the 
state. It was only gradually, however, that they would come to describe a specific category of 
urban space.429 Press reports about Las Yaguas from 1931 described the neighborhood as simply 
a “barrio” (neighborhood)  or a “reparto” (subdivision). Even as reports noted that “indigents” 
had been relocated from the Isla de Pinos neighborhood the same year, the place itself was 
referred to as a “suburbio,” “barrio de pobres,” or “conjunto de chozas” (suburb, poor 
                                                 
426 “Los sin trabajo serán alojados en el antiguo mercado ‘La Purísima,’” El Heraldo de Cuba, June 19 1931, 1.  
427 Asociación de defensa de los vecinos desocupados e indigentes de la provincia de la Habana, 25 August 1936, Legajo 206, 
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vecindad specifically made no mention of the word “indigent.” Bay y Sevilla, La vivienda del pobre, 103-112, 381-386.  
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neighborhood, or collection of shacks).430 Since it was destroyed by the government to move 
residents to the Purísima camp for “indigents,” and then repopulated by those same camp 
residents, however, Isla de Pinos was strongly associated with the term. When in 1933, after 
Machado's fall, armed struggle broke out around the adjacent Atarés castle, a press report made 
the connection between people and place explicit: “Isla de Pinos, barriada indigente located on 
the slopes of Atarés, emerged unscathed from the bombardment.”431 
 In the years that followed, the term “barrio de indigentes” cropped up with increasing 
frequency in reports describing Las Yaguas, Cueva del Humo, Isla de Pinos, and other 
neighborhoods, though its usage was still not uniform.432 By 1937, the term was established 
enough that a writer in Diario de la Marina thought to contest it, writing a piece entitled “Las 
Yaguas is not a barrio de indigentes,” and by 1938 an urbanist published a study of “the so-
called barrios de indigentes.”433 The early Communist journal, La Palabra, like the CNOC, 
seems to have refused the term entirely, and called Las Yaguas a “reparto” populated by 
“desocupados” in several articles.434 In 1939, when another Communist journal, Noticias de 
Hoy, began coverage, it would initially insist on the term “barrios de desocupados” exclusively. 
                                                 
430 “La miseria y el infortunio han levantado un 'pueblo' al que han dado en llamarle 'Isla de Pinos' o la “Ciudad del Plante,” El 
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By the mid 1940s, however, even this journal would often use the term “barrios de 
indigentes.”435 
By the 1940s, then, “barrio de indigentes” had become, among the press, a discrete 
spatial category—one that was used even in journals that rejected its connotations. Although the 
most conservative scientists and officials continued to note the need for better employment 
opportunities for the poor, the gradual, uneven victory of “indigent” over “unemployed” in 
classifying urban shantytowns aligned with an implicit consensus among scientists that the 
problems of these neighborhoods could not only be dealt with through structural economic 
reforms. Not merely manifestations of unemployment, the neighborhoods were linked, as Bay 
Sevilla had argued, to the need for targeted interventions from the state.   
4.3 THE INDIGENT HOME: “BARRIOS DE INDIGENTES” IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
In the absence of a centralized bureaucracy to deal with popular housing, the targeted 
interventions proposed by scholars were diffuse. As “indigence” and informal housing became 
linked in the public discourse, scholars of public health and eugenics gradually intervened, 
crafting policy solutions to improve the conditions of informal housing and in some cases to 
eliminate the barrios de indigentes themselves. Their proposals were fragmentary and 
overlapping. Taken together, however, they comprised a wide array of knowledge available to 
policy makers.   
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 By the 1930s, Bay Sevilla’s conclusions had already drawn approval from health 
officials and were aligned with the conclusions of local eugenicists.436 With the term barrios de 
indigentes growing in popular discourse, medical officials continued to study deficient housing, 
sometimes using the term directly. In a paper presented in a 1940 conference, Oswaldo Morales 
Patiño and several co-authors interested in “labor medicine” cited the need to construct homes 
for poor workers, noting that “these buildings should be under the care of the state in order to 
have an absolute control…making their possessors keep them clean at all times.”437 In 1949, 
Morales Patiño discussed sanitary problems in some barrios de indigentes, related to the “secret 
raising of pigs.”438 Eugenicist José Chelala characterized barrios de indigentes explicitly in a 
series of articles published in Bohemia in 1941, some of which he sent directly to then-
opposition leader Grau. Chelala criticized health officials for doing too little to enforce codes and 
to help the poor, which he saw as a threat to national security in a time of war.439  
These medical concerns were synthesized and propelled by the newly institutionalized 
field of juvenile delinquency, a field that deemed heredity and environment as especially 
important. In May 1933, Cuba established a juvenile court system, and in 1938, it created the 
Child Correctional Center at Finca Torrens.440 With official recognition for their discipline, 
scholars concluded that there were strong links between “indigence,” deficient housing, and 
juvenile crime, advocating a variety of solutions.  
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Scholars of juvenile delinquency abroad linked “the indigent home” to criminal 
tendencies. An influential study by Argentine criminologist Ernesto Nelson published in 1933 
explained that it was necessary to consider the relationship between adolescents’ “hereditary 
baggage” and “the environment” in which they lived.441 The study went on to classify three types 
of problematic homes, seen to generate crime: “the incomplete home,” lacking a parent, “the 
incompetent home,” with negligent, criminal, or abusive parents, and “the indigent home,” with 
parents living in misery.442 In an extensive section on “the indigent home,” Nelson outlined 
various elements of poverty, including unemployment, poor hygiene, and high fertility, calling 
the tenement house “the incubator of crime”443 The worst type of indigent housing, he wrote, 
was “a tin shack set on empty land on the city’s outskirts.”444 Professional scholars and medical 
students researching juvenile delinquency at the University of Havana cited Nelson and 
organized their theses around his classifications until at least the 1950s.445   
 Adding to these studies, scholars of juvenile delinquency in Cuba discussed the 
fundamental role of housing, particularly shantytowns and tenements, in generating acquired and 
hereditary degeneration of young people and their predisposition to crime. A 1935 study 
identified “the poor home” as the discipline’s main target and recommended legislative measures 
to generate employment and better housing.446  A 1945 study by lawyer Leonor Saavedra y 
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Gómez sharpened the focus on housing. “A large part of our population finds itself without 
work, which means that thousands of Cuban families have had to emigrate…to ‘concentration’ 
camps—as I call them.”447 Addressing the problem, Saavedra prescribed effective government 
intervention: “our government should have prevented this a long time ago, urgently needing to 
‘control the birth rate of our poor, inferior classes.’”448 Medical students who focused on juvenile 
delinquency applied these conclusions to shantytowns directly, characterizing Las Yaguas, 
Cueva del Humo and others as “sad spectacles” that “degrade our culture.”449  
 Given their biological focus, these writers were more concerned with race as it related to 
housing than Bay Sevilla had been, but like him they explained biological inferiority as caused 
by poverty more generally. Even so, scientists were especially concerned with neighborhoods as 
sites of undesirable social and racial mixture. One criminologist wrote that crowded tenements 
forced cohabitation among “distinct families who have never before met and who belong to the 
most diverse social and ethnic classes.”450 Citing Israel Castellanos and other eugenicists, 
Saavedra worried that “the poor classes, biologically inferior for being socially inferior, 
reproduce themselves in large contingents…This danger is infinitely greater,” she continued, 
“due to cohabitation with a biologically inferior race.”451 All told, however, race was mentioned 
infrequently in scientific discussions of urban poverty, in spite of clearly worded conclusions 
about the biological deficiencies of the poor. In each case, poverty was considered a condition 
separate from African descent.    
By the 1950s, then, medical conclusions about poverty, race, and housing were 
synthesized in the institutionalized field of juvenile delinquency. In this field, there was 
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consensus that indigence was represented in a particular type of home, which produced 
individuals with criminal tendencies. While, for some, racial mixture worsened this type of 
home, they saw poverty as a separate and crucial variable. Over time, scholars applied these 
conclusions to their discussions of barrios de indigentes in Havana, and their conclusions 
resonated in the popular press. A 1939 article in Bohemia claimed that many children in barrios 
de indigentes became criminals, not because they were born criminals, but because of their living 
conditions.452 In 1952, quoting heavily from a study of juvenile delinquency in Argentina, one 
article claimed that perhaps 85 percent of youth from barrios de indigentes and solares in Cuba 
were juvenile delinquents. “These were children pushed to evil by the ignorance of their parents 
and by the laziness of public authorities,” declared another.453 As a result, discussions of barrios 
de indigentes increasingly focused on the next generation of Cubans, and by implication, the 
future of the nation.  
4.4 SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE STATE 
Despite numerous proposals from doctors and criminologists, however, their effectiveness in 
generating shantytown policy was limited by the issue’s complexity. Health officials often 
carried out policies in conjunction with police, but they had few tools to address entire 
neighborhoods. In their normal dealings with housing, they merely assessed fines and sometimes 
evicted families from single buildings.454 As Bay Sevilla recognized, shantytowns were 
                                                 
452 “Palabras a las mujeres sobre la niñez cubana desvalida,” Bohemia, August 13, 1939, 42-43, 61, 63. 
453 “Los problemas del niño delincuente,” Bohemia, Aug 31 1952, n.p.; “La aniquilación del niño: crimen y pecado,” Bohemia, 
July 27, 1952, n.p. 
454 On health officials working in tenement buildings, see chapter 5.  
  130 
multifaceted, presenting issues that single agencies could not address. When political pressure 
generated momentum for new initiatives towards barrios de indigentes, all policies therefore 
implied dividing and classifying the neighborhood residents to determine what state obligations 
might be, and which tools should be used to fulfill them. In other words, into the 1950s, policies 
towards barrios de indigentes were written more as questions than solutions. 
In 1939, for example, legislation signed by President Federico Laredo Brú and written by 
Cosme de la Torriente sought to determine how many residents in Las Yaguas were not, in fact, 
in extreme poverty. “The local Sanitation Authority of Havana will proceed to undertake a 
census,” the legislation explained, “to determine who are the indigents, and who are those [who] 
can rent a place to move to.”455 When the Health Ministry, acting on Grau's orders, sought to 
clear Las Yaguas again in October 1944, Eddy Chibás made a statement to the press in which he 
was more specific. “The inhabitants of the barrios de indigentes are not all equal,” he declared. 
“They divide into three categories: true indigents, workers without appropriate housing, and the 
criminal element. The first two categories constitute a problem of social assistance that can be 
resolved kindly. The last category is not a matter of social assistance, but rather, social 
defense.”456 By 1948, Congress debated housing legislation that continued to refine these 
classifications. One bill proposed to take a detailed census of the neighborhoods to exclude those 
who were not poor, while finding relatives to shelter those who found themselves in 
neighborhoods “due to accidental circumstances.” Those who were limited by “permanent 
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circumstances” were to be placed in “a rehabilitation regimen without restricting their personal 
liberty.”457  
Uncertainty surrounding shantytown policy was reflected in the fact that barrios de 
indigentes remained an informal term throughout the 1940s. De la Torriente’s legislation referred 
to “indigents” who inhabited “such lands,” while never using the term barrios de indigentes.458 
The term was finally recognized in 1952 legislation, which echoed previous proposals. Residents 
of barrios urbanos de indigentes (urban neighborhoods of indigents) with “profitable 
employment,” it stated, were to be forced to find housing elsewhere, while those who did not 
were to be “totally reeducated” and provided with “social assistance” under the care of the 
Health Ministry and the Corporation for Social Assistance. 459 In each case, shantytown residents 
were classified with precision in order to determine the extent and nature of the state's obligation 
to them—and in each case, policy makers made it clear that no single solution would ensure 
success. For the way they were formally and informally defined in policy, then, barrios de 
indigentes highlighted the need for precisely the type of multi-disciplinary effort Bay Sevilla had 
proposed.  
By the time Grau sought to relocate shantytown residents at the Managua camp in 1944, 
he had a variety of scientific theories at his disposal, but none that claimed to deal with the 
neighborhoods comprehensively. Instead, the poor received state welfare through overlapping 
institutions. The complications of this system are illustrated by their intersection in the story of 
one man, Pedro López, who was interned in the camp. 
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López was estimated to be 18-22 years old.460 According to a report that doctors 
compiled, his childhood in Santa Clara had been interrupted abruptly at age 6, when his father 
died of a sickness “of the blood.” He had been sent to live with an elderly grandmother who 
could not control him. At the age of 11, she placed him in a juvenile facility.461 He was soon 
moved to a new Juvenile Corrections Center at Finca Torrens in 1939, and was eventually 
released.462 After the 1944 storm hit Havana, destroying many shantytowns, López was rounded 
up with hundreds of poor people and brought to Managua, where President Grau promised their 
rehabilitation.463 
At Managua, López soon had a physical altercation with a guard and faced criminal 
charges and forensic examinations for the court. The doctors wrote that he was “of the black 
race,” and that his skin “presents manifestations of a papulous syphilis.” They suspected that his 
father's blood sickness had been “a brain syphilis,” which the boy had inherited. “Syphilitic 
heredity is determinant of criminality,” Saavedra would write later that year.464 On the basis of 
the medical report, a judge suspended López’s trial and interned him.465 The young man was sent 
to the asylum at Mazorra before being transferred to another asylum on the Isle of Pines.466  
In January 1946, after several months, doctors declared him cured.467 López was set free 
in March 1946, nearly fifteen months after his fight with the guard.468 With no housing, no 
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record of employment, and no support, López was released into the city. Despite detailed reports 
compiled by criminologists, psychologists, and doctors, the state could decide on no further 
solution. All the institutions involved agreed that López demonstrated characteristics that they 
associated with indigence, and which they increasingly located in barrios de indigentes. Yet by 
1946, López had already visited Cuba’s only proposed solution to such neighborhoods: the 
Managua camp—and the camp was now abandoned. After a lifetime of institutional 
confinement, López embodied an open question for state officials as they searched for 
appropriate policies. It was the same question raised by the informal neighborhoods scattered 
across Havana. 
4.5 “SCRATCHING THE URBAN SURFACE”: “BARRIOS DE INDIGENTES” AND 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Elsewhere in the city, Luis Bay Sevilla continued to search for answers. As director of the 
journal Arquitectura, Bay Sevilla oversaw publications from members of Havana’s College of 
Architects, a politically active community that was increasingly concerned with urban planning. 
He also corresponded with architects throughout Europe and Latin America, promoting the 
journal internationally and reprinting articles from architects abroad.469 As part of an active, 
national network throughout the 1940s, Cuban architects joined with international peers in 
debating the principles of modernism, a new paradigm that fused design with urban planning and 
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demanded technocratic authority. Local architects took up social and political issues with 
increasing enthusiasm, though from a different angle than Bay Sevilla. Rather than considering 
ways to deal with the urban poor directly, architects wrote of ways to plan a city that would not 
produce urban poverty. Even as barrios de indigentes were mentioned only tangentially in these 
wider plans, they embodied the precise definition of what planners hoped to avoid.  
As doctors and criminologists debated issues associated with “indigents,” officials 
associated with labor and economics discussed its structural foundations. In 1940, from the 
Ministry of Labor's Department of Hygiene and Social Provision, Diego Vicente Tejera, 
addressed unemployment in a book entitled “Individual Rights are not Incompatible with a 
Socialist Regime,” which proposed expanded state assistance for unemployed workers based on 
the principles of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.470 Yet discussions of employment relations 
contended with the demands of organized labor, and stirred political concern. In 1943 prominent 
government economist Gustavo Gutiérrez cited the economic interventions of the US and British 
states to dismiss “absurd” fears of communism that structural forms could incite.471  
Urban planners took up similar structural issues without their political baggage. In an 
extended three-part essay entitled “Architecture and Socialism,” published between May and 
July 1944, architect José Bens Arrarte reflected on how Vicente Tejera’s “socialist regime” 
might apply to architecture in fulfilling the needs of a modern society. Like Bay Sevilla, Bens 
fused this focus with calls for an expansive state to meet the collective social needs of the 
population. The architect of the day, he wrote, was not the one who “builds this or that palace, 
church or theater… but rather one whose work will be linked with other efforts towards the 
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economic development of the city, social wellbeing, and the happiness of others.”472 Writing of 
the “machinism” of the modern age, and the dangers of “unchecked capitalism,” Bens defended 
the potential benefits of state interventions “under a democratic regime.”473 Framing the housing 
issue as global in scope, Bens cited a wide array of legislation from Europe and the United States 
“to put an end to the barrios insalubres [unhealthy neighborhoods] and infected shacks of 
indigents.”474  
Like many Cuban architects, Bens drew from a variety of architectural schools, but these 
proposals bore the influence of French architect Le Corbusier, leader of the International 
Congress of Modern Architects (CIAM). “The machinist era,” wrote Le Corbusier in the famous 
1933 essay The Athens Charter, “has provoked immense disturbances in the conduct of men.… 
Chaos has entered the cities.”475 In response, the Charter called for greater state control to 
regulate basic functions of urban life. Holding their first Congress in 1928, CIAM architects 
began to outline a new approach to housing, with contradictory roots in the monumentalism of 
the French urban planner Haussmann and radical social critique along the lines of Engels.476 
CIAM architects were unaffiliated with the Soviet Union, but James Holston has argued that they 
deliberately fashioned their proposals in a way that could adapt to governments across the 
political spectrum. The key element of Le Corbusier's thinking was that urban planning should 
serve the collective whole, even as he avoided adherence to fascism or communism.477  
Like his peers, José Lluis Sert, an architect and professor in Harvard’s Graduate School 
of Design, was deeply concerned with balancing and correcting the structural forces that had led 
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to the creation of urban slums, but drew from the conclusions of medical scientists and 
criminologists as well. His 1942 book, Can Our Cities Survive?, was intended as a “free form” 
development of the principles of Corbusier's Athens Charter.478 He devoted a large portion of the 
book to slums, “the obvious cancer of city growth,” which, like Engels, he saw as symptoms of 
broader, structural issues.479 Le Corbusier had written of unplanned suburbs as “bastard 
boroughs,” a problem that “necessitates the squandering of public funds.”480 Sert was more 
specific, supporting his conclusions with citations from criminologists and social scientists. “The 
only remedy for this condition,” he wrote, “is the demolition of the infected houses and the 
reconstruction…of sanitary dwellings.”481 Yet eradication was not, for Sert, a solution by itself. 
Instead, he argued that slums should be addressed through comprehensive planning that would 
reorganize the entire city. “Present slum clearance projects may be ... viewed as a mere 
scratching of the urban surface, considering that they are no more than compromises with the 
urgent necessity of removing all slums from our cities and providing proper housing for vast 
masses of people.”482  
 Cuban architects were deeply connected with CIAM, and formally created a working 
group in 1939 after an extended visit to Cuba by Sert.483 The chair of the Department of 
Urbanism at the University of Havana (formed in 1924), Pedro Martínez Inclán had been a 
proponent of the Garden City model, but enthusiastically adopted the tenets of modernism in the 
1940s. In 1949, Martínez Inclán modified Le Corbusier's Athens Charter into a new work, which 
he titled, Code of Urbanism: the Athens Charter, the Havana Charter. Martínez Inclán's Code 
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proposed “the creation of Ministries of Urbanism …[with] wide and well defined legal 
authorities…to be able to carry out the general planning [planificación] of the nation.”484 Writing 
extensively against the type of crowded, unordered construction represented by shantytowns, 
Martínez Inclán did not name “barrios de indigentes” directly, but his carefully planned city 
required shantytowns to end.485 
With momentum on their side internationally, urban planners gradually gained 
technocratic authority in Cuba. Evident before 1940 in proposals such as Bay Sevilla’s Low-Cost 
Housing Law, the idea of urban planning was strongly supported by the 1940 Constitution and 
written into several articles.486 First, local municipalities were to create housing commissions 
“concerned with everything related to the dwellings of workers.” Additionally, “the state shall 
support the creation of low-cost dwellings for workers,” including legislation to promote 
company housing for employees.487 In 1942, following constitutional precepts, Batista 
established the national Pro-Urbanism Board, which operated under the mantra “better cities, 
better citizens.” Yet architect Horacio Navarrette expressed the frustrations of the Board in 1943, 
as he noted the need for sound “urbanistic legislation.”488 For Navarrette, scientific 
considerations prioritized concerns other than those proposed by the politicians—concerns such 
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as “the elimination of the so-called barrios de indigentes.”489 Functioning in an advisory 
capacity, the Board had no power with which to contest legislation.490  
In the aftermath of WWII, momentum for comprehensive national planning built across 
the globe, linking urban planning to social and economic development. A 1948 report from the 
UN Social and Economic Council stated, “The problem of housing is conceptualized as the 
essence of the social problem.”491 Within the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA), of which Cuba was a founding member, Latin American economists increasingly 
viewed state intervention as necessary to counteract unfavorable terms of trade, stimulate local 
economic growth, and resolve the unemployment associated with shantytowns. On a parallel 
track, momentum for centralized urban and regional planning built in the Pan-American Union 
(PAU), which later became the Organization of American States (OAS). During WWII, 
American urban planner Francis Violich documented planning activities across Latin America 
and sought to link them to US and pan-American networks.492 More technocrat than theorist, by 
the 1950s Violich criticized the ways that CIAM had subordinated urban planning to the field of 
architecture, and proposed greater coordination with other “technical fields,” including 
engineering and economics.493 
Within Cuba, architects channeled this momentum by promoting a national planning 
bureaucracy whose appeal transcended ideological divides. “Had there existed a National 
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Planning Law,” argued an architect before members of Batista's cabinet in 1953, “we would not 
have the grave problem of scarce housing for the middle class and the neediest.”494 An editorial 
in the conservative Diario de la Marina hailed the promise of coordinated urban planning for the 
“betterment of living conditions.”495 “Planning,” wrote a left wing politician, “has the same 
utility for an economy of private initiative as it does for an integrated collectivist system of 
totalitarians.”496 Prior to 1959, then, urban planners and economists were converging around the 
idea of collective planning, carefully weighing its socialist connotations.  
 These measures led to the creation of a National Planning Board in 1955. Primarily 
composed of architects, the Board included engineers, economists, and public officials from the 
ministries of Public Works and Labor. Bay Sevilla did not live to see it, but legislation for 
comprehensive planning had finally passed. Unlike Bay Sevilla's proposed commission, 
however, this one had a much wider scope, focusing on all housing, not just that of the poor. And 
unlike the medical and criminological interventions he proposed, the commission’s planners had 
economic and architectural concerns. The doctors who had formed part of Bay Sevilla’s proposal 
were eliminated, and the plan lacked a clear mechanism for targeted interventions into barrios de 
indigentes.497  
 The Planning Board became law in 1955, promising a nation without shantytowns. In a 
media campaign promoting the Board, architects spoke of the potential of planning to add 
precision to state authority.498 An architect explained to television audiences that planning would 
lead to “the general development of our communities, of our people…so they won't produce 
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barrios de indigentes.”499 The prevention of barrios de indigentes, both present and future, was 
to be achieved by coordinating industry, transportation, and housing, not by direct interventions. 
The practical authority of the Board remained vague, but important domestic and 
international figures used it as a platform to make increasingly ambitious proposals for the 
nation. The Minister of Public Works was named at its head, but the Board lacked full executive 
authority within the government.500 To enact more serious reforms, it contracted with the 
architectural firm of José Lluis Sert—now president of CIAM—to draw up a new master plan for 
Havana. In the meantime, scholars and officials presented a wide range of proposals at the 
Board’s first Congress in late 1956. A presentation on housing argued that construction since 
1952 had reduced the housing deficit.501 Bens Arrarte presented on regional planning via the 
construction of agricultural cities, the urbanization of the countryside, and the elimination of 
bohíos (huts).502 Attending from the US, the influential urban planner Francis Violich presented 
on controlling urban growth through regional planning, and ways to control the use of private 
land. Planning, all agreed, was the solution. 
 Planners in the fields of urbanism and economics similarly saw barrios de indigentes as 
symptoms of the insufficient regulations of the past, a problem they claimed to be on the brink of 
solving. A 1954 report from Diario de la Marina on the government’s National Plan for Action 
went so far as to claim that the barrios de indigentes had already been eliminated.503 Well aware 
that this was not true, several months later Batista explained more modestly to Congress that 
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officials would “complete…the plan…to eradicate the so called ‘barrios de indigentes.’”504 
Asked for proposals to deal with the neighborhoods, one architect joked that “I would order all 
the houses of indigents burned until the problem were solved.”505 The larger point was that, 
through planning, many intellectuals thought the root causes of shantytown housing could soon 
be eliminated.  
Meanwhile, however, barrios de indigentes remained, and underserviced subdivisions 
grew. Writing in 1955 in Bohemia of rapid building in central Havana, an architect associated 
with the Planning Board explained that “new constructions” made without proper planning 
created “problems that are more grave than what it hoped to resolve.”506 In 1957, another 
architect explained, “Even after the creation of the National Planning Board, regulations for land 
plots still do not exist” leading to “the disordered growth of our cities,” and creating new 
“slums.”507 Yet whatever the practical shortcomings of the National Planning Board, its impact 
was clear. The prevention of barrios de indigentes was a core justification for the existence of a 
state planning apparatus, which claimed to hold the potential to accelerate the economic and 
social development of the nation. Whether or not shantytown clearance was achieved, a 
technocratic consensus had been institutionalized, defining them as antithetical to the planned 
city. 
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4.6 SOCIAL WORK AND THE CULTURE OF POVERTY 
Despite the exclusion of doctors from the Planning Board, the drive to plan a city without 
shantytowns relied on medical and criminological knowledge. By the mid 1940s, there was no 
clear, politically feasible way to implement these conclusions on a wide scale. By the 1950s, 
Havana’s recently created School of Social Work provided a way. More of a method than an 
academic field, social work offered the possibility of bringing families into line with the 
conclusions of social science through negotiation and persuasion. While urban planners sought to 
prevent the shantytowns of the future, social workers sought to address the shantytown residents 
of the present. 
Like urban planning, social work was on the rise internationally, in part as a response to 
the racial science of Nazi Germany. In 1945, Cuba sent several representatives from the Board of 
Social Service to the first Pan-American Congress of Social Work, held in Santiago, Chile. At 
the conference’s introductory session, an Argentine delegate explained that social work “should 
remain independent of biological and sociological theories, of political and social doctrines.”508 
“The post-war,” he explained, “with its spiritual, economic, and social consequences had already 
shaken strongly the foundations of many of our scientific disciplines.”509 In response, social 
workers were to act “by persuasion and not by way of authority, fraternally ‘drawing near to the 
needy.’”510 
Debates at the conference reflected wider concerns for economic development, but social 
work was envisioned as a neutral force in ideological conflicts. Acknowledging that social work 
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was designed as a female-dominated profession, a Brazilian delegate noted that a social worker 
could make “her influence felt in the relations between the Union and Management” by ensuring 
friendly negotiations.511 A presentation from a Peruvian delegate linked social work with land 
reform, prompting discussion from an Argentine delegate who declared that “property should 
always function for the collective.”512  
The expansion of social work in Cuba was tightly linked to efforts to combat juvenile 
delinquency. Cuba created a Board of Social Service in 1938, leading to the creation of the 
School of Social Work at the University of Havana. Officials from the Juvenile Corrections 
Center at Finca Torrens were involved with the creation of the school, and by 1949, the new 
head of the Center had been trained there.513 In social work, then, the concerns of medical and 
criminological professionals for barrios de indigentes found new institutional backing. In 1950, 
social workers began to operate through a Department of Social Action within the Ministry of 
Health. Soon the Department began to work actively in Havana’s barrios de indigentes.  
While their method was persuasion, not forced compliance, social workers did not break 
with previous approaches to juvenile delinquency. In an extensive published report on the Isla de 
Pinos shantytown, for instance, one social worker focused specifically on families, taking note of 
parents beset with “ignorance or unawareness of their obligations,” who could be improved 
through education.514 Yet the author also spoke of “a minority” for whom action was impossible 
“because the parents are completely amoral and live off what the children produce for them.” 
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These cases required “integral juvenile legislation that would make it possible to separate” 
parents from children.515 The report’s general conclusion was that the neighborhoods were 
“susceptible to modification or improvement in the majority of cases,” especially among families 
who lived there because of economic conditions. But such improvement was only possible with 
appropriate state assistance.516 
Internationally, meanwhile, the biological focus directed towards shantytowns in 
previous work on juvenile delinquency diminished gradually. A key figure behind this shift was 
Oscar Lewis, a US anthropologist who taught at Havana’s School of Social Work in 1945.517 In 
1952, Lewis published an article, “Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study,” in which 
he argued that urbanization was not “a simple, unitary, universally similar process.”518 As he 
studied Mexico City during the 1950s, he noted that social life took place “in small groups, 
within the family, within households, within neighborhoods.” Hoping to study these “smaller 
universes,” Lewis called for “the delineation of distinctive regions within cities.”519 In 1958, 
Lewis presented another paper to the International Congress of Americanists in Costa Rica, 
where he argued that “poverty in modern nations…creates a sub-culture of its own.” “One can 
speak,” he wrote, “of a culture of poverty.”520  
Partially the result of Lewis’ deep engagement with the US and Mexican academies, the 
idea of a “culture of poverty” carried many preexisting scientific conclusions about barrios de 
indigentes, but stripped them of their biological connotations. In dialogue with Mexican 
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biotypology, US cultural anthropology, and the concerns of social history, Lewis borrowed from 
Mexican scholars in studying disparate characteristics in individuals to draw conclusions about 
groups, but abandoned their biological investigations of the relationship between environment, 
body, and mind as racist.521 Without mentioning medicine or psychological treatment, Lewis 
described characteristics as diffuse as “gregariousness,” features of post-traumatic stress, social 
deprivation, and deficient housing as cultural.522  
Economists and housing specialists in Latin America received Lewis’ work on urban 
culture with interest. In 1958, Lewis coordinated a conference with Phillip Hauser, a US 
demographer who consulted for the UN and chaired the Social Science Research Council's 
Committee on Urbanization.523 A year later, Hauser led a seminar on “Urbanization in Latin 
America” held in Santiago, Chile, and sponsored by several bureaus within the UN and ECLA. A 
relatively large delegation from Cuba attended, including engineers and architects from the 
Ministry of Public Works, and an engineer from the National Planning Board.524 
Hauser and sociologist José Echevarría opened the seminar by applauding the momentum 
towards economic and urban planning evident in the “underdeveloped” region of Latin America. 
Their paper focused on economic structures but also made comments about family life amidst 
urbanization and, more specifically, Lewis' work on Mexico City.525 Another paper presented at 
the seminar, authored by the UN's Bureau of Social Affairs, outlined “policy needs for data and 
for research” that included the “cultural traits and aspirations” of urban populations. 
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“Sociological or anthropological investigations of specific social classes, occupational groups, or 
neighborhoods in the cities,” it noted, “are only beginning to appear.”526  
By 1959, then, evolving concerns for economic and urban development in Latin America 
were actively synthesized with a new agenda to explore the urban poor in cultural terms. Like 
Bay Sevilla’s work before, the seminar represented the fusion of structuralist and progressive 
tendencies towards the goal of national development, and for the Cuban delegation it came at a 
time of new possibilities for urban policy. In Havana, revolution was in full swing. 
4.7 A NEW MAN 
On the early morning of January 1, 1959, Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba. With the army defeated 
and demoralized, and the moderate opposition stifled, state power was transferred to an unlikely 
group of young guerrilla fighters, who rode into the capital on a wave of optimism that resonated 
across the globe. As the new leaders embraced radical change in some arenas, however, they also 
resurrected the Batista government’s disrupted shantytown initiatives, which relied on old lines 
of thought. Social workers soon returned to barrios de indigentes, and leaders framed their new 
initiatives by synthesizing concerns for national development with reforms targeting the culture 
of individuals. Soon, the cultural reform of shantytown residents was associated with the success 
of the Revolution.  
Former Batista official Eduardo Anderson shaped shantytown policy during the early 
Revolution, and he declared shantytowns to be sites of hereditary physical deficiency. From 
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within the National Housing Commission, Anderson wrote a report on “Crime in the barrios de 
indigentes,” in which he referenced previous work on Cuban shantytowns and criminologists 
such as Cesare Lombroso, to make a case for relocation. Barrios de indigentes, he wrote, 
contained “all the environmental factors that classically signify those who are descendants of, 
and predisposed to crime.” The individuals in those areas, he continued, were “genetically 
constituted according to the laws of heredity…[and] the physical conditions of the parents.”527 
Even as he noted that the neighborhoods produced many virtuous inhabitants, he hinted at racial 
mixture as a factor behind criminal degeneration. Criminality, he explained, was “especially 
marked in those abandoned human groupings in which the darkest colors intermix with the most 
beautiful tonalities of life.”528 He defined most shantytown residents as “conquered,” timid, 
incapable of finding jobs or solutions for themselves. “But once the solution is found,” he quoted 
a social worker in agreement, “they feel motivated by the work.”529 
For Anderson, the deficiencies of neighborhood residents justified comprehensive 
initiatives for their social welfare. The report outlined a plan for the “social advancement” of 
barrios de indigentes that was largely similar to what was later initiated by the newly formed 
Ministry of Social Welfare in 1960. Anderson’s plan proposed to build new homes, schools, 
recreational facilities, community centers, and a Department of Maintenance, reinforcing “self-
help and mutual aid.”530 (The phrase later became the title for Cuba’s slum relocation program.) 
He also proposed offering full employment for the neighborhoods, including for women who 
might be heads of families, in order to eliminate crime.531  
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While these proposals resonated with other housing officials, Anderson’s conclusions on 
physical degeneracy conflicted with some of the core messages of the new regime. Publicity 
from the Ministry of Social Welfare quickly shifted away from labeling residents as physically 
deficient, even as it carried out policy solutions for a number of shantytowns across the island 
similar to what Anderson proposed. Whereas Anderson highlighted the inherited and learned 
criminality of residents as a justification for reform, Ministry literature now denounced efforts to 
label residents as “criminals, impossible to reincorporate into a dignified social existence.” “Far 
from alarming,” it stated “the physical and moral configuration of the residents offered hope for 
their revolutionary civic action.”532 After visiting the Las Yaguas shantytown in 1961, Oscar 
Lewis echoed this optimism before audiences in the US. “It was clear that the people were still 
desperately poor,” he wrote, “but I found much less of the feelings of despair, apathy, and 
hopelessness that are so diagnostic of urban slums in the culture of poverty.”533 Aligned with 
Lewis’ focus on culture, not biology, Cuban anthropologists conducted studies of Las Yaguas 
that were deeply influenced by his new book, Children of Sánchez, which had become an 
international best seller. Fidel Castro called the book “revolutionary,” and during the late 1960s, 
two books would be published within Cuba modeled on Lewis' ethnographic techniques.534  
The shift in tone was significant.535 For Anderson, state intervention was required to 
uplift residents from physical, moral, and cultural deficiency. For the Ministry and for Lewis, 
however, those deficiencies were rooted in an old, discriminatory social structure. As residents 
accepted a new, inclusive society they would be freed from the burdens of their history. By this 
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formulation, doing work for the Revolution was evidence of social redemption, already achieved. 
Between a picture of shantytown children in rags and a clean, modern new neighborhood, 
publicity from the Ministry of Social Welfare boasted, “What a people can do when it has faith 
in its government.”536  
None of these changes implied the elimination of “indigence” as a category of difference; 
instead, the category was renamed and redefined in political terms. For government officials as 
much as for Lewis, problems remained in classifying ongoing behaviors associated with barrios 
de indigentes. For his part, Lewis failed to develop a conceptual framework for poverty in a 
socialist system. In one of his essays, for example, he stated, “I am inclined to believe that the 
culture of poverty does not exist in the socialist countries” but argued that its elimination would 
“take more than a single generation,” even under “a socialist revolution.” The essay concluded 
that the culture of poverty “tends to decline” in socialist countries.537 Meanwhile, according to 
Juventud Rebelde, despite the government’s “redemptive labor” in relocating shantytown 
residents to a new neighborhood in Santiago de Cuba, “antisocial conduct” continued. Children 
wandered the streets without going to school, while the community center, designed for 
“educational activities to raise the cultural level of residents,” was closed. Even worse, the 
residents were building crude shacks as additions to their homes. “A new society cannot permit 
the existence of this type of antisocial outbreak,” it concluded.538 Even as official rhetoric 
emphasized shantytown residents’ full inclusion in the revolutionary project, that inclusion was 
premised on traditional social norms.  
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These complexities notwithstanding, the rhetoric was powerful. Efforts at cultural reform 
in shantytowns blended with larger plans to promote national economic development through a 
system of moral rather than material incentives. “To build communism, a new man must be 
created simultaneously with the material base,” wrote Ernesto “Che” Guevara in 1965.539 In the 
meantime, as the National Planning Board was being reconfigured, Cuban architects discussed 
ambitious structural proposals along lines developed in the 1950s. Through regional planning, 
they hoped to align the distribution of the population with new plans for industrial development, 
and in the process, solve areas they now called “barrios insalubres (unhealthy 
neighborhoods)”540 Along lines begun by planners in the 1950s, the revolutionary government 
labeled resistance from shantytowns as a vestige of past flaws. In the process, concerns for 
national development and individual consciousness were linked. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
From the work of Luis Bay Sevilla to the early years of the 1959 Revolution, the scattered 
conclusions of social scientists who studied urban poverty embodied the promises and the perils 
of state reform. By the time of the Cuban Revolution, urban poverty was not limited to material 
deficiency but had also become a discrete social category, constructed by dense layers of medical 
and criminological studies. These studies sought to understand the physical, environmental, and 
social characteristics of poor people in order to better address their needs and better incorporate 
them into the dominant norms of urban society—in many cases with little concern for the 
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demands of the people themselves. By reaching out to residents of the city whose lives had often 
been marked by the absence of any state protection, the welfare initiatives they proposed could 
be a blessing. Yet by reconfiguring established social and racial cleavages according to formal 
scientific language, those initiatives could also be a curse.  
 As recognized emblems of urban poverty, the informal neighborhoods that came to be 
known as barrios de indigentes were at the center of scientific discussions of poverty’s impact 
on individuals and the nation. Recognizing the conclusions of medical professionals and 
criminologists, urban planners and economists saw such neighborhoods as chaos in the midst of 
a city where they hoped to create order. Concerns for shantytowns therefore shaped master plans 
for Havana, regional plans for the country, and development strategies for the nation. As these 
types of plans gained momentum internationally during the early years of the Cuban Revolution, 
progressive fears of urban degeneration mingled with socialist faith in the potential of 
technocratic planning. In the resulting synthesis, improving the culture of poor people became a 
national goal. The Revolution marked a geopolitical rupture; yet the revolutionary government 
remained committed to well-established tenets of national development. 
In the midst of continuity and change, however, the government did not implement its 
plans exactly as it hoped. Instead, the directives of scientific planning met the actions of 
shantytown residents, property owners, tenants, landlords, and investors in Havana. All of them 
confronted state initiatives with ideas of their own. 
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5.0  A CONSTRUCTIVE REVOLUTION: RENT CONTROL AND PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT IN HAVANA’S HOUSING MARKET, 1939-1963 
The tenants of 143 Campanario Street in the Los Sitios neighborhood of central Havana paid 
between $4.5 and $8 pesos for their rooms, normal prices in 1944. While none of them was 
without work, their job titles indicated the sort of partial, irregular employment that was normal, 
too: carpenter, painter, bricklayer, “household chores,” or simply “employed.” They paid their 
rent, however, and had receipts to prove it. Each month, they turned money over to a principal 
tenant who managed their building—34 separate dwellings, home to 37 separate families, 
divided within what was once listed as a single address.541   
Overcrowded, the tenants were also insecure. In what they suspected was a coordinated 
scheme, the owner obtained an eviction ruling against the principal tenant on the pretext that he 
rented the building alone. He justified the move by planning to make what tenants called 
“fictitious renovations,” possibly to raise rents later. More, they claimed the manager hid the 
ruling for months. Now, with eviction impending, they took the matter to court. Claiming that 
the proceedings threatened “public order,” and that “there will not be a single tenant among us 
that is able to find a house to move into,” the tenants sued by referencing recent presidential 
decrees. “What we cannot tolerate, and what this respected court cannot allow,” they wrote, “is 
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that señor Espinosa publicly threatens us…saying he has nothing to do with the changes in 
governments or the current laws.”542  
To explain the overcrowding and informal employment represented at 143 Campanario, 
studies of the Republic agree that high rates of private construction, especially in the capital, 
combined with almost nonexistent public housing, while landlords often circumvented rent 
control policies.543 Along similar lines, scholars have noted the overrepresentation of 
Afrodescendants in deficiently housed areas, blaming economic inequality and discrimination.544 
Together, these conclusions support a general thesis that spatial inequality in the Republic 
resulted from unchecked private initiative, sharply contrasting with the nationalized housing 
sector following 1959. While these studies accurately highlight aspects of Havana’s housing 
sector, they have not systematically investigated the history of key aspects of public policy: rent 
control and mortgage regulations. More, they have not accounted for the ways these policies 
shaped the type of legal activism evident at 143 Campanario. Beyond Cuba, studies of such 
policies have revealed their importance, both as a social benefit and in exacerbating social 
cleavages.545 How did private property in interact with public policy in Havana? What was the 
impact of this interaction on the political system? And how did interaction between public and 
private initiative in the Republic shape the policies of the revolutionary government? 
This chapter calls into question the strict dichotomy between private and public housing 
initiatives. Like the tenants of 143 Campanario, many residents of Greater Havana saw housing 
as a component of urban citizenship, leading policy makers to pass and strengthen rent control 
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legislation for tenants of all social classes. As a way to stimulate construction in the meantime, 
they offered incentives for private construction. As social divisions in new constructions 
widened, they began to regulate the mortgage market as well. I argue that, as a result of these 
interventions, the legal and political systems became central arenas to determine who had rights 
to what housing, reinforcing both the language of citizenship and widespread calls for the state to 
solve deficient conditions. One component of this language was a discourse around morality, a 
term that was written into the 1940 Constitution and shaped housing policies. As private 
developers collaborated with public institutions, this language served as a platform for social and 
racial discrimination, leading to new inequalities, which reinforced criticism of the state. Policy 
reforms during the early years of the Revolution reflected these pressures and sought to eliminate 
conflicts around housing. As the revolutionary government nationalized the housing sector, it did 
so on lines that had little to do with geopolitics and much to do with political dynamics that 
developed during the Republic. 
Although the legal and political circumstances of shantytown neighborhoods were not 
directly connected to these dynamics, they served as an important point of reference in housing 
debates. As the appropriate role of the state in housing became a central point of contention 
between property owners and tenants, who together comprised the vast majority of people in the 
capital, shantytown housing served as evidence of state failure on all sides. Debates over 
shantytowns therefore mapped onto heated political debates about housing across Havana, 
lending visibility to neighborhoods like Las Yaguas and making their elimination an increasingly 
important political task. 
The chapter begins by analyzing the political dynamics of rent control leading up to 
1945. It continues by analyzing the impact of rent control in practice and the ways conflicts 
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around housing blended racial classifications into the language of housing and morality. It then 
discusses the ways that such language combined with state policy in the housing market, and 
examines the relative lack of public housing in the Republic. Finally, it traces these multiple 
dynamics across two political shifts: first, Fulgencio Batista’s reforms (1952-58) and, second, the 
housing legislation of the revolutionary government until 1963. 
5.1 RENT CONTROL 
In the three decades preceding the 1959 Revolution, the relationship between tenants and 
landlords played an outsized role in urban popular politics, shaping debates over the meaning of 
citizenship. Between 1920 and 1958, Greater Havana grew in absolute and relative terms, 
maintaining an extremely high rate of tenancy as increasing portions of the urban population 
lived in subdivided, substandard housing. As the urban popular classes gained new footholds in 
the political system following 1933, two interconnected promises on housing characterized 
popular campaigns: first, that the state enact new legislation for the protection of tenants in their 
existing homes, and, second, that it should promote expanded housing construction to provide 
new and better homes. In 1939, Congress acted on the first promise, passing legislation to control 
rents throughout the country. Yet the legislation sustained attacks from a property lobby, which 
also deployed the language of citizenship and characterized state regulations as an infringement 
of their rights. As a concession, the government took action around its second promise by 
offering incentives to the private housing market.  
During these years, the search for adequate housing became increasingly competitive, 
and many faced deteriorating conditions. Population growth played a role. After the 1920s, 
  156 
Greater Havana’s population increased from 728,500 people in 1931 to 1,361,600 in 1958. From 
12.6 percent of the national population in 1919, Greater Havana held 20.9 percent of all Cubans 
by 1958.546 As Havana grew, the vast majority of its population rented their homes—in 1943, 92 
percent of families in Havana City and 86 percent of families in Greater Havana were renters.547 
Underlying these features of the city was a growing density within the housing stock. Between 
1919 and 1953 the number of dwelling units per building in Havana province increased, while 
the number of people per dwelling decreased in Greater Havana, indicating a tendency to 
subdivide homes and buildings into greater numbers of dwelling units for smaller families.548  
The trauma of mass evictions surrounding the 1933 Revolution fueled widespread 
demands for tenant protections, leading to the passage of rent control legislation. During his brief 
first government, Grau temporarily suspended evictions by way of decree.549 In 1936, citing a 
“multitude of profit-seeking property owners and sub-renters,” who threatened to create “grave 
conflict” with the popular classes, the House of Representatives passed a bill limiting rents to 
pre-1936 levels.550 The bill died in the Senate, but momentum for housing reform continued. 
Incoming Havana mayor Beruff Mendieta made the issue central to his 1936 campaign.551 
Writing on behalf of the campaign, Afro-Cuban activist Gustavo Urrutia saw rent controls and 
measures preventing racial discrimination in housing as “minimal points for a municipal 
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agenda.”552 In the midst of a populist turn, then-Colonel Fulgencio Batista also included rent 
control in his 1938 minimum legislative program.553  
In March 1939, the Senate conceded, but with its own conditions. New legislation 
sponsored by Batista’s ally, Senator Carlos Saladrigas, passed and was quickly approved in the 
House of Representatives.554 Congressional wrangling had changed the law, however, which, 
among other things, stopped short of imposing penalties on infracting landlords as previous 
measures had proposed. Still, the law froze rents for all buildings constructed prior to 1937 at 
their 1937 levels, while rents for tenement houses (ciudadelas, casas de vecindad and solares) 
were to be reduced by 25 percent from their 1939 levels.555  
The delay in the Senate was the result of an increasingly well-organized lobby of 
property owners, who saw rent controls as an infringement on their rights. Seeking political unity 
in 1934, urban property associations across the country formed the National Federation of 
Property to organize against tenants who “threaten a new attack on the rights of property with 
their absurd ambitions.”556 Urban property owners were a socially heterogeneous group, and 
their association linked a variety of urban organizations. While some commanded relatively 
modest means, others were architects, engineers, Rotary and Lions Club members, members of 
the Chamber of Commerce, and congressmen. One of the Federation’s directors, Raúl de 
Cárdenas, became Vice President of the Republic in 1944.557 Eddy Chibás, a rising political star 
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in the Auténtico party, also featured in its membership.558 Yet despite these powerful members, 
they lacked the popular support necessary to have a determinative influence on controversial 
issues like rent control.  
This did not prevent them from mounting opposition, however, and they centered their 
message on the importance of private property as a foundation for citizenship. Speaking to 
Congress in 1939, Raúl de Cárdenas declared that, “as egotistical as they want to portray us,” the 
interests of the Federation were linked “to public interest, to general wellbeing, to the future of 
the nation.” Rent controls, he claimed, restricted free contracts and were “anti-democratic.”559 
Another member presented a paper entitled, “Private property constitutes the genesis of the 
nation,” stating that laws “favoring…sometimes certain social sectors, sometimes others…incite 
the emigration of men and riches, which is the first symptom of the disintegration of a 
people.”560 Along similar lines, Ernesto Pujals used a term in wide circulation, claiming that rent 
control would “condemn the rest of society to indigence” by halting economic progress.561  For 
the property lobby, rent control threatened the content of citizenship, even as its proponents 
claimed to protect it.  
In response to the property owners’ campaign, the 1939 Senate legislation conceded a 
component of their demands that aligned with popular will: incentives for private housing 
construction. While rent controls remained untouched, the law supported the larger principle that 
“the problem of rents” should be solved through market mechanisms, and “laws of supply and 
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demand.”562 Supported by economists such as Gustavo Gutiérrez, the law only passed after 
including substantial tax exemptions for constructions completed within two years—
constructions that would not initially be subject to controlled rents.563 For periods of 5-10 years 
upon completion, new constructions were exempted from construction permit fees and all 
property taxes, and had their water payments reduced by 33 percent.564 The exemptions were 
extensive enough to cause worry among municipal officials.565 
By linking rent controls to tax exemptions, the Senate’s legislation undermined the 
property owners’ central argument to politicians, since housing construction accelerated with its 
passage.566 It also divided their interests. Property owners pointed out that the exemptions were 
favorable to those wealthy enough to invest in new constructions, sacrificing “the property 
owners of old, the poor property owners…to the benefit of rich property owners.”567 Yet a report 
in El Sol stated that “the best of the Rent Law, what makes it most acceptable even to the 
property owners themselves,” was that “constructions have risen considerably.”568 By 1940, a 
report indicated that 1,200 homes in Havana were exempt from property taxes, a number that 
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would continue to grow.569 The law was initially slated to last for two years, but Congress 
extended it until 1944, including the tax exemptions.570  
National politicians listened closely to the property lobby, but regarding rent control they 
remained firm. Speaking before a somewhat hostile assembly of property owners after issuing a 
new decree in 1945, President Ramón Grau began his speech by acknowledging that any form of 
government intervention in rents would make the owners “cry.”571 Prior to the 1944 presidential 
elections, Batista did what Congress would not, freeing the rent control issue from wider 
compromises. Against rising, almost hysterical opposition from property owners to another 
congressional extension of the 1939 rent controls, a wide array of local unions and neighborhood 
groups mobilized.572 Amid rumors of a rent hike as high as 40 percent, many called for action 
from Batista.573 Seizing the issue from Congress in March 1944, the administration extended the 
1939 law indefinitely through a presidential decree. Unlike the existing legislation, the decree 
included penalties for violating landlords. More significantly, and with construction on the rise, 
the decree abandoned previous tax incentives for new construction.574 Upon taking office, Grau 
strengthened the measures further through two new decrees.575  
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In 1939, then, rents were officially frozen for all previously existing dwellings, 
generating a political dynamic in which measures favoring tenants were balanced by measures 
encouraging investment in private construction. In the years that followed, what property owners 
labeled a radical, demagogic measure became an inviolable pillar of democratic politics. For 
property owners, overturning the law became a focal point for debates about urban citizenship. 
5.2 RENT CONTROL IN PRACTICE, 1939-1945 
Rent control laws were strong in practice, decisively shaping occupancy disputes throughout the 
city. As conflicts among landlords, managers, tenants, and subtenants landed in court, rent 
controls expanded the role of the legal system in the lives of the urban poor. The result was that 
many habaneros came to view housing as a right, whose protection they demanded from 
politicians. And while property owners claimed that rent controls violated the norms of urban 
citizenship, tenants countered that reasonably priced housing was an essential component of that 
citizenship. As property owners and professional managers created ingenious ways to circumvent 
rent laws and harass tenants, however, housing conditions deteriorated in the central city, leading 
both to emphasize the failure of the government. 
The available evidence indicates that rent controls were effective in limiting evictions and 
somewhat effective in stabilizing rental prices. Based on statistical compilations, several authors 
have estimated that 60-70,000 evictions took place annually in Havana, within a total urban 
rental stock of about 460,000 units. This would mean that nearly 15 percent of renters faced 
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eviction proceedings each year.576 There was more to the story than these numbers suggest, 
however. First, the vast majority of cases likely did not result in eviction. While citywide data is 
unavailable, in 1951 the Department of Evictions from the National Federation of Property’s 
Havana chapter reported filing 1,753 suits across the city in the previous year, suits they claimed 
to pursue for their members based on “vast experience” and deep knowledge of eviction law.577 
Of these cases, 146, or eight percent, were carried out.578 In other words, in 1950, 92 percent of 
eviction cases brought to trial by a department of lawyers specializing in eviction law resulted in 
no eviction. The percentage for the city as a whole was likely higher. And while rents did rise 
over the period when the decrees were in effect, overall estimates indicate that they either rose 
less than 10 percent, or in another study held steady as a percentage of family income for middle-
income and poor Cubans between 1934-1952, despite the growing density of the city.579 
Aside from its material impact, rent control placed the legal system at the center of 
occupancy disputes. The volume of litigation increased because of rent control, not in spite of it. 
Citing a recent decree favoring tenants in 1949, a property owner explained that it would be 
logical to expect evictions to diminish, “but since everything concerning rent legislation…has no 
logic…eviction cases [desahucios] have risen…which never result in evictions [lanzamientos], 
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but do produce an excess of work.”580 An example of what this work might entail, tenant Pedro 
Raurell generated several eviction suits as he moved between rooms in a single building. 
Initially, he sub-rented his apartment from a principal tenant but fell behind in his payments. 
When faced with eviction proceedings, he moved voluntarily to a room rented out by a different 
tenant, where he faced additional eviction proceedings filed against the room’s previous 
occupant. In response, he claimed the landlord was violating rent laws.581  
Eviction proceedings were therefore frequent, but they served a variety of purposes other 
than the actual removal of tenants. A collection of 1958 eviction cases in Guanabacoa for 
nonpayment reveals that many tenants used what was normally a more than one-month gap 
between an eviction sentence and a forcible eviction to pay outstanding rents. Even when these 
evictions were carried out, the result was often that tenants stayed several months in an 
apartment without paying.582 And for tenants who refused to pay more to their landlords than 
they were obligated to under rent control measures, one tactic was to pay less than the requested 
amount, forcing landlords to press the issue in court. Speaking to inspectors, for example, 
property manager Fausto Wong claimed that he had fined a disgruntled tenant for breaking a 
window, after which she refused to pay rent. When confronted with eviction, she eventually paid 
and stayed in the apartment. As she did, however, she filed her own suit, later dismissed, 
claiming that Wong raised the rent illegally.583 In another case, a judge evicted a tenant who had 
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withheld his entire rent to protest an increase demanded by the owner, but noted that if the tenant 
had continued to pay the stipulated price, he would have been protected.584 
Property owners frequently challenged the validity of the laws in court, but judges 
affirmed the basic authority of the state to regulate rental prices on the basis of the “social 
function of property” provision of the 1940 Constitution.585 Inconsistent rulings were frequent, 
but centered on technicalities. Ruling in favor of a tenant who claimed that the landlord had 
collected rent beyond what was proscribed by the law, for example, a judge cited the 1940 
Constitution as he ordered the excess rent returned to the tenant. “There is no doubt regarding the 
applicability of these much-touted laws,” he stated.586 Meanwhile another judge refused to order 
the return of money to a tenant in a similar case.587 Yet he did not deny the baseline authority of 
the rent decrees to regulate rental prices. As disputes between left- and right- wing judges grew 
heated, there was little dispute about the basic validity of rent control.  
The strength of the rent laws was real enough that landlords devised ways to circumvent 
them, which they did by harassing tenants, hiring professional managers, allowing buildings to 
fall into disrepair, and disguising rent hikes by subdividing properties and creating new “rooms” 
through complex sub-tenancy arrangements.588 One tenant claimed that his landlord “has raised 
the rents, alleging that the…law-decree is unconstitutional,” while threatening to “throw us out 
onto the street.” 589 Other tenants stated that their landlord illegally turned off the water supply to 
pressure them to leave.590 Most rent increases were hidden under sub-tenancy arrangements, 
however. Inspectors found that Fausto Wong charged a total of 57 pesos to various sub-tenants 
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of a single apartment for which he only paid a total of 30 pesos monthly.591 According to one of 
those sub-tenants, Wong “has worked for a long time in capriciously raising the price of the 
rents,” making “illegal profits.”592 For his part, Wong claimed, “it is simply the best way to keep 
paying … the property owner,” and that he raised the rent after clearing out pool tables.593 Other 
property managers operated on a much wider scale. In 1944, sub-tenants complained that a 
principal tenant contracted with the infamous slumlord Ernesto Sarrá, who quickly subdivided 
the rooms with “unhealthy plywood [cartón], dividing the rooms into two or more apartments, 
which he rented to distinct people.”594 According to Noticias de Hoy, by 1940 Sarrá had taken 
control of numerous properties in Havana, leaving poor families across the city with “the 
permanent threat of being tossed out to the street hanging over their heads.”595  
Poor tenants’ deep engagement with the legal process was revealed in the months 
following Batista’s 1944 decree. The decree gave them new rights to sue their landlords for 
violations of the rent laws, and tenants brought numerous cases to trial. In all cases that I have 
located in Cuba’s National Archive, judges ruled against tenants. The Supreme Court later found 
the specific provision of the decree that allowed for such suits to be unconstitutional.596 For 
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several months, however, tenants aggressively confronted landlord violations, with the help of 
judicial inspectors. Suing his landlord from Santo Suárez, for example, Emilio Mirando, an 
alleged lottery numbers runner, hand-wrote a poorly worded letter addressed directly to President 
Grau, claiming that he paid rent “higher than the house.”597 Another tenant claimed that his 
landlord should be held responsible for the “crime of grave disobedience, attempted fraud, and 
conspiracy to alter the prices of things.”598 In another case, 14 tenants from Los Sitios joined 
together in denouncing illegal eviction efforts from their landlord.599 Nor were all claimants 
poor. Another claim came from a single tenant in El Cerro, who was paying a relatively high 23 
pesos per month, and securing extensive documentation from the municipality, while using 
polished legal language.600  
While numerous suits appear to have been undertaken by tenants on their own behalf, 
others came from large tenant organizations with political connections. On November 13, 1944, 
the “Central Committee” of a group identified as “Popular Revolutionary Defense,” claimed 
damages for violation of the rent law.601 The Tenant Confederation of Cuba raised another suit. 
Presenting their case in formal legal language, the confederation secured backing from a lawyer 
representing the Office of Price and Supply Regulation (ORPA), a government body, which was 
more active in supporting the decrees than the courts. In another case, tenants contested an 
eviction with the help of the Confederation of Cuban Labor (CTC), and generated publicity for 
                                                 
597 Denuncia de Emilio Mirando, 18 November 1944, Legajo 261, Expediente 20, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC. 
598 Denuncia de Antonio Zayas, 18 April 1945, Legajo 274, Expediente 26, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC. 
599 Denuncia de Luis Soto Montes et al., 17 October 1944, Legajo 254, Expediente 80, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC.  
600 Eusebio Ramirez Alemán to Sala Quinta de la Audiencia de la Habana, 28 November 1944, Legajo 260, Expediente 26, 
Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC. 
601 Denuncia de Defensa Popular Revolucionaria, 13 November 1944, Legajo 261, Expediente 19, Tribunal de Urgencia, ANC.  
  167 
their case in the communist press.602 Meanwhile, numerous other tenants reached out to the 
Communist Party, which publicized their cases in Noticias de Hoy.603 
In bringing these claims to the courts, tenants and tenant organizations argued that rent 
controls were their rights as citizens. One group highlighted that a blind Independence War 
veteran lived among them, always paying his rent.604 Another group of tenants referenced the 
“impossible material situation faced by the Cuban people in exercising their rights.”605 Another 
tenant reported being “a modest worker with absolute faith that all the problems of humble and 
modest men are being attended to by the government that rules for the honor of Cuba.”606 They 
also reached out for state protection in ways that extended beyond the courts, especially through 
the Health Ministry. Many tenants demanded state attention in response to dilapidated homes.607 
In one case sub-tenants sued a principal tenant for speculating “with us poor people,” claiming 
that the eleven rooms, “according to the Health [Department], should not exist.”608 In 1951, 
Noticias de Hoy demanded action from the Health Ministry against slumlord Sarrá’s “foul 
solares.”609  
On the other side, however, health regulation could be used against tenants, since they 
allowed the Ministry to clear out dwellings that it deemed unsafe. In 1939, an architect noted that 
there was no clarity regarding the way that new tenant protections might interact with the Health 
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Code. “Clearly,” he explained, “tenements…are in no condition to be rented as houses.”610 
Indeed, if rooms “should not exist,” as the sub-tenants claimed, forcible eviction might be the 
logical conclusion. In 1951, the police and Health Ministry officials oversaw the eviction of three 
families from a Vedado solar. Evicted tenants claimed the owner had prompted the move “in 
order to be able to sell.”611 In other cases, tenants claimed that corrupt inspectors were colluding 
with wealthy landlords. In the town of Encrucijada, a claim that health officials were selling 
eviction orders to property owners reached the courts.612 
This uncertainty prompted additional political mobilization. After the Vedado eviction, 
representatives from the Communist Party questioned sanitation officials to determine if other 
buildings would be threatened.613 In another case, leading up to the eviction on the basis of 
health codes, a report in Noticias de Hoy stated, “Numerous telegrams have been sent to the 
President of the Republic and the Minister of Health related to this attempted abuse.”614 Since 
the influential property owner’s lawyer was Francisco Prío, brother to then-Senator Carlos 
Prío—later President of the Republic—residents approached the senator, who promised “to solve 
their situation of anguish.”615 
Thus, following the 1939 passage of rent control legislation, the legal system and the 
state more generally played an increasingly central role in occupancy disputes throughout the 
city. While property owners had claimed that rent laws were an affront to urban citizenship, 
tenants throughout the city seized on rent controls as a basic component of their rights. As 
conditions deteriorated in the central city, however, tenants demanded that elected leaders do 
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more to protect them. Property owners looked at such conditions and blamed the protections 
themselves. The result was that the role of the state became a focal point for debates about 
housing. 
5.3 MORALITY AND RACE 
As rent control came to be a central pillar of housing politics in the central city, it was central to 
debates about the boundaries of urban citizenship as well. As actors defined these boundaries in 
different ways, questions of poverty and race swirled beneath the surface. In the Cuban public 
sphere, neither of these categories was acceptable grounds for explicit social exclusion. Instead, 
debates took place over a shared language of “morality,” strongly linked to tenement houses and 
shantytowns and written into the 1940 Constitution. This language allowed racial discrimination 
to persist, even as the same language could be employed to highlight racial exclusion.  
 As the state intervened in the rental market, Afro-Cuban activists denounced racial 
discrimination in housing, but their complaints provoked limited public debate. Many argued 
against racial discrimination, which was widely acknowledged to exist; few publicly argued for 
it. Explicit racial discrimination was prohibited by the 1940 Constitution, and several 
antidiscrimination laws proposed by Afro-Cuban societies listed it as a top issue to be confronted 
by the government.616 In 1939, a writer in Guanabacoa published a scathing critique of rent 
control, noting that it did little to address “racial, sexual, or even class discrimination.”617 Racial 
discrimination was especially apparent to upwardly mobile Afro-Cubans. After extensive field 
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research in the 1940s, Afro-Cuban activist Juan Chailloux claimed, “The black family with 
sufficient resources to occupy a decent apartment has to face the greatest problem when they 
look to find somewhere to rent.... They do not rent to blacks.”618 
Calls to legislate against racial discrimination in the rental market were weakened by the 
difficulty in pinning it down, however. One high profile case, reported in Noticias de Hoy, 
involved a black tenant, who rented a room “by way of a friend.” Later, “aware that the house 
that was leased would be inhabited by a black woman, the property owner ripped up the 
document, destroying it … meaning that she did not rent to black people.”619 In an exceptional 
case, a property owner advertised an apartment by writing that he “only did business with 
whites.”620 The case was taken to trial separately by both the Communist Party and the Afro-
Cuban Club Atenas and widely publicized. Yet the shame was apparently so severe that, before a 
sentence was reached, the accused was rumored to have killed himself “for being profoundly 
shamed by his crime of discrimination.”621 While many similar cases likely went unreported, 
explicit discrimination was usually disguised.  
Instead of race, many property owners used a widely shared discourse of morality to 
describe desirable or undesirable city residents. In 1939, a property owner claimed, “The Rent 
Law has produced an unsettling demoralization among tenants.… Those who have been 
excellent payers until now, claim the right to a discount because their neighbor got one.”622 In 
1941, one Havana landlord gave tenants eleven conditions for behavior, the first stating simply: 
“be moral.”623 In 1951, a neighborhood association demanded that officials act to improve the 
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“moral level” of Marianao.624 This language was not only publicly acceptable, but also backed 
by public policy. In 1932, Congress debated legislation that would offer “certain practical 
guarantees to know the moral quality of the residents,” and which would require tenants to 
proffer character references in order to rent a house.625 In 1945, a police investigator in 
Guanabacoa filed a standard report on a tenant during a rent dispute in which he noted for the 
court that the tenant was “of good conduct and morality.”626 And public housing legislation 
explicitly required screening for residents based on their work and family status, so that, as one 
architect put it, projects would not become areas of “doubtful morality.”627 These policies were 
backed by article 79 of the 1940 Constitution, which stipulated housing legislation to promote 
the “physical and moral wellbeing” of workers.628 Thus, where calls to exclude based on race 
were absent, morality had the potential to function as an officially recognized substitute.  
Through the language of morality, then, racial discrimination persisted, since the 
characteristics of blackness and immorality overlapped in popular and official constructions of 
deficient housing. A prime example was the “solar,” which represented the most notorious type 
of tenement housing in Havana, frequently mentioned with barrios de indigentes 
(shantytowns).629 Scattered in what were once mansions throughout the city, solares were often 
linked to criminality, immorality, and racial mixture. In 1924, Luis Bay Sevilla characterized 
solares as refuges for “habitual criminals,” symbols of national shame and generators of social 
conflict. “Crowded in groups of the most diverse origins,” he wrote, “residents live in those 
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monstrous cages with desperation [and] tremendous rancor towards their exploiters.”630 Press 
accounts noted that solares were inhabited by “thousands and thousands of human beings who 
breathe foul air…open to all contagions.”631 “The solar corrupts and degenerates the humble 
classes of the city,” wrote Chailloux.632 According to architect and Afro-Cuban activist Gustavo 
Urrutia, in 1931, “Two hundred thousand people…live in solares in Havana and it is necessary 
to eliminate them for hygiene, health, culture, and morality.”633 
A moral label as much as a physical description of a type of housing, the solar was 
strongly associated with blackness. Solares, according to one author were an “inheritance” of the 
“Barracón … which housed the first slaves brought whipped and battered from Africa.”634 Poet 
Nicolás Guillén wrote of the solar, where tourists listen to music “they can’t dance to.”635 A 
1956 photo essay in Bohemia eulogized the solar as the “flower of dark blood.”636 And these 
associations were firmly rooted in empirical facts. Of 50 solares studied by Chailloux in 1944, 
95.7 percent of residents were blacks or mestizos. “There are cases,” he reported, “where the 
absence of whites can be classified as tradition.”637 It is likely that Chailloux, an Afro-Cuban 
activist, purposefully searched for racially concentrated buildings to study—but he found them in 
abundance.  Another study surveyed a single solar to find that 69 percent of residents were 
black.638 Afrodescendants were heavily overrepresented in shantytowns as well.639 The 
“immorality” of deficient housing was therefore strongly associated with blackness. 
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Despite these associations, overcrowded, subdivided apartments affected tenants of all 
races, lending importance to the discourse of morality for those who hoped to avoid negative 
classifications. Blacks were only slightly overrepresented as tenants in the city (table 1), and by 
1950, perhaps 15 percent of Havana residents lived in extremely dilapidated rental housing (not 
including residents of shantytowns).640 Thus, tenants of all races used the language of morality to 
indicate their own worth, especially when their housing called such worth into question. In 1944, 
one group of poor tenants reported that, because of their landlord, they worried about 
“overcrowding themselves with danger to their health and morality.”641 Complaining of racial 
discrimination, Chailloux sought to disassociate blackness from immorality, noting that buildings 
turned away black renters, “despite there being many cases in which the moral reputation of 
whites living in the building is extremely doubtful.”642 The discourse of morality therefore 
negotiated a nebulous gap between the national belonging of upstanding poor citizens and the 
nationally shameful homes they often occupied. As many sides reinforced the rhetorical links 
between immorality and deficient housing, however, they recycled a discourse that connected 
Afro-descendants to undesirable behavior.  
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Table 1: Percentage of Families Renting Their Home, by Race, 1943.643 
Pre-1959 Municipality % of Urban Black Heads of 
Household Renting 
% of Urban Native White 
Heads of Household Renting 
Guanabacoa 67% 64% 
Havana 96% 91% 
Marianao 74% 72% 
Regla 75% 75% 
Santa Maria del Rosario 48% 48% 
Santiago de las Vegas 67% 62% 
Greater Havana 91% 86% 
 
5.4 MORALITY AND THE MARKET 
As the language of morality became common to describe deteriorating conditions in the central 
city, those conditions interacted with the expanding housing market in several ways. First, 
neighborhood associations highlighted concerns for morality as they organized to prevent 
properties from becoming rental units. Investors avoided rent laws entirely by refusing to 
construct reasonably priced units. And as the rental market in the central city became saturated, 
the only low-cost units available were found in underserviced subdivisions on the city’s 
outskirts, leading to claims that the popular classes were forced into housing associated with the 
low morals of shantytowns. The combined result reinforced racial and social segregation and 
fueled elite and popular demands for changes in state policy.  
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In seeking to protect the value of their homes, neighborhood associations actively 
asserted the need to make rental properties unavailable and exclude undesirable social groups. In 
1940, a property owner from the luxurious Fifth Avenue in Miramar posted a notice in El Crisol 
to fellow property owners from the area, apologizing profusely for having allowed the sale of a 
property where rental units were now being constructed. “I see with great displeasure,” he wrote, 
that new owners had bought the property “in order to make apartments, and had I known before I 
would not have sold.”644 In 1951 a neighborhood bulletin from the Repartos Almendares y 
Kohly pressed the mayor to act against “houses of bad reputation and worse morals.” Hoping to 
prevent subdivided properties, the author requested, “Whenever you might have news of an 
unrented house in our neighborhood … communicate it, without delay, to our administrator. We 
will be able to act quickly with the property owner.”645 In 1955, a city councilman from 
Guanabacoa complained of areas where “property owners maintain a private police force that 
impedes free access of citizens … making it in fact a feudal estate.”646 In 1950, property owners 
from the Alturas del Bosque subdivision met with the Mayor to request the removal of a 
shantytown from their area, which “is the pride of the Municipality of Marianao for its 
cleanliness.”647  
In the meantime, most well-funded new construction projects did not include low-cost 
rental units. The property lobby frequently claimed that rent controls would discourage 
construction, and in the case of new low-cost rental dwellings they were correct. In 1950, the US 
State Department reported, “Where a house has been occupied since war time and was entered at 
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a comparatively low rental, … [it] seriously reduces the sales value of the property.” The report 
continued, “The overwhelming majority of Cuban owner-builders have preferred to invest in a 
higher quality of housing which not only offers a high rental return but also is believed to attract 
a more responsible type of occupant than the average slum dweller.”648 New constructions 
charge “such an elevated rent that it is out of reach of the middle class,” reported an architect.649 
The flip side of increasing exclusivity in new constructions were unregulated, 
underserviced suburbs that grew in their midst—in most cases legally purchased, but still 
perilously similar to barrios de indigentes. Following WWII, developers increasingly bought 
large tracts of land and mortgaged them as small lots, either with new homes already constructed 
or as land tracts where buyers could build. Often, however, these developers failed to comply 
with municipal ordinances. In 1943 an architect reported that “all the urbanistic science, all the 
architecture and sanitary engineering, and even social medicine, are publicly ignored—without 
any sanctions assessed for it!”650 In 1950 an article in Bohemia reported on an area housing 
approximately 100,000 residents, who “lack the most elemental public services.” A resident 
placed in charge of the lands by the development company claimed that for electricity, “it costs 
more to get official authorization than the service itself.” Other residents claimed that crime was 
rampant without an adequate police presence.651  
These new developments were legally distinct from shantytowns, but they often had 
similar conditions. An article in El Sol claimed that the poor “pass weeks, months, even on 
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occasion years without being able to install water or electricity, living … worse than those who 
crowd into barrios de indigentes, because at least they do not suffer acquiring the shack where 
they live, nor do they have to pay taxes to the municipality.”652 Officials claimed that, once 
established, the underserviced subdivisions became sites of popular protest against the 
government, when in fact the services were the legal responsibility of the developers.653 
Commenting on the situation in 1952, Herminio Portell-Vilá explained, “Habaneros do not want 
to live in tenements, solares … or barrios de indigentes.… What is nowhere seen is the tutelary 
function of the state, the province, or the municipality, in collaborating with these efforts.”654 
 In 1946, Grau signed a decree designed to confront “the existing anarchy in the land 
divisions [parcelaciones],” but enforcement was difficult.655 In 1949, a joint effort between 
Havana’s College of Architects and the Health Ministry halted 108 construction projects in 
Marianao and 800 more across the island. Hearing of the operation, popular Marianao Mayor 
Francisco Orúe visited the College of Architects with a large group of workers contracted on the 
projects, “expressing his desire to cause the least possible damage to the offenders … and to 
come to an understanding regarding the standstill of projects in his municipality.” Indeed, despite 
the fact that architects claimed to operate out of concern for “the personal security of the tenants 
and for health,” the issue contained populist dimensions: The popular classes needed housing, 
while bureaucrats denied it.656 Given such pressures, an architect later claimed the 1946 decree 
                                                 
652 “Los nuevos repartos: un engaño al pueblo,” El Sol, February 17, 1951, 1. 
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656 “Cooperan los arquitectos con el Ministro de Salubridad en el mejoramiento de la sanidad y la vivienda,” Arquitectura, 
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had been “dead letter.”657 The result was that new subdivisions often resembled shantytowns and 
all their attendant cultural connotations.  
As poor families were, in effect, barred from well-serviced constructions on the city’s 
periphery, the housing stock in Havana’s central city had reached a saturation point—and the 
city’s population continued to grow. To avoid rent controls, new buildings constructed in the 
central city charged high rent. Worse, new construction usually implied demolition, leaving 
families with nowhere to move. In the meantime, property owners used construction to justify 
eviction and raise rents while making only minor repairs.658 Tenants protested such moves, but 
tactics could be dirty. In 1952, Noticias de Hoy alleged that a landlord allowed the collapse of 
one of his buildings in order to secure the removal of a small business.659 Discussing demolitions 
in the central city, an article in Bohemia pictured a shoeless girl in front of a shantytown street. 
“This girl,” the caption read, “innocent angel who never asked to come into the world, is a 
‘tenant’ in one of the many shantytowns. Hundreds and hundreds of families of modest means 
may be going to keep her company.”660 
The combined result of a saturated rent market and demolitions was that from 1943 to 
1953, the municipalities of Centro Habana and Habana Vieja lost significant numbers of 
residents, declining to 90 percent of their 1943 populations, while Greater Havana grew by 129 
percent over the same period (figure 1). Census data do not track race by neighborhood until 
1980, but by then these municipalities were disproportionately populated by black or mulatto 
                                                 
657 José Maria Bens Arrarte, “Los parcelamientos clandestinos,” Arquitectura, November 1955, 539. 
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residents, making it likely that nonwhites suffered disproportionately from demolitions.661 And 
while there were no racially segregated neighborhoods of concentrated poverty in Havana, the 
same was likely not the case for some wealthy sections. Based on fieldwork in the 1960s, for 
example, Susan Rigdon described Miramar as “a quiet, prosperous, all-white Havana suburb.”662 
Because of exclusive new constructions, popular demands for housing focused on generating 
new and economically accessible homes. Because of underserviced, peripheral subdivisions, they 
demanded better regulations as well. Property owners supported these demands as a way to 
eliminate the need for rent control. On all sides, demands focused on new policies to stimulate 
housing construction.  
 
                                                 
661 Residents of these neighborhoods were 44 and 47 percent black and mulatto, compared to 36 percent in Greater Havana. 
These were sections of the city, moreover, that urban planners slated for demolition. The Jesus María neighborhood successfully 
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Associates, Plan piloto de la Habana, 33, 42; de la Fuente, A Nation For All, 313. 
662 Lewis, Lewis, and Rigdon, Neighbors, xiv.  
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Figure 5: Population change in Havana, 1919-1953.663 
5.5 PUBLIC HOUSING, 1940-1952 
Given these pressures, it is notable that public housing remained relatively limited during the 
Second Republic.664 Further research is needed to assess Havana’s volume of public housing 
construction relative to other Latin American capital cities, but it seems to have been less than 
average, in contrast with Cuba’s relatively high per capita GDP. The question becomes 
particularly important in the aftermath of WWII, when public housing initiatives gained 
momentum internationally and the price of construction materials dropped. Three factors seem to 
underlie this situation in Cuba. First, active political mobilization in existing public housing units 
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Censos 1953, 11; Cuba, Censo 1943, 825; Scarpaci, Segre, and Coyula, Havana: Two Faces, 120. 
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and agitation around future ones, made them unprofitable. Second, several key figures favored 
measures to stimulate low-cost housing production in the private market—a position reinforced 
by their proximity to US housing officials who advocated similar policies. Third, corruption 
during Grau’s administration (1944-48) limited the funds available for housing and generated 
skepticism about new projects. Grau’s efforts were dramatized in the failure of the Barrio 
Obrero, Havana’s largest national public housing project of the Second Republic, which 
discouraged the Batista regime from similar initiatives after 1952.665     
Like most welfare initiatives of the Republic, public housing generated intense political 
debates. The government passed public housing legislation in 1910, appropriating funds for the 
Pogolotti neighborhood in Marianao. After its distribution, workers were obligated to make 
payments, but most did not. What followed was decades of protests and disputes, as officials 
threatened to evict residents and residents used the neighborhood’s public status to demand 
infrastructural improvements. Calling the neighborhood “a failure” in 1941, Bay Sevilla, argued, 
“The cause of all this is only one: politics.”666 Yet the law did give the government a legal 
channel to allocate funds to public housing, which meant that new initiatives remained open to 
discussion in all subsequent administrations.667 
Even so, the politicization of public housing reinforced a wide-ranging consensus among 
Cuban technocrats that the state should facilitate construction by collaborating with the private 
                                                 
665 On municipal public housing initiatives, for example, Francisco, “Panchin” Batista (brother of Fulgencio) organized the 
distribution of 18 homes in Playa Jaimanitas, Marianao for nearby shantytown residents in 1946. In 1951, the municipal 
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among other things. The US State Department reported, “The collection of their monthly installments has been frequently and 
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“Cuban Government Issues Regulations Governing the Construction, Repair and Distribution of Low-Cost Housing for 
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market. For example, Bay Sevilla’s housing proposal, which never passed, proposed expansive 
government oversight of homes but argued directly against public housing, which he saw as 
beholden to patronage politics. Likewise Gustavo Gutiérrez, the architect of Batista’s economic 
policies, favored measures to encourage the private sale of homes through long-term 
amortization payments.668 “If the US and England have had to mobilize private capital … what 
could Cuba have done with its resources alone?” asked Pedro Martínez Inclán, chair of the 
Department of Urbanism at the University of Havana.669 Many architects agreed that in order to 
construct low-cost housing on the scale necessary, public funds should be combined with 
“private or semi-private initiative,” which they said was common in Latin America.670 
 Congress appropriated money for new housing after the 1944 hurricane, but the execution 
of the plan reinforced the arguments of skeptics.671 While many of the funds went to individual 
families, the government also began work on a residential development in Luyanó that came to 
be known as the Barrio Obrero. The project was a disaster. It was slated to have “no less than 
1,500 individual houses; eight four-story apartment buildings; an open market; a school; a 
recreation facility; a home for the elderly and a child-care facility.” Yet according to the same 
government bulletin, at a 1947 inauguration ceremony for the project only 114 of the homes had 
been completed and only two of the eight apartment buildings were close to being finished.672  
By 1950, the houses were said to be valued at $14,000 pesos each, far beyond the reach of the 
poor.673 After spending additional funds on the project in 1952, Batista was able to distribute 
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673 R.M. Connell, Housing and City, Town, and Country Planning—Cuba, 11 August 1950, RG59/837.02/8-1150, USNA. 
  183 
only 433 homes, less than a third of the original projection.674 Additional problems arose when 
landowners sued the government for not handing over required expropriation payments.675 In the 
meantime, the government used other low-cost housing appropriations to expropriate lands on 
underserviced subdivisions like La Hata, with rumors of kickbacks to politicians and property 
owners (chapter 2).  
The partially completed Barrio Obrero became a rallying cry for protest against the 
government—a “concrete demonstration of incapacity,” according to one author.676 The homes 
remained unoccupied throughout Prio’s presidential term (1948-52), practically within sight of 
Havana’s central shantytowns. Facing eviction, shantytown residents at the Plaza Cívica site 
threatened to occupy the neighborhood.677 After a fire in Las Yaguas in April 1950, similar 
rumors reached such proportions that police were stationed around the Barrio Obrero to protect 
it.678 The outcome of public housing projects prior to 1952 therefore discouraged new state-
directed construction. However demands for action to promote low-cost housing remained high.    
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Figure 6: The Barrio Obrero (Worker’s Neighborhood) as it appeared at its 1947 inauguration.679  
5.6 BATISTA’S HOUSING PROGRAM 
On March 10, 1952, when Batista took control of the presidency, the Barrio Obrero remained 
empty. Immediately after securing power, Batista moved to distribute houses from the 
neighborhood and to address housing issues more broadly. His initiatives on housing 
demonstrated the same dual-track approach he had used to stabilize the political system in the 
1930s. On the one hand, he sought to generate mass support through populist gestures, including 
support for the strong tenant protections initiated in 1939. On the other hand, he sought to 
establish firm, centralized institutions to stabilize the economy and discipline the popular 
                                                 
679 Cuba, Memoria del plan, n.p. 
  185 
classes—institutions he hoped would expand foreign investment towards national development, 
particularly in housing for the capital. This was a developmentalist regime, and housing was a 
central component to its plans. With growth from the sugar industry largely stagnant and 
unemployment on the rise, members of the administration saw the housing sector as central to 
job creation, general wellbeing, and legitimate governance.  
On the first track, Batista delivered in several ways, standing up to criticism from 
planners and urban elites. Distributing the Barrio Obrero through the CTC, the government 
finished parts of the neighborhood and settled expropriation claims.680 In an effort to set up a 
parallel welfare state akin to Evita Perón’s in Argentina, Marta Fernández, Batista’s wife, 
occasionally distributed additional units from the neighborhood to poor families.681 The 
administration intended the neighborhood to be economically solvent, however, and soon 
clashed with residents who were unable or unwilling to make amortization payments.682  
Meanwhile, Batista launched a debate within the Consultative Council on possible 
reforms to rent control. When the council faced irreconcilable differences and ultimately 
emerged with a bill that would have undermined the existing legislation, Batista intervened 
personally. Securing CTC support and announcing a labor holiday in the capital, Batista spoke to 
hundreds of thousands of workers, promising to resolve the rent issue and to encourage new 
construction. The US Embassy reported, “Some quarters believe that the rent measure…was 
deliberately put forth to give Batista an opportunity to make a grandstand play in vetoing it.”683 
Soon after the rally, he announced his own law, which reduced rents for many homes in Havana 
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and maintained most occupancy rights. The law strengthened the ability of property owners to 
evict tenants in order to construct new buildings, however.684  
Within the first year of his regime, then, Batista took measures that were decidedly 
against the wishes of urban planners, with populist undertones. He distributed public housing to 
CTC supporters, extended distortionary rent control measures, and even legalized some 
underserviced subdivisions. Yet the administration saw these measures as part of a broader 
strategy to give housing technocrats precisely what they wanted. The heart of Batista’s plans on 
housing centered on the expansion of private investment through the mortgage market, in ways 
that aligned with urban planning.  
 Following a consensus among urbanists that the state should collaborate with private 
capital, Batista launched a set of measures to sponsor investment in middle-class housing.685 In 
1951, the Report on Cuba, authored by the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), noted that mortgage loans were “very restricted; and that the market for 
new mortgage bonds is virtually nonexistent.”686 Batista sought to channel money into the 
construction of new subdivisions through the Fomento de Hipotecas Aseguradas (Promotion of 
Ensured Mortgages, FHA), an institution modeled on the US Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), and headed by a US citizen, Isidoro Quintana, who had worked with the US FHA in 
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Miami.687 “Thousands of Cuban families…can have their own house without a large down 
payment or the worry of a high monthly rate,” promised government publicity.688 
As housing construction accelerated in the mid-1950s, many cited the FHA as an 
important contributing factor.  Combined with a “condominium law [ley de propiedad 
horizontal],” which allowed units in multi-family buildings to be purchased rather than rented, 
the FHA offered an avenue for developers to circumvent the populist-dominated rental system. 
In a 1958 speech, Batista cited the FHA and the condominium law, stating, “There are thousands 
of new property owners…do these things not make one proud to be Cuban?”689 Though the 
institution bore the mark of US influence, officials saw it as a national innovation. After an inter-
American conference in New Orleans, one report stated, “The experience in Cuba was 
unequalled even in the United States itself.”690 Even left-wing journalists like Samuel Feijóo 
conceded, “Official organisms like the National Housing Commission and the FHA do their 
part,” while noting that the progress was “minimal” for the poor.691 By April 1956, the FHA had 
approved $42.7 million in loans, and was actively insuring $13.6 million nationwide. In Greater 
Havana, eleven new FHA subdivisions and 27 high-rise condominium buildings were under 
development. Batista claimed that by 1958, the FHA had underwritten the construction of 8,088 
houses in Havana, or over 2,000 per year, for a total of $78.3 million in loans, 88 percent of 
which was in Greater Havana.692 Broken down annually this would have been approximately one 
fourth of the national construction value from 1958.693  
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Yet the practices of the FHA in the US leave reasons for skepticism. As of 1949, only 
one African American in the greater Miami area, from where Cuba’s new director came, had 
been granted an FHA loan.694 Indeed, historian N.D.B. Connely calls the US FHA “likely the 
most effective vehicle for racial segregation in American history.”695 I have not located evidence 
that the Cuban FHA restricted investments to particular locations based on race as the US 
institution did. However, it openly encouraged the selection of buyers based on characteristics 
associated with “morality,” publicly reinforcing the same language of discrimination used in the 
private market.  
Furthermore, like its US counterpart, the Cuban FHA left occupant selection in private 
hands. Neither lending money nor constructing homes, it instead insured mortgage loans between 
private lenders and borrowers for home purchase and construction. Created in March 1953, by 
1954 the FHA insured all mortgages generated by “approved entities,” which received special 
certification.696  Most of the “approved entities” were commercial banks or construction 
companies, though several non-state retirement funds were also approved.697 In order to qualify 
for FHA financing, developments were required to meet building standards more stringent than 
legal norms and to screen borrowers.698 Extensive sanitary and architectural provisions were also 
established for FHA projects.699 Thus, the FHA accelerated the building potential of private 
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developers who would make houses available to approved buyers. The selection of those buyers 
was up to the developers, in effect underwriting the social divisions of the private market.  
In spite of these restrictions, the FHA was intended to be a solution to the social housing 
problem, though officials acknowledged its limitations. One FHA official claimed, “Principally, 
the FHA tends to accommodate the middle class and the working class,” and that it had no 
interest in “the moneyed classes.” It limited the value of insured homes to $16,000.700 At the 
same time it was widely acknowledged that the loans were not available for the poor. The 
cheapest homes listed in an informational publication were $3,000, requiring a $300 down 
payment and a $16.20 monthly payment amortized over 30 years—a relatively high payment 
over an extremely long period.701 The abovementioned official readily admitted, “theoretically 
the FHA regime supposes that there should co-exist…another state organism with direct 
responsibility for the disappearance of poor houses and the construction of the future houses of 
the needy classes.”702  
As the state intervened in the mortgage market with heady promises, the popular classes 
demanded inclusion. A principal example was a new FHA subdivision Las Delicias, under 
development by the bus workers union, whose houses cost a relatively modest $4,500 each.703 
The project had initially struggled to gain FHA financing, but succeeded by publicizing its case 
to politicians. In 1954 organizers from the United Bus Workers Union stated that, “Thanks to the 
President of the Republic,” their cooperative had built twenty-five houses with thirty more under 
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way, and asked for support to continue their work. The union’s ambitious plans went much 
further, with hopes that 3,000 bus workers could construct “their own low-cost homes.”704 
Publicity surrounding the project contrasted sharply with many FHA projects. In a pro-
Batista section of Alerta, a black union member explained the history of the project, stating that 
workers did not want to pay rents “for the enrichment of parasitic capital.”705 A large report on 
Las Delicias in El Crisol claimed that the initiative had “its origin with a small group of workers 
on route 16-17,” who hoped to work with a “prestigious” institution “destined to liberate the 
workers of that sector from the monthly payment of rents.”706 In August 1955, the union 
inaugurated 46 houses in the subdivision at an event attended by the director of the National 
Housing Commission.707 The project was something of a political showpiece, but it also 
reflected popular demands. Left to its own devices, however, the FHA favored higher-grade 
projects, screening developers who screened buyers according to their own criteria. Meanwhile, 
expanded housing construction meant that residents of rent-controlled houses in the central city 
faced displacement as developers built condominiums. 
On the eve of revolution in 1958, then, Batista’s dual-track housing measures had 
exacerbated deep social conflicts, even as they had succeeded in generating unprecedented levels 
of construction. Havana’s rental market remained distorted and corrupt; FHA-funded projects 
reinforced development that was unavailable to the poor; and under-serviced subdivisions 
expanded on the city’s edges. “When new constructions come as an avalanche,” wrote an 
architect in 1955, “the unsheltered families are tossed out to un-serviced ‘subdivisions.’… A 
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localized problem … spreads dangerously.”708 As crisis engulfed Batista’s government in the 
late months of 1958, the administration badly needed popular support. In November 1958, facing 
defections in the military and losing US support, Batista acknowledged the central importance of 
popular housing to his legitimacy, launching a 50-million-peso low-cost housing initiative, 
administered by the National Housing Commission to construct decent housing for the poor.709 
5.7 HOUSING AND THE REVOLUTION 
Cuba’s new policy makers took up the issue of popular housing in 1959. As an issue of wide 
relevance, housing immediately occupied a central role in the plans of revolutionary leaders, as it 
had for the deposed dictator. Mere weeks after Fidel Castro arrived in Havana, the government 
enacted populist reforms along the same two tracks employed by Batista in 1952. First it 
leveraged popular support in the rental market by temporarily suspending evictions on January 
26.710 Then, on February 7, it enacted measures to promote the construction of low-cost popular 
housing. With reforms underway, Castro made his position on past housing policies clear. “What 
were they doing for fifty years?” he asked at a speech on March 1959. “Did they fix the housing 
problem? No! No they didn’t fix it, because I see the immense majority of the people living in 
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one room, in a solar, in one of those houses falling down with 200 people inside it.”711 As he 
proclaimed a break with the past, his indignation reflected a well-established consensus.  
Three years later, in 1962, the initiatives launched during the first months of 1959 were 
obsolete. Alongside a strengthening relationship to the Soviet Union, rents had been abolished 
entirely, and housing construction centralized in the Ministry of Construction. In the intervening 
years, housing policy shifted significantly towards the demands of the popular classes and this 
shift affected the dynamics of housing in Havana for years to come. While the early housing 
policies of the Cuban Revolution conformed to certain aspects of socialist doctrines, the housing 
sector was already unevenly nationalized prior to 1959. As the state took over the rental market 
and infused its semi-private popular housing initiatives with language that emphasized moral 
reform, it revealed the radical possibilities of policies that had their origins in the Republic.   
 Rent control was a case in point. From January 1959 until October 1960, the government 
intervened progressively in the rental market, eventually turning tenants into potential owners. 
These measures adhered closely to the patterns of popular mobilization that had emerged around 
legal structures in Havana since 1939. On March 10, 1959, President Urrutia signed an extension 
of Batista’s 1952 rent law, which included new rent reductions between 30 and 50 percent.712 
Similar to previous legislation, the extension included significant tax exemptions for new 
construction, but now only in cases in which builders would occupy the apartments 
themselves.713 As property owners voiced disapproval in familiar ways, the US Embassy 
officials noted that the “arbitrary drastic reduction of rentals” was “a severe jolt not only to 
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landlords, but to the construction industry, investors, and others.”714  
As they had for decades, tenants quickly seized on the measures, which had broad appeal. 
As news spread, El Crisol reported that “all day and night yesterday, we received…distinct 
groups…supporting the recent rent reduction.” Many of these groups sent donations to the 
revolutionary government, while representatives from a Tenant’s Committee asked for further 
legislation to create a permanent registry of rental prices (to facilitate opposition to illegal rent 
hikes), a proposal they had made earlier in the decade.715 These and other actions from tenants 
propelled state action as tenants fought for their reductions in court, and landlords fought 
back.716 US Embassy officials reported that the Ministry of Justice had opened an office for the 
public staffed with lawyers, and “nearly all of the problems presented to date have centered 
around rental reduction cases.”717 Technically the eviction moratorium expired after 45 days, and 
was only extended for an additional 30 days in August 1959, but embassy officials noted an 
“intrinsic bias in favor of the tenant against the landlord” in the courts.718 Landlords continued to 
file eviction papers as many tenants stopped paying rent entirely. In Guanabacoa, for example, a 
judge ordered several evictions based on nonpayment into 1960, even after tenants claimed 
exceptions based on the new laws. No date of removal is listed, however, and it is unlikely the 
evictions were carried out.719  
Yet the dynamics of tenant-landlord conflicts quickly surpassed the plans of 
revolutionary leaders. As many tenants stopped paying rent entirely, leaders pushed back against 
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popular pressure. In October 1960, the government enacted the first Urban Reform law and 
nationalized rental properties entirely, granting ownership to tenants who were to make 
amortization payments to the state. At the same time, the law respected the populist wing of the 
property lobby by compensating landlords. While the law abolished the rental system, it also 
meant that, in theory, tenants who had ceased to pay now had to start. Citing new payments, 
restricted mobility, and the fact that many now found themselves owning apartments they did not 
like, the US State Department reported, the Urban Reform was “the most unpopular measure 
taken by the Castro regime in its 22 months of office,” an assessment they claimed was 
supported even by “officers of the Yugoslav Embassy, who, because of their socialist 
proclivities, have usually approved of the various economic measures of the Castro regime.”720 
As late as 1965 many former tenants continued to neglect of payments on their homes, 
prompting the government to seek new enforcement methods.721 On rents, then, longstanding 
political pressures favored greater redistribution than their radicalizing leaders were willing to 
give. Regardless of popularity, however, the Law transformed previous tenant-landlord conflicts 
into conflicts with state authorities. 
Reforms on housing production followed logically from republican policies as well. Led 
by Pastorita Nuñez of the July 26 Movement, the Instituto Nacional de Ahorro y Vivienda 
(National Housing and Savings Institute, INAV) was designed to leverage capital from savings 
towards social ends, meeting the need of those who could not afford the types of homes offered 
through the FHA, which continued to function. INAV was therefore deeply rooted in existing 
paradigms. Consistent with all prior public housing initiatives, moral criteria were required for 
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eligibility for homes.722 In constructing homes, INAV extended financing and regulation to 
cheaper owner-occupied homes, along lines similar to those proposed in 1958 by Batista’s 
National Housing Commission. Like the 1958 plan, it was funded through an initial government 
appropriation to be recovered through monthly amortization payments from residents, with 
additional financing to come from FHA-style housing bonds purchased by individual lottery-
ticket buyers and by larger entities.723 Not hostile to investors, the institution acknowledged the 
need to locate additional private financing, although its optimistic projections for lottery 
proceeds led leaders to underestimate how much capital they would need. In March 1959, the US 
State Department reported on negotiations between Pastorita Nuñez and US-based construction 
and engineering firms for the construction of popular housing in East Havana. The firms 
involved in the discussions reported that the Cuban government planned to seek US financial 
backing for new industrial construction.724  
INAV was infused with quasi-religious language, blending the long established language 
of morality with the promises of the Revolution. An autonomous institution like the FHA, INAV 
claimed to be an instrument of moral redemption, even while funded from lottery proceedings, 
by turning gambling into an agent of social change. INAV listed as its primary goals to eliminate 
gambling and convert the popular classes into homeowners. A manifesto for the institution 
published in early 1961 linked gambling to Cuba’s history of colonialism and slavery, recounted 
INAV’s birth in the Sierra Maestra, and announced that the institute “would create homes over 
the ruins of gambling dens, would make gardens where misery had reigned before.”725 Castro 
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declared that INAV “is the first institution in the world of this kind … Instead of the state 
exploiting gambling, the state combats gambling: it transforms gambling into saving.”726 This 
language of moral reform reflected old hopes in the possibilities for state reform, although such 
hopes were now framed according to more radical possibilities.  
The state’s rent policies addressed the populist demands of the Republic, ended the 
conflicts between tenants and landlords, and through INAV deepened the state’s involvement in 
the housing sector. By 1962, however, housing policy underwent a sharp break, following the 
Bay of Pigs invasion. INAV policies blended easily emerging socialist doctrines, but as private 
capital became scarce, its activities were curtailed and the FHA abolished. INAV remained in 
charge of processing the distribution of homes, but not of construction. As the government 
openly declared itself socialist, a new state-controlled housing program came into place. With 
private investment no longer a central component of housing production, and conflicts over rent 
no longer central to the political system, many of the mechanisms that produced spatial 
inequality were eliminated. The language of morality remained in place.727  
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
The centralized state housing system of 1962 was a break with the past, but it was also years in 
the making. Since the 1930s, calls for housing reform had animated popular politics in Havana, 
leading to a series of policy initiatives that regulated and stimulated the private market. The 
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reform of the rental system in 1959-1961 was shaped by goals, conflicts and policies that were 
inherited from the Republic. Beginning with the rent law of 1939, local and national politicians 
enacted a series of laws and decrees designed to favor tenants in occupancy disputes with 
landlords. These laws played a significant role in limiting the ability of landlords to evict tenants 
arbitrarily, preventing large increases in rental prices from taking hold in many parts of the 
central city, but they also led to deteriorating housing conditions through the unregulated 
subdivision of existing units. Rent laws had a wider political impact, however, expanding the 
central role of the state in basic housing disputes throughout Havana.  
Debates over rent control led all sides to demand construction. Politicians initially passed 
rent control legislation by linking it directly to tax concessions for private developers. These 
direct links were broken in 1944, but they established a basic pattern where housing policy in the 
capital counterbalanced measures favoring tenants with ones that would encourage private 
investment in housing instead of public housing. These measures intensified in the 1950s, 
leading to the development of a Cuban FHA, which was designed to promote private investment. 
This delicately balanced system, in which the dominance of tenants in political disputes over rent 
control was combined with the government’s wider reliance on private investors, altered the 
dynamics of socio-cultural cleavages in the city by allowing a widely shared language of 
morality to mediate access to housing. The result was that poor and especially dark-skinned 
Cubans were generally excluded from new well-serviced developments in Greater Havana, 
contributing to social and racial segregation in the city.  
Thus by 1959, the revolutionary government sought to reform a housing system that had 
been the subject of intense state attention for decades. By initially favoring tenants, the 
government intervened in a system that had been shaped by the actions of the poor in their 
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conflicts with landlords. Tenants quickly seized on the favorable environment by largely 
abandoning rents. By 1962 the government eliminated those conflicts but created potential 
grounds for new ones, as it became the collector of tenants’ payments. In the absence of a 
negotiated housing policy with private investors—a true innovation—state control grew over 
housing construction as well.  
As its power grew, the government continued to grapple with the delicate balance implied 
by its own radical claims at moral redemption. With the elimination of landlords and developers 
from Havana, the government checked some of the key mechanisms through which social 
discrimination had proliferated. Yet the basic premises through which those mechanisms had 
operated remained intact. South of the capitol, the contradictions and ambiguities of this 
formulation now faced a test. In 1962, with the structures of a new housing system in place 
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6.0  “THEY ARE CUBANS TOO”: SLUM CLEARANCE BETWEEN REPUBLIC 
AND REVOLUTION, 1950-1963 




In 1949, shantytown leaders from Las Yaguas, Isla de Pinos, and Cueva del Humo presented a 
journalist with proposals for public housing to replace their neighborhoods. Ex-President Ramón 
Grau’s unrealized promises to trade shacks for modern constructions should go on, they argued, 
and residents would do the work themselves, paying for the homes gradually. “We have enough 
people,” stated a leader from the shantytown federation. “We do not want a gift.” “The 
government that offers these folks decent, human homes, will have won the people,” commented 
another leader.729  Printed in the popular weekly, Bohemia, the proposals seemed to generate 
little notice as public housing in the capital languished.  
Then in 1961, after 12 years of evolving shantytown policies, circumstances changed. In 
the midst of a turn towards the socialist bloc, revolutionary officials presented shantytown 
leaders with a plan that, in many ways, was the realization of their old hopes. The government 
would fund new neighborhoods, and occupants would pay for them over time. Just as leaders had 
proposed, moreover, shantytown residents were to build the houses. In assigning meaning to 
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these houses, however, there was a shift. While in 1949, the leaders had emphasized their civic 
worth as a prerequisite for their labor, by 1961 project leaders implied that the new projects 
would instill them with civic worth. “The Revolution did not just provide adequate housing to 
the mistreated compatriots,” claimed a report, “it elevated them…to the honorable status of 
citizens of a free land.”730 And their labor was important, since, as another report put it, “in a 
socialist system there is no room for begging.”731 Separated by 12 years, and by the physical, 
social, and cultural boundaries that divided shacks from the formal city, the statements of 1949 
and 1961 are striking, then, both for their identical content and their contrasting implications. 
The roots of this uneasy convergence—between shantytown leaders making demands of the 
state, and the state making demands of shantytown residents—is the subject of this chapter.  
Most accounts of slum clearance in Havana begin in 1959. Yet the policy shifts that led 
to Las Yaguas’ final clearance in 1963 had deeper roots, beginning with its reconstruction from a 
fire in April 1950. The trajectory of Las Yaguas during these years been studied only in bits and 
pieces, and very few accounts have acknowledged any pre-1959 initiatives towards shantytowns 
at all. As a result, studies of the revolutionary period have assumed that the government’s 
program had little precedent.732 The few exceptions have assumed sharp divisions between pre-
and post-1959 initiatives.733 The history of Las Yaguas between fire and eradication therefore 
sheds light on the evolution of the Cuban state at a time when the government shifted from 
democracy to dictatorship in 1952, and from capitalist to socialist alliances during 1959-1961. 
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Several basic questions serve to assess change and continuity during these years: First, what 
methods did these regimes use in their efforts to clear shantytowns from Havana, and how did 
they change? Second, to what extent did shantytown residents shape these methods?  
I argue that efforts to clear Las Yaguas from 1950 to 1963, and slum clearance in Havana 
more broadly, came from a synthesis of actions dictated by two frameworks. First, state 
initiatives reflected neighborhood leaders’ successful engagement with the political system 
through an established language of contention that emphasized their unfulfilled rights as citizens. 
Second, the implementation of those initiatives reflected the rise of a hemispheric paradigm for 
urban policy linked to national planning, social workers, and the “culture of poverty” thesis. As 
these frameworks collided in Las Yaguas and other shantytowns, the result was an evolution of 
policy initiatives that granted increasingly generous concessions to residents in exchange for 
relocations from contested lands. The rhetorical cost, however, was that officials shrouded their 
initiatives in the language of “redemption,” which denied the legitimacy of local mobilization 
and land occupation, even as it met some local demands. In short, in the case of Las Yaguas and 
several other neighborhoods, shantytown mobilization was vindicated but not valorized—and it 
would continue to be defined as beyond the norms of urban citizenship.  
The chapter begins by examining an eviction outside the central shantytowns, which 
contrasted sharply with what the government was willing to undertake in Isla de Pinos, Cueva 
del Humo, and Las Yaguas. It continues by examining the birth of a slum clearance program 
based on the persuasive methods of social workers during the Prio administration, documenting 
the ways that this program was expanded and institutionalized during a large-scale, relatively 
successful slum clearance operation launched by Batista’s government in the mid-1950s. It then 
addresses Las Yaguas’ unlikely survival of the program, continuities and changes in the slum 
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initiatives of the Revolutionary Government, and, finally, the complicated success of those 
initiatives in clearing Las Yaguas. 
6.1 OUR JOSÉ MARTÍ 
At the geographic heart of 1950 Havana’s greater metropolitan area, wide, flat, low-lying terrain 
surrounded a small hill. The land was bordered to the north by a steep ridge, topped by the 
imposing Principe Castle that guarded the elegant homes of Vedado and the grand Avenue Paseo 
as it pointed off towards the sea. To the south and east, what was once farmland now stood at the 
crossroads between new developments in Marianao, El Cerro, and the central city, offering an 
entryway towards the capitol and an ideal canvas on which to display the accomplishments of the 
Republic. Crowded, beautiful, and growing, Havana had for years attracted planners who hoped 
to develop these central lands, and by 1950, with construction on the rise, long-standing 
proposals were finally underway. At Havana’s center would be a modern Civic Plaza that would 
feature a statue of José Martí, hero of independence, and father to the Cuban nation.  
Havana’s proud future was mired in its conflictive present, however, as these lands had 
become central to hopes of poor residents as well. Speculators had purchased much of the area, 
which they rented haphazardly to thousands of occupants. In geographic terms, it was at the time 
perhaps the largest informally occupied area in Greater Havana—”a city in ruins,” according to 
one report.734 “Where they will raise … the monument to the Apostle,” declared a photo report in 
                                                 
734 This estimate is based on Raul Glez-Abreu Gómez, “Plano del Termino Municipal de la Habana en los 43 barrios,” 1945, 
Mapoteca, Biblioteca Nacional José Martí. Quoted from, “Trescientas familias pobres ocuparán el Barrio Obrero de Luyanó si el 
gobierno insiste en sus maniobras para desalojar el lugar donde viven,” Noticias de Hoy, April 12, 1950, 4. 
  203 
Bohemia, there is a “theater of pain and a stage for all human misery.”735 At the heart of a 
crowded city, then, three sets of interest sought to influence the site’s future: a surge in new 
construction was entwined with plans from politicians and architects, in direct opposition to the 
claims of poor, politically mobilized Cuban citizens in scattered collections of shacks. The future 
of Havana would be determined less by plans and blueprints than by negotiation and conflict—
and how such conflicts would play out was far from clear.  
In early 1950, the Ministry of Public Works put these dynamics to the test, initiating 
expropriations and evictions that quickly foreclosed any questions over who had rights to the 
neighborhood’s property. Protest targeted the Cuban state. One group of poor residents formed a 
committee and organized a meeting with city councilmen from the Communist Party (PSP), 
which erupted into threats to take over the empty Barrio Obrero if the government’s plans were 
carried out.736 After stalling, the Ministry of Public Works moved forward anyway—although it 
acknowledged the need to indemnify poor families along with owners. In October 1951 the 
Ministry paid approximately 100,000 pesos to land owners. Concurrently, a court representative 
signaled that the eviction rulings were final, delivering 50 pesos each to an estimated 300 
families—25 pesos in the name of property owners and 25 from the Ministry of Public Works. 
Residents had no legal avenue, except to demand better compensation.737  
Protest did not focus on the eviction ruling, but highlighted instead the state’s failure to 
care for residents. Denouncing the “precipitous form in which the Ministry of Public Works has 
attacked and destroyed the modest shacks they inhabit,” residents demanded more time.738 
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Others claimed that they had never received payments.739 Alongside parallel efforts by 
Communists, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer and aspiring politician, reportedly worked on behalf 
of squatters in the area to negotiate higher indemnities.740 With construction underway in early 
1952, neighborhood organizations continued to publicize their resistance, claiming that there was 
nowhere else in the city to live and reformulating the symbolism of the José Martí statue with 
signs reading, “act and think with our Martí.”741 
The Ministry was not moved. Facing down protesters, construction workers began to 
excavate the site as promised. In late October 1951, a crane began to “rip off the roofs of the 
houses where people still lived.”742 In November, as one elderly resident was loading his 
possessions into a truck arranged by the Ministry, a dynamite blast launched rocks into the 
neighborhood, killing the man instantly and narrowly missing several children. Noticias de Hoy 
labeled the blast “terrorism,” and new protests soon followed.743 Even as poor families continued 
to occupy the edges of the Plaza, however, by 1953 the central area was empty.744 With the land 
free for “the vital nucleus of our city’s future,” residents were forced to seek homes elsewhere.745 
Without time to make other arrangements, some made their way across the city to another 
contested site, Las Yaguas.746  
                                                 
739 “La tragedia de la Finca Ermita,” Noticias de Hoy, November 9, 1951, 1, 4. 
740 Szulc, Fidel, 214-16.  
741 F. Rodríguez Piedra, “Un negocio, 4 mil familias a la calle,” La Ultima Hora, February 7, 1952, 10-11; Protestan contra los 
desalojos, vecinos del barrio del Príncipe,” Alerta, January 11, 1952, 10-11.   
742 “Piden trescientas familias un plazo para buscar casas,” Alerta, October 20, 1951, 3. 
743 “La tragedia de la Finca Ermita,” Noticias de Hoy, November 9, 1951, 1, 4; “Muerto a causa de una explosión,” El Crisol, 
November 9, 1951, 8.   
744 Citing an interview with Jorge Aspiazo, Szulc claims that Castro was successful in negotiating a 50 peso indemnity for 
residents, until the agreement was scrapped when Batista cleared the neighborhood after his 1952 coup. This claim is partially 
supported by Batista’s own claim to have eradicated 515 homes and 1,532 residents from “La Pelusa,” where Castro was 
working. However, evictions at the Plaza were well under way by the time of Batista’s coup. Szulc, Fidel, 215; “Barrios de 
Indigentes Erradicados,” n.d. [c. 1961], Box 135, Folder 77, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar Papers, CHC.  
745 Quoted from “Liquidan indemnizaciones a los vecinos de la Plaza Cívica,” Alerta, October 27, 1951, 7. 
746 LP Interview with CM, 11 April 1969, Box 139, Folder 41, Oscar Lewis Papers, UIA, 1. 
  205 
6.2 TOWARDS A DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ACTION 
Away from the construction, Havana remained an informally housed city. The public battles of 
Las Yaguas and the central shantytowns against property owners and the state respectively, 
meant that these neighborhoods were relatively entrenched. Aside from firmly establishing the 
state’s legal responsibility for their property status, local conflicts had generated a widespread 
public consensus that the state could not relocate residents without offering support 
commensurate with their rights as citizens. Still, the expropriations and evictions underway in 
the Plaza Cívica served as notice that a place in the central city could not be taken for granted.   
Throughout the 1930s and 40s, central shantytowns demanded adequate housing and 
other benefits, but until the 1950 fire, their most significant achievement was to halt arbitrary 
relocations, not procure resources from the state. Following the fire, however, public pressure 
consolidated momentum around new policies, with hints that local demands might be taken more 
seriously. As officials targeted the neighborhoods, they began to draw from methods developed 
by social workers and influenced by Oscar Lewis, who taught at Havana’s School of Social 
Work in 1944.747 By the 1952 presidential elections, shantytown policy in Havana no longer 
relied on the imposition of force if such force was ineffective. Instead, influenced by local 
mobilization, state initiative focused on persuasion, opening new avenues for local claims.  
These tactics developed gradually, as central shantytowns remained under vague, 
persistent threat. Leading up to the 1950 fire, health officials argued publicly that shantytowns 
endangered the health of the wider population. In 1946 the Health Ministry lifted a shantytown 
quarantine begun during the 1944 hurricane, but officials continued to press for the eradication 
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of “the sick part” of the metropolis.748 “Just imagine … what would happen to the inhabitants of 
Havana if an epidemic developed in one of those neighborhoods,” explained a health official.749 
In March 1947, Grau’s Health Minister, Pedro Nogueira, told reporters that he had received 
complaints from nearby businesses, citing “a grave threat to public health.”750 In a meeting later 
that month, he proposed to vaccinate and remove infected residents and close all local 
businesses.751 Accompanying these discussions were rumors around hasty relocation plans. That 
year, the Ministry of Public Works proposed building a national park and a military museum 
near the Atarés Castle, offering 25 pesos to each family from Cueva del Humo and Isla de Pinos 
that would move.752 Other government housing proposals would have sent residents to distant, 
underserviced lands.753 All the while, the much-touted Barrio Obrero public housing project 
remained incomplete.754  
Many press reports agreed with health officials that the conditions of deep poverty were 
cause for alarm, but residents were savvy at deflecting criticism towards the state. Citing “a 
scene from a Dostoyevsky novel,” a sympathetic journalist reported that the nearby Hijas de 
Galicia clinic received hundreds of visits daily from shantytown residents seeking medical help 
for symptoms of malnutrition.755 In one sensationalized incident, a baby in Las Yaguas died after 
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being bitten by rats.756 Yet local leaders sharply contested health officials’ abstract 
characterizations of their homes as threatening to the wider urban area. In a 1949 Bohemia 
report, Cueva del Humo mayor Abelardo Pol declared, “we want the Health Ministry to come 
visit us … so they know our needs and wants; let them stop speaking to us from far away.”757 
Others claimed to prevent the outbreak of disease only through their own diligence, blaming 
municipal officials for failing to pick up trash and provide basic resources.758 And whenever the 
neighborhoods faced eviction, leaders stuck to familiar talking points, explaining “that they did 
not oppose the disappearance of the shantytowns, but rather the tossing of families out of their 
homes where they have sacrificed so much.”759 
By the start of Carlos Prio’s presidential term in 1948, neighborhood leaders’ success in 
publicly linking plans for relocation to demands for benefits from the state made their 
elimination appear more distant than ever. A detailed 1947 report in Información noted the 
proliferation of businesses, church groups, and political organizations in Las Yaguas supervised 
by dense community networks.760 Political groups of all kinds visited the neighborhoods offering 
resources in exchange for support.761 Now purged from the Confederation of Cuban Labor 
(CTC), Communist-affiliated groups took a renewed interest in the neighborhoods, organizing 
for public schools in Las Yaguas.762 And the Federation of Barrios de Indigentes, organized by 
the University Student Federation (FEU), remained outspoken in demanding shantytown 
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rights.763 Mongo Píz, the Federation’s president and a Cueva del Humo resident, organized 
positive publicity for the neighborhoods with the help of his “propaganda secretary,” including 
several feature stories by popular weekly journals Carteles and Bohemia. In 1950 a journalist 
from Carteles agreed to spend a “weekend” in Cueva del Humo, photographing and interviewing 
friendly residents with the Federation’s guidance, eventually spending a “wonderful night” in a 
shack.764  
The 1950 fire in Las Yaguas put the political capacity of the neighborhood on full 
display, and residents captured the sympathy of the nation. Following the blaze, the front page of 
Alerta pictured a Las Yaguas woman kneeling above burned homes, reading a Bible passage to 
her young daughter.765 As residents quickly rebuilt their homes, one journalist stated that the 
neighborhood “will be a new edition of the phoenix legend.”766 By now a somewhat familiar 
public figure, Las Yaguas mayor Rufino González gave interviews, stating, “What we need is 
wood, nails, furniture, clothes, and food, because we will do the work ourselves.… At this point 
we have not received any visit from officials; let them come bring us what we need.”767 With 
tight organization and wide visibility, neighborhood representatives made it clear that their 
voices would be heard in future discussions.  
Yet the publicity surrounding the fire made it clear that state officials would be part of the 
conversation too—and relocation remained a top priority. Along with another fire in Cueva del 
Humo that year, the incident pushed the Health Ministry’s larger plans for the neighborhood into 
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the national spotlight to an extent not seen since the 1944 hurricane, and there were hints that the 
Health Ministry sought to repeat previous actions. Following the fire, Minister Ramírez claimed 
to be studying a construction project on state lands “in more remote areas.” And while such 
construction would “come about with cooperation from residents,” Ramírez echoed a 
formulation designed to negate the claims of residents that the state was obligated to provide for 
them. Many, he stated, were not “true indigents” and would not be included in the plans since 
“they are perfectly capable of paying for housing.”768 With these statements, however, the 
Ministry was caught in the trap of its own rhetoric—and one which neighborhood leaders put to 
use: it could not publicly justify the clearance of the neighborhoods without ensuring that 
residents could adequately provide for themselves.  
As the fires generated public sympathy, Prio’s Health Minister Carlos Ramírez Corria 
recognized the dilemma. After the fire in Cueva del Humo, the neighborhood mayor reported 
that the Health Ministry had sent materials, and that Ramírez himself made “daily visits.”769 
After the Las Yaguas fire, in the midst of swirling rumors of arson by the government after a 
failed rally for mayoral candidate and brother to the president Antonio Prio, the Health Ministry 
planned a “Day with Ramírez Corria in the Reparto Las Yaguas,” a title that was quickly 
changed to “Pro Municipal-Health, Antonio Prio for Mayor,” and which was to include visits 
from local business leaders, gift handouts, conga drums, and possibly alcohol. Calling the event 
“the most inept kind of politicking,” Noticias de Hoy denounced the Ministry for playing politics 
while failing to provide “gasoline [for trucks] to pick up the trash”770 Yet the change in tone was 
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meaningful. According to El Crisol, following the fire, neighbors were “grateful to the National 
Police,” simply “because they have been authorized to raise their homes out of the rubble.”771  
While his plans for relocation remained in suspense, Ramírez’s public statements brought 
to the surface previous negotiations between several sets of interests in Havana. Months earlier, 
Carteles reported on meetings between Ramírez and President Prio about strategies to overcome 
“enormous difficulties” and “tenacious” neighborhood resistance.772 Ramírez also “exchanged 
impressions” with officials from the National Tourism Board and with property owners from 
around the city.773 The minister spoke with representatives from the Lyceum Society, the Rotary 
Club, Lions Club, and several other organizations to “coordinate the efforts of all interested 
institutions.”774 The result was a plan for a “regulating neighborhood,” where residents would be 
kept healthy and monitored by government officials. Financing would come from the “indigents 
fund,” and other sources.775 In addition, Ramírez “addressed the possibility of raising 
contributions from the property owners of those lands,” a proposal that “faced serious 
objections” at first, but quickly generated a pledge of two million pesos.776 “My plan,” explained 
Ramírez, “must be in the careful hands of people interested in ‘social action.’”777  
In April 1950, with the attention of the nation turned towards Las Yaguas, Ramírez had 
momentum to take action, and he introduced a new set of actors to do it. On April 4, he issued a 
public statement assuring the nation that residents could be relocated and also rehabilitated 
effectively, through the efforts of social workers. 
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The entire population of those neighborhoods is cooperating with a plan to make 
rehabilitating neighborhoods, where adults can elevate their cultural level and 
protect the future of their children. There are already construction experts in the 
neighborhoods with a clear notion of a different kind of sanitary life. Little by 
little they are elevating that cultural level. The group of social workers has been 
doing lovely work, and it is not utopian to think that soon those neighborhoods of 
so-called indigents will have tools, dispensaries, schools, [and] small 
industries.778 
 
While eliminating Havana’s central shantytowns remained a key goal for the Health Ministry, it 
planned a new type of intervention to achieve it. Social workers, not police, would now be on the 
front lines—and Ramírez assured that they would generate sustained cultural uplift. “A house 
and its materials in themselves are much less important than the culture of its residents,” 
concluded the minister. 779  
6.3 BEYOND POLITICS: SOCIAL WORKERS IN ISLA DE PINOS 
Spoken in the midst of crisis, the Health Minister’s rhetoric was not easy to put into practice, 
even after the publicity of the fire. Yet as officials moved slowly, pressure mounted. Criticizing 
the national government’s slow reaction, Havana’s city council took up the issue of shantytowns 
in 1951, following a series of incendiary articles from Ortodoxo councilman Herminio Portell-
Vilá. “One would laugh if it were not so painful!” he gibed in Bohemia, after putting together a 
census team for the central shantytowns.780 In November 1951, the council unanimously 
approved legislation to set up a commission to negotiate with police for the targeted removal and 
relocation of Las Yaguas, Isla de Pinos, and Cueva del Humo, along with a public hearing on the 
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matter.781 “It is past time that we do something more than feel sorry for ourselves,” stated an 
editorial in El Mundo, favorably reviewing the measure.782 The council’s initiative was 
ultimately scuttled by infighting, but all members publicly criticized “the Central Power,” which, 
“up until now has had no solution.”783 
Given the pressure, however, the “Central Power” had not been as idle as the city 
councilmen assumed. Plans for Ramírez’s publicly constructed “culturing” neighborhood were 
abandoned, but as the council debated in November 1951, Diario de la Marina reported that the 
Health Ministry had created a Department of Social Action to clear shantytowns. Social worker 
Celina Cardosa was named to head the initiative, “in which many predecessors failed,” and the 
report stated she “had the sage instinct—a woman after all—to understand … that to conquer 
prejudices, resistance and even deep rancor, it was necessary to win the confidence … of the 
indigents themselves.”784 For its first mission, the Department of Social Action targeted Isla de 
Pinos, the neighborhood burned to the ground by Machado’s police two decades before. By 
November, 100 homes had been eliminated.785   
In Isla de Pinos, social workers collaborated with doctors, lawyers, and the Boy Scouts, 
to integrate themselves into neighborhood life. Social workers assisted residents in collecting 
back pay on pensions, teaching others to read so that they could apply for a fingerprint 
identification card, and registering birth certificates for others so they could find formal 
employment. Volunteers came to play with local children, and a Women’s Committee was 
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established to sew new clothes. Firefighters were called to unclog a water drain, while some 
tubercular residents were taken to sanatoriums. Additionally, the Department offered dental care 
and other medicine through a mobile clinic. “At the beginning many refused to attend the clinic, 
but we broke down their resistance as they gained more confidence,” reported a social worker.786 
The social workers conducted these operations with a clear eye towards removing 
residents. After checking a tubercular man into a sanatorium, a social worker reported that the 
children had been “alleviated … of their family burdens,” permitting the oldest daughter to work 
as a domestic servant. “Soon they will be able to abandon the neighborhood,” the report 
continued. Another social worker convinced a home for the elderly to permit two sisters to take 
up residence with their pet hen. In other cases, social workers claimed to have “guided 
individuals towards … purchasing small plots of land with very small payments,” where they 
could build a home that was “always cleaner and more comfortable than what they currently 
have.” For several Russian-born residents, social workers arranged for new passports and travel 
funds to return to their country of birth—reportedly a voluntary return, though one that was 
required by law, since foreigners were prohibited from living in “a state of indigence.” “When 
they abandoned the neighborhood, the five corresponding houses were immediately 
demolished,” the social worker explained.787  
Though using a lighter touch than previous removal efforts, social workers faced a 
daunting task. Even after being allowed to keep their hen, the elderly sisters quickly returned to 
the neighborhood. After another elderly woman’s house was burned—by whom is unclear—she 
declared that before going to a nursing home, she would “rather live in the jungle.” “Practice has 
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shown us, that bringing these types of elderly people to the ‘homes’ is all but impossible,” 
commented a social worker.788 
Other workers cited resistance of a fiercer kind. Railing against tax-shirking 
businessmen, political sergeants who lied to the press, habitual delinquents, and outside political 
interests who had chosen the neighborhood “as a field of action,” one social worker complained 
of “fierce tumults without any other cause than the destruction of a few unoccupied homes.” 
“Unoccupied” could be a relative term, however. In December 1951, workers from the Health 
Ministry destroyed a series of homes and distributed “various sheets of zinc” to nearby residents. 
Returning to find her home in ruins, Ana Lidia allegedly attacked two men with a machete, 
cracking the skull of one. Injured as well, the “ferocious woman” claimed that she was the one 
who had been attacked and was only defending her home, from which “no one had given 
permission to take those materials.”789 Sarcastically denouncing the “humanitarian” labor of the 
Health Ministry, Noticias de Hoy reported that residents had successfully halted demolition 
efforts, reportedly greased with twenty pesos per home, with protests “that almost came to 
disturb the peace.”790 
For all its caution, government action in Isla de Pinos quickly inflamed tensions. Calling 
President Prio a “good millionaire after all,” Noticias de Hoy published a serious of highly 
critical articles denouncing the government’s “frequent inhuman acts.”791 The Department of 
Social Action is “destroying the houses by fire,” the journal reported, “fanning indigents 
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throughout the city along with the ashes.”792 Meanwhile, conservative papers like Diario de la 
Marina supported the measures, denouncing “false indigence.” “Politicians have always 
exploited the thesis that the indigents did not want to abandon their neighborhoods,” the author 
wrote, citing the dramatic success of the Department’s “persuasive methods in some cases, and 
of the smooth but constant pressure of authority in others.”793 
In spite of these rhetorical battles, by February 1952, social workers claimed to be 
moving towards success. “Currently the Department has gained the confidence and friendship of 
almost all the neighborhood residents,” claimed a social worker. 794 By 1952, then, new methods 
from social science were applied to the political dynamics of Havana shantytowns. Removal of 
the neighborhoods remained at the top of the state’s agenda, and local resistance remained fierce. 
As the state deployed social workers to navigate treacherous political terrain, the future of 
Havana’s central shantytowns hung in the balance. 
6.4 A NEW REGIME 
Batista promised to turn half-measures into full-scale reform after taking control of the 
government in 1952. In the weeks following the coup, the US State Department reported that 
“the new government seems to be determined” to build “cheap housing projects,” claims that 
Batista repeated in a series of radio addresses to the nation.795 Rejecting the label of dictator in 
an April interview, Batista justified his suspension of elections as “transitory,” and promised 
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“radical rectification” for “the sincere and pure dreamers of the Revolution.” At the center of the 
article, he was pictured on a hill overlooking the shacks of Las Yaguas, pointing off into the 
distance. “Although many great capitals endure them,” he explained in the caption, “in Cuba 
there is no justification for those neighborhoods to exist.”796  
 Reflecting popular ideas in social science and urban planning, Batista viewed 
shantytowns in cultural terms, and he entangled that culture with the responsibilities of an 
expanding welfare state. Claiming that other countries faced urban poverty as a result of 
economic crisis or “heartless cosmopolitanism,” he explained that Cuba was neither poor nor 
uncaring. Havana shantytowns, he claimed, were partially the result of “shortsightedness and 
inattention from the state,” but, because of resident behavior, they were worse than the scale of 
the poverty they contained. “There will be enormous surprise the day it is publicly known that in 
a good number of cases, residents in ‘Las Yaguas’ … earn more than a teacher in a school,” he 
said. The misery of shantytowns was more “moral than economic,” and “it is not nearly what 
those neighborhoods make it appear.”797 By highlighting urban poverty, while simultaneously 
questioning the extent of the state’s obligation to provide for residents, Batista laid a foundation 
for both expanded benefits and stronger discipline.  
The thesis of moral decay in shantytowns also served as a foil for appropriate norms of 
citizenship, and Batista argued for the role of the state in situating the poor on the correct path. 
“The citizen who lives in ‘his’ house…thinks and acts very differently from the father who lives 
in uncertainty and alienation,” he stated. In response, he promised to deploy “the social action of 
my government” to “rapidly launch a well studied, coordinated, scientific plan” for the 
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construction of new homes for workers. Once in place, such a program would make clear that 
“there is no reason for a number of compatriots who remain inhumanly at the margins of 
society.”798  
These priorities were quickly reflected in legislation, which clarified the illegality of 
barrios urbanos de indigentes (urban neighborhoods of indigents). In May 1952, the Junta 
Nacional de Economía (National Economy Board, JNE) approved a report on low-cost housing, 
proposing measures on rural huts as part of a wider plan to promote housing construction.799 In 
June, the Cabinet approved specific legislation on the matter, regulating rural housing and adding 
measures against barrios urbanos de indigentes. Echoing Cosme de la Torreinte’s 1939 
legislation, the measure mandated the elimination of these neighborhoods, while linking 
relocation to various types of social welfare. Shantytown residents with “profitable employment” 
were to be forced to find housing elsewhere, while those who did not were to be “totally 
reeducated” and provided with “social assistance” under the care of the Health Ministry and the 
Corporation for Social Assistance.800  
Departing from efforts of previous administrations, which had focused on public health, 
Batista’s administration integrated slum clearance measures into a broad institutional structure 
dedicated to housing. Working past opposition from sugar growers and other interests, an August 
decree made the already-existing National Housing Commission (CNV) an autonomous entity, 
financed by taxes and penalties on rural property owners whose land held sub-standard 
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dwellings.801 Additionally, the decree set “a tax of 50 percent on the increase in the value of the 
lands on which barrios urbanos de indigentes are located” after the state cleared them of 
occupants. The clearances and payments were to be conducted through “voluntary agreements” 
between the CNV and title-holders of the lands.802  Rather than paying property owners for 
occupied land, as agrarian reform laws had problematically done, the decree channeled profits 
from property owners towards the relocation of shantytowns.  
Neither the 1952 nor 1953 decrees offered an explicit definition of barrios urbanos de 
indigentes, but together they reinforced the links between urban land seizures and the welfare 
state. While the 1952 legislation implied that shantytowns were areas of deficient housing where 
some residents needed rehabilitation, the 1953 legislation made it clear that they were areas of 
informal urban land occupation. Since the program functioned through voluntary agreements 
with titleholders, it amounted to the institutionalization of norms to settle property conflicts. The 
government ultimately supported titleholders, the decree implied, but by taxing them in exchange 
for slum clearance it also tacitly recognized the legitimacy of residents’ claims to social welfare. 
The results of the combined taxes were effective. By October 1953, the CNV reported a budget 
of 1.5 million pesos, and estimated that it would receive two million pesos annually.803  
With medical hygienist José Pardo Jiménez at its head, Doctor Humberto Fernández 
Aguirre overseeing its shantytown efforts, and an autonomous operating budget, the CNV was 
positioned to put legislation into practice, promising “true rehabilitation.” An official spelled out 
the methods of the institution as it dealt with the neighborhoods one by one: “To the elderly, we 
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say, you will be provided a nursing home; to the children, schools; to the sick, hospitals; and to 
those who are able to work, facilities to find work.” Deploying teams of social workers to 
investigate neighborhoods and administer censuses, the CNV set out to clear neighborhoods that 
had been built to resist clearance. The first neighborhood target would be Isla de Pinos, followed 
by Cueva del Humo, and then Las Yaguas.804 With social workers at their doors, not flames, 
Havana’s central shantytowns faced a new type of challenge.  
 
6.5 THE NATIONAL HOUSING COMMISSION 
In 1954, the CNV began the largest slum-clearance initiative in Havana’s history, a program 
designed to eliminate informal centers of concentrated poverty from the capital. Relying on 
persuasion, not force, the CNV’s methods were innovative in two ways. First, the campaign was 
explicitly designed around established channels of shantytown protest, managing publicity and 
neutralizing claims for resources by offering relatively generous compensation on an 
individualized basis. Second, it established a reliable procedure to resolve insurgent land claims 
while generating revenue. Well-resourced, innovative, and flexible, the CNV faced off against 
Havana shantytowns. 
 “The destruction of the Isla de Pinos shantytown is the beginning of the end,” declared 
an optimistic news report in 1954. 805 Optimism seemed justified. In early January 1954, a small 
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neighborhood, Villanueva, was cleared.806 Then in February, “thirty-something shacks in the 
‘Casariego’ shantytown” in Rancho Boyeros were demolished.807 By early March, “Cueva del 
Humo, and Fanguito numbers one, two and three, with more than one thousand shacks or houses 
and more than four thousand residents” were gone. By April, La Pelusa, a neighborhood that had 
successfully resisted Prio’s clearance efforts near the Plaza Cívica, was in the process of 
eradication.808 Rising above these accomplishments was the January clearance of Isla de Pinos, 
where the CNV claimed to have helped 550 families find the means to live elsewhere.809 Set 
before a wide, empty field enclosed by a barbed wire fence, a billboard credited the  “public 
works plan of President BATISTA,” and the CNV for the surrounding scene: “This was Isla de 
Pinos and its residents are living better,” it read.810  
By mid-1955, Pardo Jiménez, now Batista’s Minister of Public Works as well as head of 
the CNV, claimed to have relocated more than 10,000 people while eliminating 16 shantytowns 
from Havana. After 1959, Batista claimed that the CNV had relocated and rehabilitated 25,000 
people during the 1950s, eliminating 70 percent of all urban shantytowns. It is possible that these 
numbers were exaggerated, and they limited the definition of “shantytowns” to areas lacking 
land title, not infrastructure. However, multiple reports from major newspapers leave little doubt 
that many people were relocated and a large number of shantytowns cleared.811 “The operation 
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811 I have not located precise published records for all of these clearances, particularly those following 1955. In August 1955, 
Pardo Jiménez stated to reporters that more than 10,000 residents had been moved. By 1961, Batista claimed that 25,000 
residents were moved from 36 neighborhoods.  
Batista’s claims correspond to press reports from 1954, but later years are murkier. In Batista’s personal records, he 
reproduced CNV data for 12 specific neighborhoods, 2,047 shacks, and 6,274 residents cleared during 1954. Only 70 of these 
residents were from urban areas beyond Greater Havana. In these notes, Batista goes on to claim that 11,231 residents had been 
moved by the time he made an address to Congress in March 1955. He further reports that “more than 14,000” residents were 
subsequently moved from approximately 5,000 shacks and 24 neighborhoods in 1956, for a total of approximately 25,000 people. 
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that appeared impossible for thirty years, has now been achieved,” Pardo Jiménez told 
reporters.812  
More remarkable than the operation’s scale, was the fact that no resident protest reached 
the press. The program was effected, Batista later reflected, “without producing a single protest, 
a single note of inconformity with the laborious eradication.”813 A rosy picture, no doubt, 
Batista’s characterization was bolstered by press accounts that ranged from skeptical approval to 
effusive praise. Characterizing the conduct of the “ex-indigents” as “excellent,” a report in Alerta 
called the CNV’s work a “moral triumph.” 814 “Social salvation,” declared an editorial in El 
Avance Criollo.815 The CNV “has produced [a] miracle” reported Gente de la Semana.816 A 
public report from the CNV even claimed support from the FEU, “who were strongly opposed in 
the past.”817 As part of the campaign, First Lady Martha Fernández de Batista publicly visited 
multiple shantytowns to speak to residents.818 Roundly thanking General Batista, the first lady, 
and the CNV, a journalist repeated a claim made during Machado’s rule nearly three decades 
before, gushing, “The next Christmas will pass without the presence of shantytowns.”819  
Batista’s general political repression and censorship were central components of the 
CNV’s success. Publicity was infused with pro-government propaganda, and CNV officials 
supervised reporters. Additionally, the government had forced the PSP journal Noticias de Hoy 
                                                                                                                                                             
According to Batista, this marked the clearance of 70 percent of all barrios de indigentes, presumably in Greater Havana. With 
several exceptions, I have not located press reports to corroborate most clearances post-1955. It is unclear how many of the 
purported 25,000 residents were from cities outside Greater Havana. 
See Batista, Piedras y Leyes, 316; “Barrios de indigentes erradicados,” n.d. [c. 1961], Box 135, Folder 77, Fulgencio 
Batista y Zaldívar Papers, CHC;  Rodolfo Rodríguez Zaldívar, “Erradica la bochornosa lacra,” Bohemia, August 7, 1955, 
Supplement; Cuba, Un año de labor, 28-38; “Promete Pardo Jiménez acabar con los barrios de indigentes,” El Faro, February 18, 
1957, 1.  
812 Rodolfo Rodríguez Zaldívar, “Erradica la bochornosa lacra,” Bohemia, August 7, 1955, Supplement.  
813 “Barrios de indigentes erradicados,” n.d. [c. 1961], Box 135, Folder 77, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar Papers, CHC. 
814 Guillermo Villaronda, “Como fue erradicado el barrio ‘Isla de Pinos,’” Alerta, January 18, 1954, 2. 
815 “Bacheo y barrios indigentes,” El Avance Criollo, March 8, 1954, 1.  
816 “Borrando un baldón,” Gente de la Semana, November 11, 1956, 20.  
817 Cuba, Un año de labor, 33. 
818 González, Martha Fernández Miranda de Batista, 174-177.  
819 Guillermo Villaronda, “Como Fue Erradicado El Barrio ‘Isla de Pinos’” Alerta, January 18, 1954. 
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to halt publication in July 1953, several months before the CNV began to operate in Isla de 
Pinos. The most reliable public forum for shantytown protest since 1938, the journal’s silence 
amid the clearances was deafening. Meanwhile, Ortodoxo, Auténtico, Communist, and student 
opposition leaders faced harassment and prosecution.820 Without free elections, these leaders had 
little incentive to leverage shantytowns protests against ruling politicians. And while the CNV 
publicly claimed to have support from the FEU, the neighborhood leaders connected to the 
Federation of Barrios de Indigentes were nowhere heard in the press. How officials dealt with 
these leaders is unclear, but a once-active political structure appeared to be broken or silenced.821 
Discussing the clearances years later, Las Yaguas resident Alexis García blamed Cueva del 
Humo’s weak community organization and the death of Manolo Castro in 1947. Cueva del 
Humo “didn’t have strong leadership,” he said. “Or, rather, they didn’t have capacity.”822 
Leadership opportunities were few in undemocratic times. 
It is not plausible that 25,000 residents were relocated without opposition. Still, the 
absence of negative publicity is evidence of a strategy that was more sophisticated than 
censorship and repression alone. Indeed, mainstream skeptics of the campaign were numerous, 
and they voiced suspicion that the CNV had not gone far enough, not that it had gone too far. 
Under the headline “One Shantytown Disappears and Two Appear,” a Bohemia report claimed 
that the eradication of Isla de Pinos was accompanied by the rapid growth of several more 
peripheral shantytowns. “It would be deplorable if the Commission’s efforts…did nothing but 
move the indigents from one side of the city to the other,” it stated. Yet as Fernández Aguirre 
                                                 
820 Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, 124. 
821  Identifying Isaías Hernández as the mayor of Cueva del Humo, reporters made no mention of Abelardo Pol, or Mongo Píz, 
respectively mayor and president of the shantytown federation in 1950, who had publicly resisted previous clearances. However, 
the title of “mayor” was used somewhat informally in press reports on shantytowns. Juan Pedro Sánchez, “Autobiografía de un 
barrio de indigentes: Cueva del Humo cuenta su vida…,” Bohemia, April 18, 1954, 32. 
822 OL, MD, MB, AT interview with FA, 16 May 1970, Box 142, Folder 28, Oscar Lewis Papers, UIA, 13. 
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and Pardo Jiménez assured the reporter that the CNV would soon eradicate these other 
neighborhoods, he conceded that the clearances were “undoubtedly worthy of praise.” 823 
Opening with a similar question, “will they really eradicate the problem or only disperse it?” 
another article anthropomorphized Cueva del Humo. “I will be dead,” the suffering 
neighborhood “told” Bohemia readers beneath pictures of men destroying its shacks. “Goodbye, 
let it be forever!”824 An article in the Afro-Cuban publication Atenas called the clearances 
“excellent,” while noting that poverty in Havana’s peripheral neighborhoods remained severe.825 
Even a CNV report published after 1959, with every political reason to criticize previous efforts, 
stated that clearance efforts had generally improved the lives of residents.826 Wistful but 
accepting, even skeptical journalists were impressed by the CNV’s work.  
This positive reputation led some shantytown residents to seek out the CNV for 
protection. In 1955, residents from a shantytown at Los Quemados, Marianao, publicized 
protests against eviction proceedings from a US property owner—proceedings not connected to 
the CNV. Acting on requests from a neighborhood commission, the director of the local paper El 
Sol called the CNV’s Fernández Aguirre, who promised to visit. “We are interested in the case,” 
he told journalists. Residents were interested in the CNV too, requesting that it build them homes 
on the contested land in exchange for monthly payments.827 Rather than an agency of repression, 
residents saw in the CNV an opportunity to claim benefits. When a judge dismissed eviction 
proceedings against the approximately 100 residents several months later, the paper displayed 
                                                 
823 It is plausible that Pardo Jiménez was true to his word, since the Caseriego neighborhood in Rancho Boyeros was eradicated 
soon after. See, “Tomó posesión en OP Pardo Jiménez; erradicará más barrios indigentes,” El Avance Criollo,  February 18, 
1954, 1,14; Oscar Rego, “Desaparece un barrio de indigentes y aparecen dos,” Carteles, January 24, 1954, 25-27. 
824 Juan Pedro Sánchez, “Autobiografía de un barrio de indigentes: Cueva del Humo cuenta su vida…,” Bohemia, April 18, 1954, 
30-32.  
825 Mario Guiral Moreno, “Los barrios indigentes,” Atenas, October 1954, 39.   
826 However, the report was produced by an official who was active in Batista’s CNV. See Anderson, La delincuencia en los 
barrios de indigentes, 2. 
827 “Interesado el Ministro Pardo Jiménez. Pretende resolver el desahucio en Quemados,” El Sol, May 7, 1955, 1. 
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the “triumph” on its front page.828 While there is no evidence that the CNV built houses on what 
remained informally occupied land, the neighborhood remained intact during Batista’s rule.829 
In neutralizing resident protest, then, the CNV operated with persuasive, depoliticizing 
tactics, defusing collective demands by meeting smaller individual requests. Residents were 
processed by a team of social workers led by María Isidora Ros, who, with “an affectionate smile 
of friendship and understanding,” presented them with solutions beyond the neighborhoods.830 
Accompanied by social workers, a reporter met with families who reported feeling “happy to 
have abandoned Isla de Pinos” for more distant subdivisions. Various residents launched new 
commercial endeavors with the CNV’s help.831 Meeting with a neighborhood mayor and a 
resident who had lived in the neighborhood since 1930, a reporter listed requests residents made 
to the CNV. One-third asked for building materials, 23 percent for money, 14 percent for jobs as 
public employees, three percent for scholarships, and 25 percent for a “later solution.”832 They 
asked for a “great assortment of things,” explained Fernández Aguirre, mentioning three months 
worth of rent, the purchase of land “on the outskirts of the city,” and medical care. “Some of the 
requests were suitable,” he said. “Others were impossible and they were convinced … to modify 
them.”833 In meeting these requests, the CNV claimed to have found work for approximately 50 
percent of affected residents, finding 20 percent to be capable of living elsewhere once a 
residence had been located, and moving 10 percent to self-constructed homes in peripheral 
                                                 
828 The eviction was dismissed on identical grounds to those used by the Judge to halt 1944 eviction proceedings in Las Yaguas: 
since the property owners never had possession of the land, previous eviction efforts were ruled invalid, leaving no grounds for 
the present case. Thus, the case merely halted the eviction while title remained with the US owner. See Chapter 2. 
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Sol, August 27, 1955, 1; “Los Quemados: una vergüenza que desaparece,” Metas, June, 1960, 24. 
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30-32. 
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subdivisions. Additionally, it sent 10 percent to medical institutions. Two percent went to live 
with family members in other provinces.834 By dealing with individual requests, the CNV 




Figure 7: Led by Maria Isadora Ros (right), social workers leave a shantytown accompanied by a journalist (second from 
left) in 1954. 835 
 
 These strategies allowed the CNV to bask in positive press coverage and to claim that it 
had addressed the residents’ needs, even as it sidestepped longstanding hopes for public housing. 
By eliminating shantytowns, it instead pushed residents towards the city’s housing market. 
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Where shantytown protests had often pointed out that the city lacked adequate housing, the CNV 
portrayed new subdivisions with questionable infrastructure as socially beneficial. Boasting of its 
work, the CNV publicized the cases of multiple former Isla de Pinos residents who had relocated 
to La Hata, Guanabacoa, where they reportedly enjoyed “the tranquility” in which they lived.836 
On the distant outskirts of Greater Havana, La Hata was one of the poorest areas of the city, with 
minimal services, where residents had only recently gained rights to occupy the land (Chapter 2). 
A report published after 1959 acknowledged that the physical conditions of new neighborhoods 
occupied by relocated residents were generally not much better than their old ones.837 Falling 
short of residents’ hopes for modern constructions, then, the CNV led residents to a housing 
market where well-serviced subdivisions were expensive and discriminatory, and decent rental 
dwellings were scarce.838  
Whether the CNV significantly improved the lives of relocated residents is therefore 
doubtful. Yet in two respects, the slum clearance program was a wild success: first, it 
depoliticized shantytown relocation by neutralizing established lines of protest, and, second, it 
established workable procedures to resolve urban property disputes. In offering resources to 
residents in exchange for moving, the government responded to individual demands for public 
benefits and broke up informal neighborhoods, even as it sidestepped collective demands for 
public housing. A far cry from Grau’s 1944 efforts at the Managua indigents camp, the CNV 
addressed neighborhoods with a budget, a plan, and with workers who were trained to facilitate 
modest claims. And in meeting local demands, the CNV also silenced entrenched sites of local 
protest.  
                                                 
836 Ibid, 2. 
837 Anderson, La delincuencia en los barrios de indigentes, 2.  
838 See Chapter 4.  
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6.6 LAS YAGUAS 
In the publicity that surrounded the CNV’s shantytown campaign, one neighborhood was rarely 
mentioned. As informal settlements disappeared, Havana’s most famous shantytown remained, 
resisting the CNV’s new strategies successfully just as it had avoided Zubizarreta’s fires in 1931. 
“The Las Yaguas neighborhood remains in the same place, unshakable,” stated a 1957 report. 
“Pardo Jiménez’s resolve has not led to a … solution.”839 While the CNV raised the threshold for 
effective local resistance by counteracting the public relations strategies of shantytown leaders, 
Las Yaguas’ leadership generated internal unity sufficient to meet it. Although they failed to 
generate sympathy in the popular press, leaders continued to campaign among their neighbors. 
Relocation, they insisted, could not be so cheap. Their cohesion was fortified as relocated 
residents from other shantytowns moved in, ensuring that action against them would be a messy, 
collective affair. Neighborhood leaders also strengthened their ties to the Batista government. 
Even as Las Yaguas remained politically strong, however, its visibility as an emblem of state 
failure loomed large.  
As social workers moved to gain the confidence of shantytown residents throughout 
Greater Havana, Las Yaguas’ leaders opposed them actively, weighing the benefits they already 
had against the meager payments they were to receive. Along with local mayor Rufino González 
and the now-clandestine PSP, Alexis García rallied the community.840 “I was opposed,” he said, 
to offers of 200-peso relocation indemnities. Many were not convinced, however, leading to 
“struggles between the neighbors.”841 Recalling a conversation with a frustrated woman who 
                                                 
839 Regino Martin, “Hay que cuidar la gallina de los huevos de oro,” Bohemia October 13, 1957, 47.  
840 The PSP seems to have kept up an active clandestine presence in Las Yaguas during the 1950s. See Lewis, Lewis, and 
Rigdon, Four Men, 224. 
841 OL, MD Interview with FA, 27 May 1970, Box 142, Folder 30, Oscar Lewis Papers, UIA, 32.  
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planned to use the money to leave Havana, he told her, “With $200.00 you won’t do anything. 
…You came fleeing your village, because the hunger and misery there was plaguing you.”842 
Working with the Agrupación Católica Universitaria (Catholic University Group, ACU), 
Manuela recalled, “At the beginning people thought [the social workers] really were going to 
make things better … but later … they saw that the only ones who had improved were the ones 
in charge of improving us, and they got a salary for it.”843 In the meantime, the ACU seems not 
to have supported the social workers, opening a new high school the same month that the CNV 
campaign began.844  
With smaller informal neighborhoods gone, Las Yaguas’ utility as a site for cheap 
housing grew, likely increasing its capacity for resistance. Many residents of Isla de Pinos and 
Cueva del Humo accepted relatively generous indemnities from the CNV and simply moved to 
Las Yaguas.845 Of the residents still in Las Yaguas in 1963, more reported moving to the 
neighborhood in 1955, in the midst of the CNV’s shantytown eradications nearby, than in any 
year in the neighborhood’s history, rivaled only by 1931.846 As they did, the extent to which the 
CNV actively sought to clear the neighborhood is not clear. In his interviews with Oscar Lewis, 
García makes several vague references to a police raid of Las Yaguas in 1956, which he and 
others resisted with letters to Batista’s wife, Marta Fernández, but his account is fragmentary.847 
Manuela voiced annoyance after head social worker Maria Isidora Ros convinced her to check 
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into a nursing home. “They tricked the old people to leave, like me,” she remembered.848 “I came 
back to the neighborhood dirtier than I left it.”849  
Neighborhood leaders gave the government reasons not to press them. The 
neighborhood’s cohesive organizational structure enabled leaders to form productive political 
ties to the government. At a time when Batista sought legitimacy, Manuela claimed that Rufino 
Gonzalez, his wife, and the network he represented, were strong supporters of Batista, an 
impression shared by Oscar Lewis and García.850 In the late 1950s, a central avenue in Las 
Yaguas still bore the name “September 4,” after Batista’s 1933 uprising.851 Amparo, a resident 
who had worked with the Communist-affiliated CTC’s Unemployed Section during the early 
1940s, held a job granted by politicians linked to Batista in exchange for organizing votes.852 
When several participants in anti-Batista attacks allegedly took shelter in Las Yaguas during the 
late 1950s, Marta Fernández was apparently disappointed enough to cancel a customary toy 
distribution for neighborhood children.853  
As Las Yaguas’ prospects for remaining in the city improved, however, its separation 
from the formal city increased. As its population grew, moving into the neighborhood requiring 
bribing local police officers that were connected to neighborhood businesses.854 The officers 
were widely rumored to operate a local drug trafficking network, while markets for stolen goods 
and other items flourished.855 “People were becoming more and more shameless, but now no one 
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was dying of hunger,” remembered Manuela of the late 1950s.856 Nearby neighborhood 
associations begged the CNV to finish with the “absurd” shantytown, a “cancer,” they claimed, 
where residents lived a “at such a low level of existence that it is hard to find something similar 
anywhere on Earth.”857 In 1957 left-wing journalist Samuel Feijóo called Las Yaguas “the vortex 
[maremágnum] … of final poverty, of sickness, of abandonment.”858 
Unlike the sensationalized, popular resistance to eviction suits or public health 
relocations in the 1940s, Las Yaguas’ success against the CNV was no longer celebrated in the 
national press. Instead, resistance was conducted internally, as leaders rallied residents behind 
the collective benefits of their central location, rejecting what they deemed insufficient offers 
from the state. These networks were fortunate to have strong connections to politicians who were 
influential with Batista’s government. Yet in the battle for social acceptance and dignity, 
residents were victims of their own success. The permanence they had worked so hard to achieve 
reinforced perceptions of cultural degeneracy and political corruption.  
6.7 THE REVOLUTION IN LAS YAGUAS 
“I don’t remember what I did January first,” stated Alexis García. “If I got drunk, if I slept, if I 
went out, I don’t remember.”859 With little fanfare, revolution came to Las Yaguas—and as the 
old regime crumbled, the neighborhood’s relative security crumbled too. In meeting the 
transition, leaders in Las Yaguas were initially skeptical of all state interventions, and they met 
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talk of relocation by making substantial collective demands. For their part, meanwhile, 
revolutionary leaders did not see Batista’s slum clearance program as controversial or misguided. 
To the contrary, in marshaling evidence of the regime’s failure, they pointed to Las Yaguas’ 
continued existence. Yet as government hopes for eradication collided with neighborhood calls 
for benefits, the wider rhetoric of the Revolution opened new spaces for dialogue. By 1963 the 
government was able to realize long frustrated hopes for Las Yaguas’ destruction. In the process, 
it met residents’ longstanding demands for adequate housing. In the aftermath, officials 
characterized the neighborhood’s history of resistance as a failure of the past.  
Residents greeted January 1, 1959, with distance and caution, as local political leaders 
positioned themselves strategically in relation to the new government. During the first month of 
1959, Manuela recalls that supporters of Batista opponent Tony Varona “immediately changed 
and organized themselves for the Revolution to assault the houses of Batista supporters,” 
including her own. Fleeing the neighborhood temporarily, she states that residents severely beat 
the wife of one alleged Batista supporter.860 According to Manuela, residents “thought that since 
they were talking about the Revolution no one would do anything to them.”861 Only Manuela 
recounts this event, but it is consistent with an image of neighborhood residents trying to connect 
to the new government. Interestingly, Las Yaguas mayor Rufino González is absent from all 
accounts of events following 1959.862  
Other residents were more indifferent. While many agreed that Batista’s fall was a happy 
occasion, by no account was Las Yaguas deeply invested in the Revolution before 1959. “I heard 
a lot of sirens … a lot of commotion, you know, that the General had left, and I felt really 
                                                 
860 Emphasis is in the original. García Alonso, Manuela, 413.  
861 Ibid, 413.  
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happy,” recalled one resident.863 García recalled more mixed views. “There were many of them 
who knew the truth…that the system here needed to change,” he said. “But others…thought that 
a revolution didn’t mean anything. They said, ‘look, the president is Joe Schmo, what does it 
matter to me?”864 García also recalled how the neighborhood benefitted from longstanding 
informal ties to the PSP. “There were many … who were waiting for them to burn down Las 
Yaguas because there hadn’t been anything but counter-revolutionaries there,” he said, “But … 
the Socialist Party knew what kind of politics we were developing.”865 Other radicalized 
residents had organized under the Catholic Church, and some switched their affiliation after the 
group turned against Castro.866 
Local concerns proved justified when the new government moved to address the 
neighborhood with force, assuming Las Yaguas was a site of criminality and counter-revolution. 
An internal report from a housing official called the shantytown “spectacular…for the number of 
criminal acts recently taking place.”867 On February 18, 1959, police raided Las Yaguas, by 
some accounts looking for prisoners who had escaped after Batista’s fall, and by others seeking 
out supporters of Batista’s ally Rolando Masferrer.868 “600 detained in Las Yaguas,” reported El 
Crisol, a total which Diario de la Marina placed at 800, and El Mundo “almost 1,000.”869 
Forcibly rounding up hundreds of men from the neighborhood, police reportedly went from 
house to house, seizing marijuana, weapons, radios, televisions, clothing, “and other objects 
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whose origin could not be verified by owners.”870 “The number of shots that night!” Manuela 
remembered.871 El Mundo reported wild gunfire against police, to “great alarm” and general 
confusion, while Diario de la Marina reported that the initial shots came from police as residents 
tried to flee. In both accounts, the tumult left three residents shot, including one woman, all of 
whom were taken to a hospital.872 After the roundup, the police forced men into trucks, 
transporting them to a park near a police station, where a near-riot ensued. When one police 
officer allegedly told residents, “no one who is honorable and decent lives in Las Yaguas,” El 
Crisol reported that residents launched protests, which “could have had fatal consequences.”873  
Yet the detained men soon gained sympathy from the police by emphasizing their status 
as hardworking poor citizens. Many claimed that they would miss work.874 As National 
Revolutionary Police Chief Efigenio Ameijeiras sought to calm the situation, Diario de la 
Marina reported that he met with three “older residents,” including García.875 According to his 
own account, García convinced the police chief to let the men go by praising the Revolution, 
arguing that the radios were not stolen, and denouncing Batista’s police for forcing drug traffic 
on the neighborhood.876 After meeting with these residents, the press reported that Ameijeiras 
entered the park unarmed, promising the men that he had no “rancor” in his heart, and that the 
Revolution would not “go against the humble classes.” Stating that the government would 
provide jobs, health care for the sick, and education for children, the police chief sought to 
distance himself from the practices of the Batista government. “We have not come here for 
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politics,” he said. Residents were calmed by the message, though whether they agreed to 
abandon “politics” is doubtful. According to El Mundo, Ameijeiras told residents that Fidel 
Castro, “like all of us, has come from the humble classes,” leading residents to shout out “vivas” 
to the Revolution. The police chief was reportedly carried back to Las Yaguas on the shoulders 
of enthusiastic residents, where he arranged for the delivery of a truck full of food. He then 
instructed residents to form a seven-person commission, which included García, to coordinate 
with police.877   
Using their first violent encounter with the new regime to establish productive ties to the 
government, Las Yaguas leaders secured a commitment for benefits. The press praised the 
agreement. “For the first time in Cuban history, a public disturbance has been transformed into 
an act of revolution,” reported Revolución. Noting that the incident had nearly led to “grave 
consequences” until Ameijeiras “avoided anything worse,” the report stated that the government 
now planned to “transform Las Yaguas,” organizing a “civic-revolutionary commission” to 
facilitate social change. Where there had been a “center for criminals,” the attitude of residents 
was now allegedly “favorable to revolutionary changes.”878 After the police roundup Manuela 
recalled the sudden proliferation of olive-green militia members in the neighborhood. “They 
looked like iguanas after a rainstorm.”879 The plans left no doubt, however, that government 
leaders were “looking towards the eradication of the neighborhood.”880 
Despite new political links, then, residents remained skeptical. Alliances with the 
government had often been a starting point for local resistance, not an end, and impending 
eradication had been a fact of life for decades. Despite their new relationship, resistance quickly 
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resumed as the government sent social workers from the CNV back into Las Yaguas.881 María 
Isidora Ros and Eduardo Anderson, both veterans of Batista’s slum clearance campaign, oversaw 
new efforts to remove residents from the neighborhood on an individual basis, though it is 
unclear how many.882 Amid worries that elderly women would be moved to homes, Manuela 
remembered, “the poor old women began to tremble.”883 According to one resident, these social 
workers began to register the houses and relocate residents, to general opposition. “No one 
wanted to leave like that.”884 According to an outside observer, a number of residents “wanted 
nothing to do with the plans of the government,” and formed a new shantytown near Puentes 
Grandes, a Havana suburb.885 And tensions emerged with other government officials as well 
during a charitable food distribution on one of the first Christmas Eves after the Revolution. 
When a police sergeant opposed the giveaways, the elderly leader and santero, García, grew 
furious: “if you would have looked through my skin, which is dark dark black, you would have 
seen me turn red.”886 
Despite these conflicts, the government gained credibility from successful piecemeal 
relocations and other state initiatives.887 Isidora and Anderson relocated an unconfirmed number 
of residents before 1960. Moreover, of 740 families left in Las Yaguas in 1960, 103 were moved 
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and provided housing through the Urban Reform.888 The Urban Reform Law allowed these 
families to relocate to good houses vacated by wealthy exiles, or homes in the well-constructed 
East Havana project, likely fostering trust in the government.889 The government also provided 
some Las Yaguas residents temporary work in rural sanitation brigades organized by the Health 
Ministry. “A lot of people came from Las Yaguas and elsewhere to work a couple of weeks, long 
enough to get their pay and gamble it away,” remembered a worker.890 During 1961, literacy 
workers taught Las Yaguas residents to read, efforts that they first met with enthusiasm but that 
ultimately had little success.891 In February 1961, the government established centers for 
childcare and recreation.892 With halting steps, Las Yaguas residents engaged with the state 
productively. 
Yet questions over the neighborhood’s eradication lingered. In 1960, the Revolutionary 
Government launched new plans for slum clearance across the country, calling the move an 
“obligation of the nation.”893 As before, the program relied on social workers, reflecting 
international trends as well as the established practices of the state. In 1960, the government 
established the Ministry for Social Welfare, where Minister Raquel Pérez explained that social 
workers would be a “coordinating element… between the needy and the resources offered by the 
state.”894 The Ministry addressed issues like juvenile delinquency, education for the poor, and 
the clearance of shantytowns. 
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 In addressing shantytowns, the Ministry showed that it was prepared to surmount 
neighborhood resistance without alienating residents. The program departed from the Batista 
regime’s efforts in two key respects: first, it would directly oversee the construction of new 
homes for residents, and, second, it would deal with neighborhoods collectively. After taking 
over from the CNV during the first months of 1960, the Ministry launched its new campaign, 
“Self-Help and Mutual Aid” (Esfuerzo propio y ayuda mutua). It initially slated 10,457 residents 
from shantytowns across the island for relocation and rehabilitation.895 A final report on the Self-
Help program, presented in 1963 claimed that 21 new neighborhoods were constructed across 
Cuba, with a total of 3,400 houses.896 In Greater Havana, the program targeted three 
neighborhoods and 5,019 residents. Set for clearance were Zamora and Los Quemados, in 
Marianao, and Las Yaguas.897  
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Figure 8: Above, the Los Quemados shantytown—”ugly and denigrating for a country.” Below, residents work to 
construct new homes in 1960.898 
                                                 
898 Vicente Rodríguez, “Los Quemados: Un tugurio más que la revolución echa abajo,” INRA 1, no. 7 (1960), 71. 
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The Self-Help program began in the Manzana de Gómez shantytown in Santiago de 
Cuba, where a new neighborhood was designed as a “pilot test” for all Cuban shantytowns and 
accompanied by wide publicity.899 Inaugurated on July 26, 1961, a single new subdivision, Vista 
Alegre, would house 3,682 residents in 612 homes adjacent to a new factory.900 Unlike “Self-
Help” programs that helped residents “upgrade” their own neighborhoods, which were common 
in other Latin American cities later in the 1960s, the Ministry of Social Welfare gave residents 
little control over the projects.901 Residents undertook the construction as volunteers, with the 
supervision of outside technical advisors.902 Men and women worked on different tasks in six-
hour shifts, as Minister Pérez “demanded the cooperation of residents.”903   
As the Self-Help program expanded to other cities across Cuba, publicity focused on the 
spontaneous, redemptive potential of the Revolution. Writing of “a town that builds itself” in 
Santa Clara, a reporter documented Ministry functionaries making personal donations for the 
materials used by poor shantytown residents to build new homes.904 Blending revolutionary and 
religious rhetoric as the government sought to co-opt opposition from the Catholic Church, an 
early report on the program quoted the Gospel of Mathew beneath pictures of shacks: “Which is 
easier: to say, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Get up and walk?’” Another photo showed a 
dark-skinned baby crawling out of the muddy entryway to a shack, accompanied by words from 
Castro: “These are the ones who needed us, and these are the ones we have helped.”905 INRA 
magazine linked these religious overtones to racial equality. Talking to “Daniel,” a 66-year-old 
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black resident with “a wrinkled face and white hair,” the report noted that 90 percent of residents 
were black like him, often suffering from hunger that “looked like it had been growing for 
centuries.”906  
The rhetoric of redemption framed local resistance negatively, as a cultural function of 
the old political system. By providing housing, however, the government also met the demands 
of local activists. At Los Quemados, Marianao in Greater Havana, reporters noted that all 
previous removal efforts had failed. Citing “negative attitudes,” the report explained that a 
neighborhood assembly, “came together to back the project” after carefully considering the 
proposal.907 Residents were “indifferent…since they had seen too many governments rise and 
fall,” claimed a report, until the Revolutionary Government “made them a neighborhood where 
they could live like everyone.”908 It took Castro’s words, claimed another report, “to transform 
passive resistance…into the enthusiasm that today propels the plan forward.”909  
As the program progressed in Santiago and elsewhere, the planned clearance of Las 
Yaguas became central to a narrative of redemption for the poor. In 1959, pictures of Las Yaguas 
appeared in publications imploring the rich to donate to revolutionary efforts.910 In October 
1960, an article in Bohemia criticized politicians in Caracas, Venezuela for doing “apparently 
nothing to eradicate the ‘ranchos’…what in Cuba would equate to ‘Las Yaguas.’”911 And Castro 
mentioned the neighborhood frequently.912 In a speech at the University of Havana in November 
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1960, he linked the religious symbolism of the Ministry’s campaign directly to Las Yaguas, 
labeling enemies of the government as “Pharisees” who had not “cast their lot with the poor.” 
Let the enemies of the government 
go to the neighborhood of Las Yaguas to see how others lived, and then let them 
say that it was just, that it was noble, that it was good, and let them say the 
Revolution is bad because it wants Las Yaguas to have decent houses … Let them 
say the Revolution is bad.913 
 
Meanwhile, filmmakers from the Soviet Union shot scenes for the film Soy Cuba in the 
neighborhood. “Don’t look away!” a scene implored viewers, as a wealthy American stumbles 
through the neighborhood in horror after a night with a prostitute.914  
Promises for reform were convincing to residents. As the Ministry of Social Welfare 
oversaw the construction in Santiago, a group from Las Yaguas began to construct one of seven 
new subdivisions to replace their neighborhood. Negotiation persisted, however. García vaguely 
recalls his initial skepticism as part of the reason why he later had no official leadership position 
in the neighborhood Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR): “I had to provide 
certain facts about the motives of our move from Las Yaguas to here, and one of the CDR 
members said that I … sounded like a latifundista.… And that hurt me … I told him, chico, I 
wouldn’t call someone a latifundista who has lived 28 years in Las Yaguas, fighting in the 
conditions that we fought.”915 García further claims that he sought out an architect from the 
government to try and convince him to construct the new homes on the old site of Las Yaguas, 
something that was apparently impossible due to its uneven terrain.916 A more significant dispute 
arose around wages for the constructions. While publicity for the Self-Help program insisted that 
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the construction of neighborhoods was voluntary, some workers thought otherwise. When they 
complained about the lack of wages, “the Social Welfare office went to the different ministries 
and collected a sum of money to pay us”—though the Ministry did not count these as wages.917 
Some Las Yaguas residents considered the homes benefits they had earned, whether they worked 
or not. Many residents never made required payments for their homes.918 
 Construction on the first of seven new subdivisions for Las Yaguas residents began in 
1960, but relocations did not begin until some of the projects were completed in 1962.919 While 
the Vista Alegre project in Santiago moved all residents together, subsequent projects were split 
into groups of no more than 150 units.920 The new subdivisions replacing Las Yaguas were 
scattered about distant corners of the city, with several in Marianao, others in Guanabacoa, and 
others in southern Havana.921 Officials credited residents with hours of labor on the projects, 
which counted towards the payments they would owe on new homes, and residents happily 
remember Ernesto “Che” Guevara joining the brigades to work on one of the sites.922 By early 
1963, two subdivisions had been completed and 411 families remained in the neighborhood. The 
final five subidvisions were finished during the early months of that year.923  
Residents greeted the moves with anxiety and excitement. “People didn’t sleep at all that 
night,” remembered Manuela.924 “The first days I was so disoriented in a concrete house,” 
remembered Amparo, “but from a house of palm branches to a house of cement in a residential 
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neighborhood, it’s like day and night, right?925  Reflecting on the move in 1969, García voiced 
enthusiasm for the homes, but he also regretted the loss of community and a lack of appreciation 
for how hard the neighborhood had worked for their new homes. “The outlook we had [in Las 
Yaguas] has been broken. I mean really broken,” he said, highlighting the paradoxical way that 
fires had brought neighbors together in the past. “There’s more independence and no worry since 
‘my house won’t burn because it’s cement,’” he claimed. “Differences have arisen.… There are a 
lot of people who ... want to say ‘I don’t remember anything from Las Yaguas.’... Me, come on, 
I'm satisfied, I'm happy ... when people think back on those conditions, because they'll have more 
responsibility. Today they'll know how to show more respect.”926 
With relocations underway across the island, government officials publicly celebrated 
shantytown clearances, but expressed ambivalence of their own. With new urban reforms, the 
types of urban property disputes that had fueled shantytown activism diminished. As private 
investment in housing dried up, the program was expensive, too.927 By August 1961, the 
government abolished the Ministry of Social Welfare, ending the Self-Help program in the 
process.928 “The accelerated evolution of the country produced … a revision of the solutions to 
the problem of shantytowns [barrios insalubres],” explained an official report in 1963.929 The 
report claimed several reasons for the shift, including slow construction, high absenteeism given 
other employment opportunities, and low productivity from non-specialized workers, leading to 
a system “inadequate” for the industrialized system Cuba was developing.930 The report also 
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stated that the program was isolating shantytown residents from the rest of society, while, “the 
growth of revolutionary organizations at the level of neighborhood blocks has made it possible to 
do great work with families coming from slums [tugurios].… Difficulties resulting from the low 
educational and economic level of their previous environment disappeared quickly.”931 By the 
time Las Yaguas contested lands were emptied, publicity surrounding slum clearance had 
already run its course.932 Deficient housing continued to present major difficulties in Havana, but 
for the time being, as residents prepared to occupy new homes, national political debate around 
shantytowns was over. 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
The Revolutionary Government’s clearance of Las Yaguas was produced by over a decade of 
engagement between neighborhood leaders and government social workers. The final, messy 
product, visible in seven new neighborhoods spread around the capital, bore the influence of both 
camps. On one hand, government officials proposed to settle urban property disputes by 
facilitating shantytown relocation and offering benefits in exchange. On the other hand, residents 
resisted relocation by publicly highlighting their rights as citizens and demanding benefits higher 
than officials were prepared to give. Over time, this engagement led to better offers from the 
government, as it depoliticized local conflicts through non-confrontational interventions. Yet the 
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internal cohesion of Las Yaguas allowed the neighborhood to resist all the same, until a new 
government met long-awaited demands for housing.  
The Self-Help program was therefore a success, but mostly according to republican 
standards—something revolutionary officials recognized by abandoning it so quickly. Batista’s 
CNV had succeeded, not by constructing homes, but by promoting individual solutions, 
depoliticizing neighborhood relocation and establishing procedures to resolve urban property 
conflicts. In providing housing, the Revolution’s program succeeded in a similar fashion, 
overcoming entrenched local resistance to remove neighborhoods whose activism in property 
disputes had proven politically damaging to the government. As a program that alleviated 
deficient housing or urban poverty broadly defined, however, its impact was limited. And as 
property disputes faded, political pressure for slum clearance waned as well.  
As much as it was about housing, then, the Self Help Program was also about politics. 
Since the 1930s, Las Yaguas residents had transformed a relatively small property dispute into a 
national flashpoint for critics of the state. They had leveraged this visibility into an enduring 
place in the capital, contesting relocation by pointing to the inability of governing officials to 
provide anything meaningful in return. In providing new, modern houses, the Revolutionary 
Government had risen to the challenge. In the process, however, officials transformed the 
clearance of Las Yaguas into a testament to their vision of citizenship, which was narrower than 
the one articulated by some residents. Their program drew heavily from international currents of 
social science, which defined the political mobilization of shantytowns as an affront to national 
development and as evidence of the culture of poverty. As neighborhood activists navigated 
changing circumstances to procure housing from the state, they therefore reinforced an official 
  246 
narrative that denied the validity of their own demands. By engaging with the state, Las Yaguas 
residents were defined as beneficiaries, not heroes, of the Revolution.  
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7.0  EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
Just a short bus ride from Old Havana, the neighborhood of La Hata was built along hills and 
winding streets. In 2014, self-built “llega y pon” construction was evident nearby, but the central 
area had improved since the 1950s. Its houses were sturdy and eclectic, some wood, others 
concrete. Large, multi-story houses were scattered throughout. One of these belonged to Enrique 
Hernández Armenteros. A 94 year-old community leader and babalawo (Santeria priest), 
Enrique’s house was among the neighborhood’s best-known destinations.933  
 Featured in a 2004 biography, Enrique’s story was a product of mid-century patterns of 
Havana housing. Raised in the province of Santa Clara, he moved to Havana in the late 1940s, 
where he made shoes in the central city near the malecón (sea wall). In 1950, after wandering 
through Guanabacoa, “he had a premonition: ‘I will settle on this land.’”934 At the time, La Hata 
was still a neighborhood of shacks, but one where poor people had won formal rights to live.935 
Three years after the government finalized expropriation payments to its owner, John Stowers, 
Enrique and his wife moved there, and he gathered wood from shipping crates to build his house. 
A direct descendant of Congo slaves, Enrique was deeply religious, and his new home included a 
“a comfortable altar to St. Lazarus, his patron saint.”936 Enrique became a religious leader, and 
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eventually one of the most prominent babalawos in the capital. Over the years, his house 
improved through his own work.  
 Even as residents made good use of the opportunities available to them, however, life in 
poor Havana neighborhoods like La Hata was beset with challenges. Teacher Carmela Martínez 
Echevarria, whose legendary efforts to educate Havana’s popular classes were featured in the 
2014 feature film Conducta, began her career teaching in La Hata in the 1960s.937 At first the 
families made fun of her, she said, and she recalls winning them over gradually as she worked 
with parents to gather materials to build extra classrooms for the school.938 Film director Sara 
Gómez explored similar frictions between teachers and students in the new Las Yagaus 
subdivisions in her 1974 film De cierta manera. The film depicts fictional teacher Yolanda, 
white and of a wealthy family, seeking ways to relate to difficult students whose families had 
been scarred by poverty in Las Yaguas.939 Inclusion was stated as a central goal of the 
revolutionary government but social divisions were deep. 
In some respects, then, the problems of Las Yaguas’ former residents and the problems of 
La Hata resembled each other in the decades following 1959. Residents of both neighborhoods 
now occupied their homes legally yet still faced ongoing social marginality. The similarities are 
unsurprising, given the neighborhoods’ shared origins. Both grew large during the 1930s, as poor 
men and women claimed land in the capital when employment was scarce and evictions were 
rampant. When government officials tried to relocate poor migrants, residents insisted on their 
rights to stay, and they used political connections and agrarian legislation for leverage. During 
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the 1940s, they joined shantytown residents across Greater Havana to claim that their lands 
belonged to the Cuban state. As citizens, they insisted, they could live on them. 
Yet in the years between La Hata’s expropriation in 1947 and Las Yaguas’ eradication in 
1963, the stories of these neighborhoods diverged, and this dissertation has sought to explain this 
process. The residents of La Hata realized the radical potential of the legal system by pressuring 
the government to expropriate lands from a US titleholder. In the aftermath it faded into relative 
obscurity. By contrast, the occupation of Las Yaguas was never formalized, and the area became 
a national icon of urban poverty whose future was debated by the capital’s poor and elite alike.  
The fame of Las Yaguas was due to the actions of both its residents and land titleholders. 
To resist eviction, neighborhood leaders built connections to the radical labor movement, the 
Catholic Church, university students, and local and national politicians. They publicized their 
claims. The neighborhood’s elite titleholders responded with legislation and with their own 
political pressures. Given the government’s reluctance to permit eviction, Cosme de la Torriente 
pressed officials to acknowledge the state’s own obligation to relocate residents in 1939. The 
government agreed, claiming to have the residents’ wellbeing in mind. The effect was to shift the 
debate over relocation from one of property rights to one of social welfare. Replacing 
titleholders, the Cuban state became a key protagonist. Leaders in Las Yaguas accepted this 
debate creatively. If they were to be relocated, they replied, it would be in accordance with their 
rights as citizens. And since jobs and housing were not available in the capital, the state would 
have to provide them. During the 1940s, their activism brought relocation efforts to a halt amid 
wide publicity.  
In highlighting the state’s failure to provide adequate housing, residents of Las Yaguas 
spoke to difficulties that affected the entire capital. As urban tenants seized on rent control 
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policies to combat price hikes from landlords, housing stock in the central city deteriorated. 
Government initiatives to improve housing elsewhere via the mortgage market increased 
inequality and provided financial backing to developers, as public housing remained scarce. 
Many agreed that the lack of affordable housing in the capital required better government 
planning—and in a well planned capital, many insisted, Las Yaguas should not exist. By 
publicizing their resistance on the basis of housing demands, residents of Las Yaguas 
transformed their neighborhood into an emblem of state failure in a city of fierce housing 
debates. The neighborhood’s relocation became a political necessity. 
Under pressure, officials deployed new solutions based on international currents of social 
science and urban planning. They developed centralized slum-clearance initiatives during the 
1950s, using social workers to depoliticize shantytown resistance and relocate residents. 
Neighborhood leaders engaged with these social workers, securing increasingly generous 
compensation in exchange for relocation. In the case of Las Yaguas this compensation took the 
forms of new homes, funded by the revolutionary government in the early 1960s. In securing 
rights to the city, then, the residents of Las Yaguas contested formal legal, social, and political 
structures—but they also reinforced those structures’ basic premises. They made demands by 
reinterpreting the government’s own rhetoric in accordance with their own needs, which allowed 
them to secure benefits far beyond many poor people in the capital. It also left existing 
conclusions about social marginality in place, effectively devaluing the neighborhood’s political 
history. Still, as Las Yaguas joined La Hata in the uneven social geography of Greater Havana, 
residents of both neighborhoods proudly made the Revolution their own.  
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Figure 9: A resident of Los Quemados in 1960: “I did the agrarian reform here, and the lands weren’t mine…”940 
7.1 SOCIALISM 
In the years following the 1963 eradication of Las Yaguas, attention to shantytowns diminished. 
Debate among housing officials resumed periodically, but without the same urgency as during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Government leaders “largely ignored” shantytowns, write Mario 
Coyula and Jill Hamberg, “in the belief that a rapid rate of new construction would make it 
possible to relocate their residents.”941  
                                                 
940 Vicente Rodríguez, “Los Quemados: Un tugurio más que la revolución echa abajo,” INRA 1, no. 7 (1960), 7. 
941 Hamberg and Coyula, “The Case of Havana, Cuba,” 10. 
  252 
As the age of slum-clearance was ending in Cuba, however, it gained momentum 
elsewhere—partly in response to the Cuban Revolution. In 1962, poor residents in central 
Caracas rioted in Fidel Castro’s name after renaming their neighborhood “Sierra Maestra” to 
celebrate the Revolution. Meanwhile officials from Rio de Janeiro to Santiago, Chile, cooperated 
with the US-backed Alliance for Progress initiatives, seeking to alleviate conditions associated 
with urban poverty and prevent Cuban-style revolution from spreading.942 In Rio de Janeiro, the 
“land wars” that had centered relocation debates on the Brazilian legal system now shifted to the 
political system, as they had during the previous decades in Cuba. The municipal government 
took responsibility for slum clearance, evicting 31,000 people from shantytowns in 1961. 
Following the 1964 military coup, the federal government launched a large slum clearance 
initiative in the city, removing over 100,000 poor people from informally occupied land.943 
Funded by the US Agency for International Development, this initiative was partially motivated 
by fear of the Cuban Revolution. It also resembled Cuban initiatives, both before and after 1959.  
In the meantime, many shantytowns remained in Havana, untouched. “The largest 
shantytowns were indeed eliminated,” writes Hamberg, “but contrary to some assertions…most 
smaller ones continued to exist and even grow.”944 By 1987, an estimated three percent of the 
capital lived in shantytown housing. Infrastructure improved slowly in many neighborhoods, and 
rights to occupy the land were generally assured.945 Even so, Alejandro de la Fuente references a 
1987 study to show that prejudices against such neighborhoods remained significant. Police 
categorized several shantytowns as centers of crime, despite having crime rates similar to the rest 
                                                 
942 Velasco, Barrio Rising, 87-88; Fischer, “A Century in the Present Tense,” 29; Murphy, “In and Out of the Margins,” 73.  
943 Fischer, A Poverty of Rights, 78-80, 297-99. 
944 Hamberg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy,” 82. 
945 Hamberg and Coyula, “The Case of Havana, Cuba,” 9-11. 
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of the city. Shantytowns remained heavily populated by Afrodescendants.946 Despite the 
continued presence of shantytowns in Havana, however, new informal settlements were 
relatively limited compared to other Latin American capitals, largely because of the city’s slow 
population growth. By focusing on regional development, state authorities successfully reduced 
growth in the capital. While Havana had a population similar to Santiago, Chile and Bogotá in 
1960, by 2015 Santiago’s population was nearly three times as large as Havana’s. Bogotá 
contained nearly four times as many people.947  
 
7.2 THE SPECIAL PERIOD AND BEYOND 
During the economic crisis of the 1990s, state control over Havana’s growth weakened, and 
national debates over shantytowns reappeared. Prompted by the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and heightened trade restrictions from the US, Cubans faced severe hardships. In 
response, leaders announced a “Special Period,” legalizing US dollars and launching other 
reforms. By 1997, the concentration of dollars in the capital led to internal migration more than 
500,000 people, along with growth in informal settlements unrivaled since the 1950s.948 With the 
urban infrastructure strained, the government prohibited these new arrivals. In spite of their 
illegality, however, many found the means to stay.949 New migrants were often referred to as 
“palestinos,” (Palestinians), a pejorative term that played on their status as a people without 
                                                 
946 De la Fuente, A Nation for All, 313. 
947 Violich, Urban Planning for Latin America, 214, 263; CIA, The World Factbook; Hamberg and Coyula, “The Case of 
Havana, Cuba,” 4. 
948 Rodríguez, Los marginales, 91-94; de la Fuente, A Nation for All, 328-29. 
949 De la Fuente, A Nation for All, 328; Hamberg and Coyula, “The Case of Havana, Cuba,” 11. 
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land.950 Their settlement in the capital breathed new life into old discussions of race, crime, 
marginality, and spatial inequality. Recent works like the 2011 feature film Habanastation or 
Silvio Rodríguez’s Canción del barrio (2014) demonstrate that urban poverty in Havana cannot 
be ignored. Capturing significant audiences, these works have sought to make urban poverty and 
informality issues for national debate once again.951  
The terms of this debate are, in some ways, similar to those analyzed in this dissertation. 
In 1931, for example, the government articulated a basic framework for dealing with urban 
poverty: illegal land occupations were to be prohibited, so long as the state could meet its 
obligations to address urban poverty in other ways. In a new millennium, migrants to the capital 
have justified their presence in similar terms, by pointing out that because of the crisis their 
economic necessities are not met in the provinces. This justification has deep resonance in Cuban 
society, and in many cases the state has permitted residents to stay.952  
As these debates continue, then, it is worth considering “palestinos” alongside the 
historical connotations of “indigence” and “barrios de indigentes,” both before and after 1959. 
Currently, the state faces pressure to either legalize or prohibit new settlements in the capital. 
There is precedent for each type of action in the respective cases of La Hata and Las Yaguas. In 
both cases, state solutions have had merits, but in other ways both have fallen short. This 
dissertation has critically analyzed policies towards the urban poor from a number of angles, 
highlighting the respective dangers of paternalism, private investment, and neglect. In spite of its 
critical lens, my motivation has not been to argue against new forms of action from the Cuban 
state. Instead, my goal has been to place the political history of the urban poor into conversation 
                                                 
950 Rodríguez, Los marginales, 108.  
951 Ramírez, Canción del barrio; Padrón, Habanastation. 
952 Rodríguez, Los marginales, 109-10. 
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with such actions, in the hope that local politics are considered in future plans for Havana. In the 
Revolution of 1959, shantytown leaders found a powerful vehicle to express collective demands 
on a national stage. However, the same Revolution contained policies designed to silence such 
demands. More than 50 years later, the Cuban government remains uniquely situated to address 
urban poverty in its capital city—but it also faces unique pressures to make poverty invisible. My 
hope is to offer historical context for an open discussion among policy makers and stakeholders, 
including the urban poor, concerning the role of the state in impoverished urban settlements in 
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